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Autor: N. Mozes*
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Wprowadzenie<\/B>
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Od ponad dw\u00f3ch lat re\u017cim prezydenta Baszara Al-Assada prowadzi\u0142 polityk\u0119 obl\u0119\u017cenia i g\u0142odzenia na obszarach Syrii, gdzie napotyka\u0142 ostry op\u00f3r zbrojnych si\u0142 opozycyjnych. G\u0142\u00f3wn\u0105 ofiar\u0105 tej polityki by\u0142a jednak populacja cywilna. Ta strategia, cho\u0107 os\u0142abia si\u0142y opozycji, ma tak\u017ce na celu os\u0142abienie cywilnego poparcia i spowodowanie odrzucenia si\u0142 opozycyjnych, co re\u017cim mo\u017ce u\u017cy\u0107 jako nacisk na opozycj\u0119, by podpisa\u0142a lokalne porozumienia o zawieszeniu broni<\/A> [1].<\/A> Re\u017cim nazywa te porozumienia, kt\u00f3re de facto<\/I> s\u0105 poddaniem si\u0119 przez si\u0142y opozycji, \u201enarodowym pojednaniem\u201d lub \u201elokalnymi pojednaniami\u201d. Sam Assad powiedzia\u0142 w grudniu 2015 r., \u017ce osi\u0105ga si\u0119 te pojednania, kiedy cz\u0142onkowie zbrojnej opozycji \u201eoddaj\u0105 bro\u0144 i wracaj\u0105 do normalnego \u017cycia, a rz\u0105d u\u0142askawia ich\u201d<\/A> [2]<\/A>. Jednym godnym uwagi wyj\u0105tkiem od tej strategii jest zawieszenie broni ze stycznia 2014 r. mi\u0119dzy re\u017cimem a si\u0142ami opozycji w du\u017cych cz\u0119\u015bciach Starego Miasta w Homs, kt\u00f3re by\u0142o pod ci\u0119\u017ckim obl\u0119\u017ceniem re\u017cimu. Wed\u0142ug raport\u00f3w ze strony opozycji, re\u017cim regularnie \u0142amie te porozumienia, bombarduj\u0105c i oblegaj\u0105c tereny, na kt\u00f3rych zgodzi\u0142 si\u0119 dochowa\u0107 zawieszenie broni, wtedy kiedy uznaje to za potrzebne i zale\u017cnie od swoich post\u0119p\u00f3w w terenie<\/A> [3]. <\/A> W dodatku do pokonania si\u0142 opozycyjnych, co uwalnia jego w\u0142asne si\u0142y dla walki na innych frontach, te \u201cpojednania\u201d umo\u017cliwiaj\u0105 tak\u017ce re\u017cimowi twierdzenia, \u017ce walczy z lokalnymi zbrojnymi grupami – i \u017ce nie stoi wobec powszechnego powstania z narodowymi \u017c\u0105daniami politycznymi. W ten spos\u00f3b unika potrzeby negocjacji z opcj\u0105 polityczn\u0105, bo to mo\u017ce zaszkodzi\u0107 jego pozycji i nawet doprowadzi\u0107 do jego usuni\u0119cia. W ostatnich miesi\u0105cach przedstawiciele ONZ w Syrii bior\u0105 udzia\u0142 w negocjowaniu takich zawiesze\u0144 broni mi\u0119dzy, z jednej strony, re\u017cimem, a z drugiej, przedstawicielami miejscowych populacji i si\u0142ami opozycyjnymi, na kilku obszarach, gdzie trwa\u0142y ci\u0119\u017ckie walki. Tak by\u0142o, na przyk\u0142ad, w mie\u015bcie Al-Zabadani w okr\u0119gu Rif Dimaszk w p\u00f3\u0142nocnozachodniej Syrii, gdzie re\u017cim i si\u0142y Hezbollahu walczy\u0142y z Ahrar Al-Szam i D\u017cabhat Al-Nusra w dzielnicy Al-Waer na