{"id":8815,"date":"2017-05-16T00:22:23","date_gmt":"2017-05-15T22:22:23","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/?p=8815"},"modified":"2017-05-16T00:56:50","modified_gmt":"2017-05-15T22:56:50","slug":"nota-podpisana-przez-assada-przekazuje-iranowi-dowodztwo-i-odpowiedzialnosc-finansowa-za-syryjskie-milicje","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/nota-podpisana-przez-assada-przekazuje-iranowi-dowodztwo-i-odpowiedzialnosc-finansowa-za-syryjskie-milicje\/8815","title":{"rendered":"Nota podpisana przez Assada przekazuje Iranowi dow\u00f3dztwo i odpowiedzialno\u015bc finansow\u0105 za syryjskie milicje \u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"

Przez ca\u0142y czas trwania wojny syryjskiej Iran odgrywa\u0142 centraln\u0105 rol\u0119 w zak\u0142adaniu milicji syryjskich, kt\u00f3re dzia\u0142aj\u0105 wraz z regularn\u0105 armi\u0105 re\u017cimu i rezerwami armii. Te milicje s\u0105 wzorowane na ira\u0144skiej Basid\u017c<\/a>[1]<\/strong><\/a>. Niedawno na Facebooku pojawi\u0142a si\u0119 nota, jakoby dowodz\u0105ca, \u017ce re\u017cim syryjski przekazuje Iranowi dow\u00f3dztwo i odpowiedzialno\u015b\u0107 finansow\u0105 za niekt\u00f3re z tych milicji , co odzwierciedla zakres kontroli ira\u0144skiej w Syrii. \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

Nota, kt\u00f3ra jest datowana na 11 kwietnia 2017 r. i nosi podpis prezydenta syryjskiego, Baszara Al-Assada w jego roli dow\u00f3dcy naczelnego syryjskich si\u0142 zbrojnych, aprobuje rekomendacje komisji odpowiedzialnej za regulacj\u0119 dzia\u0142a\u0144 syryjskich si\u0142 zbrojnych dzia\u0142aj\u0105cych\u00a0 w po\u0142\u0105czeniu z Iranem na terytorium syryjskim.<\/em><\/p>\n

Rekomendacje komisji obejmuj\u0105 wezwanie do organizowania blisko 90-tysi\u0119cznych syryjskich si\u0142 zbrojnych pracuj\u0105cych w po\u0142\u0105czeniu z Iranem pod parasolem zwanym Lokalne Brygady Obrony, by dzia\u0142a\u0142y w ca\u0142ej Syrii pod dow\u00f3dztwem i odpowiedzialno\u015bci\u0105 finansow\u0105 \u00a0Iranu \u201edo zako\u0144czenia kryzysu w Syrii lub do odwo\u0142ania\u201d. \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

W dodatku do zgody re\u017cimu syryjskiego na rosn\u0105ca kontrol\u0119 Iranu w Syrii, nota ujawnia tak\u017ce trudno\u015bci re\u017cimu syryjskiego w dowodzeniu i finansowaniu lokalnych milicji oraz wielki kryzys braku personelu w syryjskich si\u0142ach zbrojnych spowodowany wysokim odsetkiem dezercji, jak r\u00f3wnie\u017c szeroko rozprzestrzenion\u0105 niech\u0119ci\u0105 w\u015br\u00f3d poborowych i \u017co\u0142nierzy rezerwy do p\u00f3j\u015bcia na lini\u0119 frontu. Wed\u0142ug informacji w nocie, z 88 723 wojownik\u00f3w, kt\u00f3rzy s\u0105 z Lokalnych Brygadach Obrony, przekazanych w r\u0119ce ira\u0144skie, po\u0142owa uchyli\u0142a si\u0119 od s\u0142u\u017cby w armii: 14 783 uchyli\u0142o si\u0119 od obowi\u0105zkowej s\u0142u\u017cby wojskowej, 16 731 uchyla si\u0119 od s\u0142u\u017cby w rezerwie, a 8 003 to dezerterzy. Re\u017cim zrezygnowa\u0142 z pr\u00f3b zwerbowania tych ludzi do armii i zamiast tego pr\u00f3buje zwerbowa\u0107 ich do lokalnych milicji, gdzie obowi\u0105zki s\u0105 mniej rygorystyczne, poniewa\u017c wojownicy stacjonuj\u0105 blisko swoich dom\u00f3w. Druga po\u0142owa to wolontariusze, jak r\u00f3wnie\u017c osoby, kt\u00f3rych \u201estatus zosta\u0142 ustalony\u201d, to jest, kt\u00f3rzy otrzymali opcj\u0119 s\u0142u\u017cenia w milicji zamiast kary za odmow\u0119 s\u0142u\u017cenia w armii.<\/em><\/p>\n

