Wprowadzenie
Wygląda na to, że irański najwyższy przywódca Ali Chamenei i irańskie kierownictwo zmierzają w kierunku taktycznego dialogu z Zachodem, którego celem jest osiągnięcie strategicznych celów reżimu. Cele te obejmują: a) poprawę gospodarki Iranu poprzez zniesienie zachodnich sankcji i promowanie masowych inwestycji w gospodarkę irańską; b) podniesienie statusu Iranu (do państwa posiadającego broń jądrową); oraz c) uzyskanie międzynarodowego uznania dla osi oporu Iranu (patrz MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1848, In Advance Of Revival Of US-Iran Nuclear Talks, Iranian Calls For Iran To Possess Nuclear Weapons Are Again Heard, 5 września 2024).
W tym celu Chamenei wydaje się powracać do taktycznego formatu politycznej elastyczności w odniesieniu do relacji Iranu ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi – „Wielkim Szatanem”. Chamenei nazwał to „heroiczną elastycznością”. To było jego motto i powód jego zasadniczego poparcia dla negocjacji nuklearnych Iranu z USA dziesięć lat temu w sprawie umowy nuklearnej JCPOA z 2015 r. Celem tej elastyczności jest osiągnięcie celów politycznych i gospodarczych, których reżim potrzebuje i które tylko USA mogą zapewnić – szczególnie jeśli USA wciągną w to również Europę.
Tak więc „Wielki Szatan” jest, jak na ironię, jedynym, który jest w stanie umożliwić reżimowi irańskiemu osiągnięcie długoterminowych celów poprzez negocjacje i dyplomację, bez konieczności wyrzeczenia się przez Iran ideologicznej wrogości wobec USA lub wycofania się z któregokolwiek ze swoich stanowisk. Tak więc Iran w rzeczywistości przetwarza, w ulepszonej i bardziej wyrafinowanej formie, podejście, którego użył do osiągnięcia politycznych i militarnych korzyści ucieleśnionych w JCPOA. To osiągnięcie rozpoczęło się od odręcznego uznania przez ówczesnego prezydenta USA Baracka Obamę w 2011 r. prawa Iranu do wzbogacania uranu na jego terytorium, dwa lata przed rozpoczęciem publicznych negocjacji w sprawie JCPOA (patrz Specjalny komunikat MEMRI nr 6131, Wysocy rangą urzędnicy Iranu ujawniają poufne szczegóły z negocjacji nuklearnych: Już w 2011 r. otrzymaliśmy list od administracji USA uznający prawo Iranu do wzbogacania uranu, 10 sierpnia 2015 r., oraz Specjalny komunikat nr 6134, Irański wiceprezydent i szef atomistyki Salehi ujawnia szczegóły z tajnych rozmów nuklearnych USA i Iranu: Chamenei uzależnił bezpośrednie rozmowy od osiągnięcia natychmiastowych rezultatów; USA przekazały uznanie praw Iranu do wzbogacania uranu sułtanowi Omanu, który przekazał tę wiadomość ówczesnemu prezydentowi Ahmadineżadowi, 16 sierpnia 2015 r.)
Obecnie, gdy zbliża się termin wygaśnięcia oficjalnych ram porozumienia JCPOA w październiku 2025 r. (którego warunków Iran nie spełnia od 2019 r., czyli rok po tym, jak prezydent Trump ogłosił wycofanie się z niego przez USA), a także w obliczu wyborów prezydenckich w USA w 2024 r., najwyższy przywódca Ali Chamenei przygotowuje się do osiągnięcia kolejnego zarysu porozumienia z USA, które wzmocni pozycję nuklearną, gospodarczą, a także regionalną i militarną Iranu w obliczu skomplikowanych międzynarodowych wydarzeń związanych z wojnami na Ukrainie i w Strefie Gazy.
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Iranian Preparations For A Renewal of Iran-U.S. Talks
As noted, Khamenei is now preparing the ground for a calculated process of negotiations with the West in several arenas.