Starym Mie\u015bcie w Holm. Wed\u0142ug tych porozumie\u0144 strony zgodzi\u0142y si\u0119, \u017ce re\u017cim zniesie obl\u0119\u017cenie a w zamian zbrojni wojownicy albo opuszcz\u0105 ten teren i przejd\u0105 do okr\u0119gu Idlib, kt\u00f3ry jest pod panowaniem opozycji, albo oddadz\u0105 swoj\u0105 bro\u0144. W obu wypadkach przedstawiciele ONZ uczestniczyli w rozmowach i negocjacjach, kt\u00f3re prowadzi\u0142y do porozumienia. W mie\u015bcie Kudsaja w Rif Dimaszk osi\u0105gni\u0119to podobne porozumienie mi\u0119dzy re\u017cimem a opozycj\u0105; w tym wypadku opozycja sk\u0142ada\u0142a si\u0119 g\u0142\u00f3wnie z Wolnej Armii Syryjskiej (FSA). Zgodnie z tym porozumieniem zbrojni wojownicy i cywile, kt\u00f3rzy chc\u0105, mog\u0105 odej\u015b\u0107 do Idlib, w zamian za co re\u017cim znosi pi\u0119ciomiesi\u0119czne obl\u0119\u017cenie. Cho\u0107 przedstawiciele ONZ nie byli obecni podczas negocjacji, kt\u00f3re prowadzi\u0142y do porozumienia, nadzorowali odej\u015bcie si\u0142 opozycyjnych. Jak wspomniano, obecno\u015b\u0107 przedstawicieli ONZ zar\u00f3wno podczas negocjacji, jak i realizacji porozumie\u0144 osi\u0105gni\u0119tych w Al-Zabadani, Al-Waer i Kudsaja stanowi nowy element. Ci przedstawiciele wyja\u015bnili, \u017ce porozumienia pozwalaj\u0105 na dostarczenie pomocy humanitarnej do lokalnej populacji po miesi\u0105cach, podczas kt\u00f3rych nie by\u0142o to mo\u017cliwe z powodu obl\u0119\u017cenia przez re\u017cim i jego sojusznik\u00f3w lub przez si\u0142y opozycyjne. Ponadto przedstawiciele ONZ pod kierownictwem specjalnego wys\u0142annika do Syrii, Steffana de Mistury, chwalili te porozumienia, pok\u0142adaj\u0105c w nich nadziej\u0119 i przedstawiaj\u0105c je jako model dotarcia do ca\u0142kowitego zawieszenia ognia w ca\u0142ej Syrii, jak stwierdzono w Rezolucji 2254 Rady Bezpiecze\u0144stwa ONZ – nie zwracaj\u0105c uwagi na fakt, \u017ce zosta\u0142y osi\u0105gni\u0119te po miesi\u0105cach ostrego obl\u0119\u017cenia i g\u0142odzeniu ludno\u015bci lokalnej. Zaanga\u017cowanie ONZ w takich porozumieniach i jej postawa wobec nich – szczeg\u00f3lnie w \u015bwietle faktu, \u017ce pojawi\u0142y si\u0119 w tym samym czasie, co nasilenie wysi\u0142k\u00f3w mi\u0119dzynarodowych, by rozwi\u0105za\u0107 kryzys syryjski i wprowadzi\u0107 w \u017cycie rezolucj\u0119 2254 Rady Bezpiecze\u0144stwa – mo\u017ce by\u0107 postrzegane przez re\u017cim syryjski jako milcz\u0105ca zgoda na strategi\u0119 obl\u0119\u017cenia i g\u0142odzenia, kt\u00f3rej u\u017cywa do pokonania opozycji, oraz jako akceptacj\u0119 tych \u201epojedna\u0144 narodowych\u201d jako sposobu zaprowadzenia spokoju. Istotnie, wczesne oznaki takiej akceptacji przez ONZ metod walki z opozycj\u0105 by\u0142y jasne w inicjatywie de Mistury \u201cNajpierw Aleppo\u201d, przedstawionej Radzie Bezpiecze\u0144stwa w pa\u017adzierniku 2014 r. Ta inicjatywa dotyczy\u0142a