31 sierpnia 2021 r. irański prezydent Ebrahim Raisi wysłał list do sekretarza generalnego Hezbollahu, Hassana Nasrallaha, dziękując mu za gratulacje z okazji wyboru Raisiego na prezydenta i chwaląc Hezbollah i jego działalność, która, jak napisał, „nie ogranicza się dłużej do Libanu i Palestyny”. W liście Raisi porównał Hezbollah do drzewa wydającego owoce – młodych wojowników dżihadu i “krew męczenników oporu” – i nazwał Hezbollah “nadzieją całego islamskiego narodu” oraz regionalną siłą, której wpływ jest taki, że „żaden czynnik polityczny, wojskowy lub odpowiedzialny za bezpieczeństwo w regionie lub na świecie nie może go ignorować”. Dodał, że Hezbollah „może stanowić unikatowy model polityczny, działający zgodnie z religijnymi zasadami i dyrektywami najwyższego przywódcy Iranu, Alego Chameneiego”[1].
Ten list wywołał reakcję Charlesa Dżabboura, szefa departamentu mediów i komunikacji partii Samira Geagei, Siły Libańskie, znanego z opozycji wobec Hezbollahu. W artykule opublikowanym w libańskiej gazecie “Al-Jumhouriyya”, która identyfikuje się z tą partią, napisał, że list Raisiego dowodzi raz jeszcze, że Hezbollah otrzymuje rozkazy od najwyższego przywódcy Iranu, stanowi integralną część islamskiej rewolucji Iranu i działa na rzecz celów Iranu, z których jednym jest zamiana Libanu z świeckiego państwa w państwo religijne. Dżabbour podkreślił, że jest to sprzeczne z konstytucją Libanu, która definiuje Liban jako pluralistyczne państwo świeckie. Dlatego, powiedział, nie ma żadnego sposobu na koegzystencję z Hezbollahem i utrzymanie stabilność w kraju w jego obecności. Według Dżabboura, list Raisiego opisuje Hezbollah jako narzędzie do ustanowienia islamskiego narodu i wystąpienia przeciwko Izraelowi. To, powiedział, zadaje kłam twierdzeniu, jakie Hezbollah szerzył przez lata, a mianowicie, że walczy z Izraelem, by bronić suwerenności Libanu. Pokazuje to, że w rzeczywistości Hezbollah walczy z Izraelem jako część wielkiego irańskiego programu.
Należy zauważyć, że ten artykuł jest częścią rosnącej krytyki głoszonej wobec Hezbollahu przez jego przeciwników w Libanie, którzy uważają go za narzędzie irańskiego reżimu, naruszające suwerenność Libanu.
[Dalszy tekst – fragmenty artykułu Dżabboura – nie jest spolszczony]
The following are excerpts from Jabbour’s article:[2]
„The letter Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah received from Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in response to [the former’s] words of congratulation upon [that latter’s] election to the presidency is significant in many ways. Its importance lies in the fact that it underscores what is already known and presents the Iranian perception of Hizbullah, this time in statements by the Iranian president himself…
„What does [this] letter include?… First of all, [by stating that Hizbullah is the hope of the Islamic nation, the letter] clearly indicates that that the Islamic nation relies upon the Islamic resistance, i.e., upon Hizbullah, to realize the program of the Islamic nation… But this role contradicts the Lebanese constitution, as well as the pluralist character of the state and its historical role.
„Second, [Raisi’s statement] that 'in accordance with the political instructions of the Exalted Imam Khamenei, the Islamic resistance [Hizbullah] can constitute a unique political model operating according to the religious principles…’ indicates two things. First, that the Islamic resistance, i.e., Hizbullah, receives orders from Imam Khamenei, namely from outside Lebanon, which contravenes the [Lebanese] constitution, the role of the state and [Lebanon’s] sovereignty. Second, that Iran is interfering in Lebanon’s affairs and openly calling to establish a religious regime in [the country], when Lebanon is a civil state and any attempt to change its identity is [in fact] an attempt to perpetrate a coup…
„Furthermore, Raisi stresses [in his letter] that the Islamic resistance is not confined to a limited area [region, i.e., „Lebanon and Palestine,” as Raisi wrote in his letter], which means that he does not recognize states and their sovereignty. The phrase he used [in the letter, namely], 'the geographical [scope] of the Islamic resistance,’ has many meanings, the most prominent of which is that this resistance has a geographical [scope] of its own that does not recognize the existing geographical [national boundaries]. This is part of its ambition of [establishing] the Islamic nation… In other words, the role of the resistance is determined by Tehran. This is known, of course, but the public declaration [of this fact] is important, and has further significance, as follows:
„1. The decision that Hizbullah has a central role in the ambition of establishing the Islamic nation originated in Tehran.