Vis-à-vis the West, he is attempting to change Iran’s image by presenting it as holding „democratic elections,” by allowing more apparently moderate candidates to join the presidential and governmental staff, and by appointing a team of very experienced negotiators. Among the members of this team are former foreign minister and head of the previous negotiations team Mohammad Javad Zarif, who now holds a newly created presidential staff position, Vice President for Strategic Affairs. In this post, he is senior to the new Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, who previously was Zarif’s deputy in the earlier negotiating team.
Khamenei has also issued religious approval – twice – for negotiating with the U.S. (see below).
Even the outcome of the recent Iranian presidential election, that was forced on the regime following the death of the ideological and hawkish president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May, can be understood as advance preparations for new talks with the U.S.: Raisi’s death gave Khamenei an opportunity to engineer the installation of president Masoud Pezeshkian, billed as a „reformist” and calling for dialogue with the West. However, Pezeshkian never previously identified as a reformist. Notably, he had also been disqualified from running in the Majlis elections in March 2024.[1]
Indeed, Khamenei recently, on August 14 and again on September 8, issued permission for negotiating with the U.S., citing a Quranic verse. He said: „According to the Quranic interpretation, a non-tactical retreat, in any area, whether in the military field or in the political, propaganda and economic spheres, leads to the wrath of God.”[2]
Khamenei explained that his mid-August granting of permission to hold talks with the enemy was a tactical retreat – i.e. willingness to negotiate with an enemy, the Great Satan, who holds the keys to Iran’s achieving its goals, which include Iran’s establishing of itself as a superpower – without any compromise on Iran’s strategic principles. Khamenei’s statement of permission also reflects his deep-seated hostility towards the West and the path he intends to take to overcome the enemy’s superiority despite Iran’s actual weakness.
He said: „… I would like to emphasize one point: One of the cornerstones of the psychological warfare being waged by the enemies of any nation, and particularly against our nation in Islamic Iran, is the glorification of the enemies of that nation. Since the [1979 Islamic] Revolution, there has been a perpetual attempt to broadcast to our nation fear of the superpowers such as America, the Zionists, and Britain. However, our great Imam [Islamic regime founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini] successfully uprooted this fear from the hearts of the nation, and gave it a sense of self-confidence and an ability to deal with its enemies.
When the psychological warfare attack of the enemy enters the military battlefield, the outcome is fear and retreat. The Holy Quran says that such retreat sparks God’s wrath. It says: ‘And whoever does so on such an occasion [of battle] —unless it is a maneuver or to join their own troops—will earn the wrath of Allah [Quran 8:16].’ If when you face an enemy that is attacking you – whether he is using a sword or carrying out a media, economic, or military attack with new tools – you retreat in a fashion that is not tactical (of course, sometimes retreating is a tactic just like advancing, and there is nothing wrong with that), then unless this is part of a strategy, then you will be subject to God’s wrath. This is how it is on the military battlefield, and it’s exactly like that on the political field, it sparks God’s wrath.