2 maja 2017 r. zdj\u0119cie noty zamieszczono na stronie Facebooka Brygady Plemienia Mand\u017cab, Ra\u2019d Al-Mahdi, milicji syryjskiej za\u0142o\u017conej niedawno z pomoc\u0105 ira\u0144sk\u0105 i dzia\u0142aj\u0105cej w s\u0142u\u017cbie re\u017cimu syryjskiego. Tekst towarzysz\u0105cy zdj\u0119ciu noty pokazuje, \u017ce brygada przyj\u0119\u0142a z rado\u015bci\u0105 to posuni\u0119cie i uwa\u017ca je za popraw\u0119 swoich warunk\u00f3w. Ta strona Facebooka, jak r\u00f3wnie\u017c inne pro-re\u017cimowe syryjskie witryny informacyjne, opublikowa\u0142y zdj\u0119cie innego oficjalnego dokumentu syryjskiego, kt\u00f3ry wspomina t\u0119 not\u0119 i przeniesienie milicji syryjskiej pod odpowiedzialno\u015b\u0107 ira\u0144sk\u0105.<\/em><\/p>\n

Nale\u017cy wspomnie\u0107, \u017ce kilka dni po dacie noty, 1 maja 2017 r., syryjska delegacja wojskowa pod przewodnictwem syryjskiego szefa sztabu Alego 'Abdallah Ajjouba, odwiedzi\u0142a Iran i spotka\u0142a si\u0119 z ira\u0144skim ministrem obrony, Hosseinem Dehghanem i z zast\u0119pc\u0105 dow\u00f3dcy Korpusu Stra\u017cnik\u00f3w Rewolucji Islamskiej (IRGC) ds. koordynacji, D\u017camaluddinem Aberoumandem, by om\u00f3wi\u0107 wzrastaj\u0105ca kooperacj\u0119 militarn\u0105<\/a>[2]<\/strong><\/a>. <\/em><\/p>\n

Poni\u017cej podajemy g\u0142\u00f3wne punkty tych dw\u00f3ch oficjalnych dokument\u00f3w syryjskich [<\/em>ci\u0105g dalszy nie jest spolszczony<\/strong>]. <\/em><\/p>\n

As noted, on May 2, 2017, the Facebook page of the Manjab Tribe Brigade, Ra’d Al-Mahdi published a photo of the memo, which is which is marked „No. 1455” and addressed to „the Honorable Commander in Chief of the Army and Armed Forces and President of Syria.” It states: „With Allah’s help, we will not disappoint you, heroes of Ra’d Al-Mahdi. We have promised and we have kept [our promise].”<\/a>[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The memo states further: „[This is] in accordance with the decision of the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister [Fahd Jassem al-Freij]… to establish a committee headed by the director of [the Syrian military’s] Organization and Administration Department responsible for arranging the forces operating in conjunction with Iran as part of the Local Defense Brigades in the [various] districts, and to publish its recommendations. The committee met several times and examined and discussed every aspect of the matter: organization; command; the supply of military and material needs; the rights of fallen, wounded and missing [fighters]; and arranging the status of draftees, [including] those evading mandatory and reserve service, deserters, and civilians working with the Iranian side. The following are the committee’s conclusions:<\/p>\n

„1. The Syrian operatives (civilians and military personnel) who are fighting alongside the Iranian side are to be incorporated in the Local Defense Brigades in the [various] districts as per to the following list:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
District<\/td>\nMandatory service evaders<\/td>\nReserve duty evaders<\/td>\nDeserters<\/td>\nCivilians<\/td>\nPersons whose status has been arranged<\/td>\nTotal in district<\/td>\nComments<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Damascus<\/td>\n4106<\/td>\n4824<\/td>\n600<\/td>\n9485<\/td>\n601<\/td>\n19616<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deraa<\/td>\n421<\/td>\n359<\/td>\n658<\/td>\n857<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n2295<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Tartus<\/td>\n321<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n679<\/td>\n100<\/td>\n1100<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Homs<\/td>\n980<\/td>\n1124<\/td>\n1127<\/td>\n4314<\/td>\n1506<\/td>\n9051<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Hama<\/td>\n2144<\/td>\n2654<\/td>\n2549<\/td>\n3915<\/td>\n864<\/td>\n12126<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Aleppo<\/td>\n3925<\/td>\n5687<\/td>\n1213<\/td>\n10241<\/td>\n4864<\/td>\n35930<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Idlib<\/td>\n1123<\/td>\n211<\/td>\n279<\/td>\n2929<\/td>\n3487<\/td>\n8029<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ladhakia<\/td>\n790<\/td>\n302<\/td>\n477<\/td>\n3165<\/td>\n700<\/td>\n5434<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Al-Raqqa<\/td>\n214<\/td>\n235<\/td>\n148<\/td>\n220<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n817<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deir Al-Zor<\/td>\n461<\/td>\n870<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n645<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n1976<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Al-Hasakah<\/td>\n388<\/td>\n465<\/td>\n952<\/td>\n554<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n2359<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total<\/td>\n14873<\/td>\n16731<\/td>\n8003<\/td>\n37004<\/td>\n12122<\/td>\n88723<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