„2. Hizbullah’s main role contravenes the Lebanese constitution and the existence of Lebanon as a fait accompli.
„3. Hizbullah is an integral part of the Iranian program and revolution. Its source of authority is in Tehran and that is where its decisions are made.
„4. Hizbullah’s decisions on Lebanese affairs are made by [Hizbullah] itself, whereas the decisions regarding the Islamic nation and [Hizbullah’s] role in spreading the [Iranian] revolution are made exclusively by Tehran.
„5. Hizbullah draws a distinction between its temporary role in the domestic Lebanese arena and its strategic role of Islamizing Lebanon.
„6. Hizbullah’s inner beliefs and orientations are Islamic and contravene the civil character of the Lebanese state and the existence of Lebanon as a fait accompli.
„Also conspicuous is the way the Iranian president addresses Hizbullah’s secretary-general, [namely, as] 'my dear brother, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin[3] Sayyid[4] Hassan Nasrallah’… This indicates Nasrallah’s important place in the chain of command of the Iranian revolution…
„Raisi ascribes no importance at all to Lebanon. He sees it merely as Hizbullah’s sphere of influence, not as an independent entity, and focuses exclusively on Hizbullah’s role as one of the fruits of the Iranian revolution. [This is evident from the fact that] he wrote in his letter that 'the role of the Islamic resistance, namely Hizbullah, in ensuring security [and] confronting the state-terror (of Israel) and the takfiri terror [i.e., of extremist Islamic organizations that accuse fellow Muslims of heresy] has turned this revolutionary jihad-fighting current into an influential element in the regional equations, so much so that no political, military or security element, including even global powers, can ignore it’…
„In light of all the above and in light of Raisi’s letter to Nasrallah, the question is this: How can a state be built and how can coexistence and stability be maintained in the presence of a political group [i.e., Hizbullah] that believes in a religious [Shi’ite Iranian] program that fundamentally contravenes the Lebanese program and forms an integral part of the Iranian revolution…
„Raisi’s statements refute the narrative Hizbullah tried to market after the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon [in 2005, namely] that its role is limited to resisting Israel and establishing a balance of terror vis-à-vis [this country] so as to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty – when [the fact is that] its confrontation with Israel is part of the Iranian program. In order to ease the Lebanese pressure on it, Hizbullah had no choice but to make the excuse that its weapons are meant to deter Tel Aviv, which cannot be deterred with the ordinary weapons [of the Lebanese army, especially] since the U.S. refuses to arm Lebanon…
„Now that the Iranian president has once again highlighted what was already known – Hizbullah’s Iranian identity and its religious program – we can once again ask the questions: Is it possible to reach understandings with a party that does not believe in Lebanon, which promotes a program that is larger than Lebanon and which seeks to change the character of the Lebanese regime from a civil rule into a religious one — especially considering that [Hizbullah’s] weapons are an organic part of [Iran’s] revolutionary and ideological program? The answer is unequivocal: there is no way to reach any understandings with Hizbullah. The upshot is that the conflict will go on and on, and each phase will look different [from the last], until Hizbullah manages to change Lebanon’s character and role and turn it into an Islamic state. Alternatively, perhaps the domestic or foreign opposition to [Hizbullah’s] program… will compel it to turn back and accept Lebanon’s historical role, its neutral identity, its sovereignty, its very existence as a fait accompli and the fact that the state is an arena shared by all Lebanese.”
[1] Alahednews.com.lb, September 1, 2021.
[2] Al-Jumhouriyya (Lebanon), September 3, 2021.
[3] Title of a senior Islamic jurisprudent.
[4] Title denoting people accepted as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.