„In the political field also, intensifying the [image of] the enemy’s strength makes you feel isolated, weak, and unable to cope. As a result, you surrender to the enemy’s demands. They tell you to do something, and you answer 'yes.’ They tell you not to do something – you again answer 'yes.’ Today, many governments, large and small, operate like this. They do whatever they are told, with no will of their own. Of course, at the diplomatic table, and in diplomatic negotiations, there are rules of etiquette and conduct, but in practice the response is ‘yes’ in whatever form. If these governments relied on their own people and their domestic capabilities, and recognized the reality of this enemy – which is not as strong as it tries to look – they could say 'no.’ But they don’t; they keep saying 'yes.’ This is what is happening in the political field…”[3]
Another sign of a tactical shift in Iran came a few days after Khamenei issued his permission to conduct talks with the enemy, when Foreign Minister Araghchi announced, in an August 24 interview with Shabakiyeh Khabar TV, that there is a need for „new negotiations” for a different arrangement with the West. He said:
„…The agreement, in its [current] format, is not a simple process. As is known, when you [re]open such a document, it is not easy to put it back together… We must approach this issue from a different viewpoint. The previous negotiations and agreement can serve as a point of reference, but they cannot be executed as they are. There is a need for new negotiations. Of course, as I said, the situation in Europe is difficult [and] in America, they are dealing with elections, and therefore this will not be an easy task, but we will make all possible efforts. We see this as a mission and an obligation to ease the burden of the sanctions on the [Iranian] public and to get them lifted. We will prioritize this subject and will use all the country’s scientific, political, and judicial skills in this area, and we hope we will be able to make a positive step in this direction…”[4]
At the first meeting of the new government, on August 27, 2024, which was headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved the mandate to conduct talks with the American administration, saying: „We should not pin our hopes on the enemy and wait for him… This reality is manifested also in the words of President [Pezeshkian] and in the announcements by Foreign Minister [Araghchi] a few days ago. Of course, this does not contradict the fact that in certain cases it is possible to cooperate with the enemy – but the thing is that we must not rely on him or trust him…”[5]
Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the 10th Majlis, discussed Iran’s political situation and interests vis-à-vis Russia and the U.S., and said on August 7, 2024 that the U.S. „thirsts for secret diplomacy with the Pezeshkian government, because this is the only way to prevent a war that will harm Western interests in Ukraine.”[6] On September 4, he tweeted: „…Putin understands that even if Iran’s policy of reliance on the East fails, the central message of [Iran’s] recent elections is the desire to reduce tensions with the West and end its reliance on the East.”[7]
It appears that contacts between Iran and the Biden administration have been underway in secret for some time, via liaison states who operated in the service of Iran in the past, such as Qatar and Oman. In this framework, the sides are working according to understandings arrived at, inter alia, against the backdrop of the continuation of the war in Gaza and Israel’s war with Iran and its proxies in the region. It can be assumed that an understanding has been reached behind the scenes regarding Hizbullah’s response to Israel’s killing of its senior commander, Fuad Shukr, that in itself was a response to Hizbullah’s murder of 12 children in the village of Majd Al-Shams in northern Israel. The responses seems to have been coordinated between Hizbullah and Israel, and, on the higher level, Iran and the U.S. – this can be deduced from the series of Lebanon and Israel visits by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein on August 13 and 14, some 10 days before the response attacks, and also from the fact that both sides reported massive strikes, but without any verification on the ground of attacks of such magnitude. These understandings appear to have been an initial basis for arriving at a broader regional arrangement, in the framework of which a public channel for Iran-U.S. talks on the above topics would be opened.[8]
On Iran’s domestic front, also there is an attempt to signal that the political system is moderating its positions towards its enemies. For example, legislation to further tighten the already harsh hijab enforcement on women in public spaces has been delayed for months – even though it is already being implemented, with women and girls enduring violent treatment at the hands of the regime (see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1786, The Iranian Regime Continues To Violently Enforce The Hijab On Women – Despite The Public’s Protests, September 6, 2024).