„2. The status of the army members (deserters) and the draftees who are evading mandatory army service and reserve duty should be arranged, and they should be transferred [to the Local Defense Brigades in their district], and it should be established that these brigades will summon them [for service]. Men whose status has been arranged and who are working with the Iranian side are to be incorporated in the Local Defense Brigades as well, as per the following list:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Explanation<\/td>\nNo.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mandatory service evaders<\/td>\n14873<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Army deserters<\/td>\n8003<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Reserves duty evaders<\/td>\n16731<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Persons whose status has been arranged<\/td>\n12122<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total<\/td>\n51729<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

„3. Civilians working with the Iranian side who want to volunteer [to the militias] are to be incorporated in the Armed Forces \u2013 Popular Army<\/a>[4]<\/a> on a two-year volunteer contract, regardless of the volunteer conditions that are implemented in the armed forces… The contracts should be renewed with the agreement of both sides, as per the following list:<\/p>\n

„- Civilians working with the Iranian side \u2013 37,004<\/p>\n

„4. The Administration of Officers’ Affairs will be in charge of arranging the status of the 1,650 members of the Class 69 graduates among the officers working with the Iranian side in Aleppo district.”<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. The Local Defense Brigades in the districts that are working with the Iranian side will remain under the command of the Iranian side until the Syria crisis ends or until further notice, in coordination with the Army and Armed Forces General Headquarters.<\/li>\n
  2. Ensuring the supply of all fighting gear and meeting all material needs of the Syrian army personnel and civilians working with the Iranian side will remain the responsibility of the Iranian side after they are incorporated into the Local Defense Brigades in the districts, in coordination with the relevant parties.<\/li>\n
  3. Guaranteeing the material rights of the fallen, wounded and missing [fighters] who worked with the Iranian side from the beginning of the [Syria] events will be the responsibility of the Iranian side…”<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Syrian Chief of Staff Ali 'Abdallah Ayyoub and Defense Minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij approved the memo by appending their signatures to it on April 5, 2017, and Assad, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, signed it on April 11, 2017.<\/p>\n

    Official Syrian Document: Do Not Arrest The Elements Working With The Iranian Side <\/strong><\/p>\n

    Likewise, both the Facebook page of the Ra’d Al-Mahdi Brigades and the pro-regime Syrian news website Dp-new.com posted a photo of another official Syrian document, referring to the abovementioned memo concerning the transfer of the Syrian militias to Iranian responsibility. This supports the memo’s authenticity.<\/p>\n

    The document is a letter sent by Gen. 'Adnan Muhriz 'Ali, head of the Organization and Administration Department, on behalf of Syrian Chief of Staff 'Ali 'Abdullah Ayyoub, to the Ministry of Internal Security, General Intelligence Directorate, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, Political Security Directorate, Criminal Security Department, Immigration and Passport Administration, and the Military Police. The letter said: „As per the decision of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Armed Forces regarding Memorandum No. 1455 of April 4, 2017 and the decision of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Prime Minister and the Defense Minister regarding Memorandum no. 1681 of April 21, 2017, we instruct you not to arrest [army evaders and deserters] working with the Iranian side who hold temporary documents [identifying them as members] of the Local Defense Forces, until their status is arranged…”<\/a>[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

    \"\"<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    <\/a>[1]<\/a> See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1242, Syria Regime Establishing Popular Armed Militias Modeled On Iranian Basij<\/a>, April 25, 2016.<\/a>
    \n    [2]<\/a> SANA (Syria), May 2, 2017.<\/a>
    \n    [3]<\/a> Facebook.com\/mammer1987, May 2, 2017.<\/a>
    \n    [4]<\/a> According to reports, the Popular Army was established in 2012 and comprises well-trained and organized fighters, many of them members of the Ba’th party. Al-Akhbar<\/em> (Lebanon), September 4, 2012; alrai.iq, November 30, 2016.<\/a>
    \n    [5]<\/a> Facebook.com\/mammer1987, April 30, 2017.<\/p>\n

    If you wish to reply, please send your email to <\/strong>memri@memrieurope.org<\/strong>. <\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Przez ca\u0142y czas trwania wojny syryjskiej Iran odgrywa\u0142 centraln\u0105 rol\u0119 w zak\u0142adaniu milicji syryjskich, kt\u00f3re dzia\u0142aj\u0105 wraz z regularn\u0105 armi\u0105 re\u017cimu i rezerwami armii. Te milicje s\u0105 wzorowane na ira\u0144skiej Basid\u017c[1]. Niedawno na Facebooku pojawi\u0142a si\u0119 nota, jakoby dowodz\u0105ca, \u017ce re\u017cim syryjski przekazuje Iranowi dow\u00f3dztwo i odpowiedzialno\u015b\u0107 finansow\u0105 za niekt\u00f3re z tych milicji , co […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":8816,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824,835],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8815","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-specjalne-komunikaty","category-archiwum"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8815","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8815"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8815\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8821,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8815\/revisions\/8821"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8816"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8815"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8815"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8815"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}