Moreover, Khamenei associate Ali Reza Panahian’s criticism of Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the regime mouthpiece Kayhan who is close to Khamenei and known for his hawkish views, can be interpreted as a calculated move by Khamenei striving for balance in light of harsh regime measures against reformists and human rights activists critical of the regime. Panahian, who is Khamenei’s representative in the universities as well as deputy head of the Ammar Strategic Advisory Base, the body that advances the revolutionary ideology of the Rule of the Jurisprudent within Iran and that advises the Supreme Leader, recently criticized Shariatmadari in a speech attended by Majlis speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. In his speech, Panahian called for legislation prohibiting state-funded media from fomenting polarization in society, pointing specifically at Kayhan. He argued that cultivating division among the political camps in the country was an „abomination” and worse than spreading lies, and called for closing down newspapers that contribute to divisive discourse. It appears that his statements had Khamenei’s approval and that they were aimed at signaling that extremist ideological speakers in the political arena should tone down their criticism of reformists.[9]
To view Panahian’s statements on MEMRI TV, click here or below:
An additional sign of the Iranian regime’s openness to flexibility with regard to Europe and the U.S. is its willingness to accept Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regulations and to advance legislation compatible with international standards for fighting global money laundering and terrorist financing. In this context, President Pezeshkian said: „If we can resolve the issue of the FATF and the nuclear agreement and the entire relationship with the world, there will be employment and investment in the country. Only if we can solve these problems will we be able to bring the country to the points of view laid out by the Leader [Khamenei].”[10]
Expediency Council member Gholam Reza Mesbahi Moghadam said that the council could revisit the FATF issue: „If the president [Pezeshkian] and his government see a need to raise this subject again, the ground is prepared legally to revisit the above issue… and if the [president’s] explanations are convincing, they will vote for the issue.”[11]
Palestinian Journalist Khaled Al-Jayousi: Where Is The Iranian Regime Headed?
Palestinian journalist Khaled Al-Jayousi wrote in an article published on September 2 by the online Arab daily Al-Rai Al-Yawm, which tends to be hawkishly anti-West and pro-resistance, in which he mused about where the new Iranian president was headed and about the extent to which he coordinated with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Below are the main points of his article:
„It appears that the statements by the new Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, in which he emphasized 'treating people politely,’ are establishing a new phase of openness that the new president seeks to base himself on. This is because how you treat people is not connected to the [U.S.] sanctions. This man wants, in his words, to solve the domestic disputes and the problems with the neighbors, and with the world. This is a policy that is pushing Iran towards peace and away from wars.
„Iran is not interested in further isolation and more sanctions. This gives rise to questions with regard to its policy in the framework of the resistance axis and to whether it will back down a little [from this activity] in the interest of 'connecting with the world’ in accordance with the words of the new president.
„In a conversation with him broadcast on Iranian television, the Iranian president stressed the importance of foreign investment and the relationship with the world, and pointed out that it is not possible to achieve 8% growth with [the continued] malfunctions in the electricity and sewage systems. It seems as if it is impossible to achieve growth in Iran without investment totaling $200 billion annually. To this end, there is a need for $100 billion in foreign investment, and it is clear that Pezeshkian has linked this [matter] to his country’s connection with the outside, with the world, with its neighbors, and with Iranians abroad.
„It seems that this Iranian policy is going towards openness to the outside, and it is not likely that it is a show of the president’s own personal policy without the blessing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This is because President Pezeshkian has explicitly announced the withdrawal of funds from the [national] development fund, following the approval of the Supreme Leader, without naming the sum. Pezeshkian said: 'We have asked the permission of the Leader of the Revolution to withdraw funds from the national development fund in order to settle debts that have not yet been paid off. We are acting in order to resolve the problems of the farmers, teachers, and [male] nurses, and [the matter of] the supply of medicines.’
„The Iranian president, in this conversation, reiterated his gratitude to Supreme Leader Khamenei, saying: 'Without the presence of the Leader of the Revolution, and his comprehensive vision, I could have been expelled.’ He also noted that he would consult with Supreme Leader [Khamenei] regarding his upcoming visit to New York and his participation in the UN General Assembly.
„The last time Iran recorded 8% economic growth was in 2016, a year after the adoption of the [JCPOA] nuclear agreement. This may mean that Iran seeks to return to the environment of agreements and negotiations, and to make some concessions for the good of the Iranian economy, since it seems that the policy of clashing [with the West] is not serving its economy, so far as can be seen from the new Iranian president’s statements. It is also possible that Iran is ignoring the World Bank’s negative predictions, since Iran’s gross domestic product [GDP] grew by 5% last year [2023], but this number could fall to 3.2% and then to 2.4% in 2026.
„In his first interview after taking office, the new Iranian president did not speak of Tehran’s expected response to Israel for daring to assassinate Hamas Political Bureau head Ismail Haniyeh. This raises questions as to the reasons for this: Does Iran seek to now focus on reducing the life of its economy, even though it has been a month since Haniyeh’s assassination? And, has Tehran completely backed down from [the issue of] vengeance?
„Iran seeks to resolve the problems of its domestic economic front – which explains Supreme Leader Khamenei’s declarations, stating: 'We are not pinning our hopes on the enemy, but this does not contradict the approach to the enemy in certain situations’ – and here the Leader permits the new government to negotiate with the West in order to obtain a lifting of the sanctions that are causing the economic sensitivity in the Iranian streets.
„It should be noted that Iran’s Supreme Leader has repeatedly warned that the U.S. cannot be trusted. This came against the backdrop of U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018.
„In light of this policy of openness, it seems that Iran aims to work simultaneously to continue its nuclear program – since a secret report by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency revealed that Iran has increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to a level [very close to that required to] manufacture nuclear weapons. According to the Associated Press, as of August 17 [2024], Iran has increased its stockpile of enriched uranium, and now has 146.7 kg uranium enriched to 60%.
„Iran, in any event, has the right to act in its own interests and to adopt a policy that serves its domestic front and a policy of reform and openness. [But] the most important question still remains: Why did Tehran adopt a harsher tone regarding a response to the Haniyeh assassination – to the point of causing apprehensions about regional war and bombing of Tel Aviv – and then downgrade [its tone] to a measured and considered response? And then, while waiting [to carry out its] response, [why did it] prominently highlight its policy of openness and its aspiration to obtain the lifting of the sanctions and to negotiate with the West, so as to hint that it was completely backing down from its [intent to] respond [to Israel]? Is this military deception – or [an attempt to gain] room for political maneuvering? Observers are wondering.”[12]
*Ayelet Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iran Media Studies Project.
[1] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1773, The Iranian Regime’s Presidential Election Scam: The Regime Appears To Be Tripling The Turnout Figures – Actual Turnout Is 14% , July 3, 2024.
[2] Tasnimnews.com, September 8, 2024.
[3] Farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=57489, August 14, 2024.
[4] Asr-e Iran, August 24, 2024.
[5] Farsi.khamenei.ir, August 27, 2024.
[6] Didbaniran.ir, August 7, 2024.
[7] X.com/drfalahatpishe, August 7, 2024.
[8] See for example the U.S. administration’s efforts to arrive at a diplomatic Israel-Hizbullah solution that would allow the launch of U.S.-Iran channels for dialogue: Israeli journalist Barak Ravid reported on September 4, 2024 that the U.S. and Israel had held a secret meeting to advance a diplomatic solution and prevent escalation in Lebanon. On September 3, the two countries had held a low-profile online meeting to discuss ways to stop the escalation in Lebanon and to reach a diplomatic solution that would prevent all-out war between Israel and Hizbullah, according to four senior Israeli and American officials. The American team at the meeting strove to „take the pulse of the Israeli side” and to coordinate policy vis-à-vis Lebanon, with a scenario of attaining a ceasefire in Gaza and with a scenario of no such agreement. Walla.co.il/item/3689060, September 4, 2024.
[9] It should be noted that Iran’s nuclearization project and its accomplishment of the JCPOA is a national enterprise approved by and closely monitored by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his backers. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1559, Iran Uses 'Maximum Pressure’ On Biden Administration – Part II: Supreme Leader Khamenei: 'If The Islamic Republic [Of Iran] Decided To Obtain Nuclear Weapons, Neither You [The Zionist Clown] Nor Those Greater Than You [The U.S.] Would Be Able To Stop It’, February 23, 2021.
[10] Kayhan (Iran), September 18, 2024.
[11] Mehrnews.com, September 17, 2024.
[12] Raialyoum.com, September 2, 2024.