zamro\u017cenia walk w okre\u015blonych obszarach i dostarczenia tam pomocy humanitarnej. Pierwszym celem by\u0142o zaj\u0119cie si\u0119 straszliwymi warunkami humanitarnymi i pozwolenie obu stronom na zwr\u00f3cenie broni przeciwko Pa\u0144stwu Islamskiemu (ISIS), kt\u00f3re de Mistura przedstawia\u0142 jako wroga zar\u00f3wno re\u017cimu, jak opozycji. D\u0142ugoterminowym celem by\u0142o stopniowe budowanie zaufania mi\u0119dzy stronami, prowadz\u0105c do negocjacji politycznych. Miasto Aleppo wybrano jako pierwszy obszar, gdzie zaprowadzi si\u0119 te kroki, zar\u00f3wno z powodu jego tragicznej sytuacji humanitarnej, jak i dlatego, \u017ce zbli\u017ca\u0142o si\u0119 do niego ISIS. W rozmowach z re\u017cimem o realizacji tej inicjatywy de Mistura zaakceptowa\u0142 wiele warunk\u00f3w wst\u0119pnych, w\u0142\u0105cznie z ograniczeniem inicjatywy do dzielnic, w kt\u00f3rych re\u017cim napotka\u0142 na op\u00f3r na du\u017c\u0105 skal\u0119 i zatrzymaniem nalot\u00f3w, ale dalszym prowadzeniem dzia\u0142a\u0144 l\u0105dowych. Cho\u0107 inicjatywa ostatecznie nie zosta\u0142a zrealizowana z powodu dodatkowych \u017c\u0105da\u0144 re\u017cimu i sprzeciwu opozycji, odzwierciedla\u0142a ona zmian\u0119 podej\u015bcia ONZ do kryzysu – to jest, dawanie priorytetu walce z ISIS i odrzucenie \u017c\u0105da\u0144 opozycji, by mog\u0142a walczy\u0107 zar\u00f3wno z ISIS, jak z re\u017cimem Assada. Og\u00f3lny plan de Mistury na rozwi\u0105zanie kryzysu syryjskiego jest zgodny z planem re\u017cimu – to jest, lokalne zawieszenia broni mi\u0119dzy si\u0142ami w terenie. Tak\u017ce prezydent Obama wyrazi\u0142 niedawno poparcie dla tego paradygmatu, ale nie wspomnia\u0142 o okoliczno\u015bciach, w jakich by\u0142 u\u017cyty ani o jego rzeczywistych implikacjach. Na konferencji prasowej w grudniu 2015 r. podczas konferencji ONZ o zmianie klimatycznej w Pary\u017cu, Obama powiedzia\u0142: \u201eCo mo\u017ce si\u0119 zdarzy\u0107, je\u015bli proces polityczny, kt\u00f3ry John Kerry tak starannie zestawi\u0142 – w porozumieniu z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Rosji, \u0141awrowem – je\u015bli to zadzia\u0142a w Wiedniu, to jest mo\u017cliwe, przy istniej\u0105cej zgodzie wszystkich stron, kt\u00f3re ju\u017c si\u0119 na to zgodzi\u0142y, \u017ce zaczniemy widzie\u0107 przynajmniej strefy zawieszenia ognia w i wok\u00f3\u0142 Syrii. Mo\u017ce to znaczy\u0107, \u017ce pewne grupy opozycyjne nie b\u0119d\u0105 d\u0142u\u017cej obiektem bombardowania syryjskiego lub rosyjskiego; b\u0119d\u0105 nast\u0119pnie rozmawia\u0142y o polityce. I powoli b\u0119dziemy w stanie zwr\u00f3ci\u0107 uwag\u0119 wszystkich tam, gdzie powinna by\u0107, to jest na \u015bciganie ISIS w systematyczny spos\u00f3b”<\/A> [4]. <\/A> Re\u017cim Assada uwa\u017ca zaanga\u017cowanie ONZ w tych porozumieniach, do kt\u00f3rych doszed\u0142 zgodnie z modelem przez siebie ustalonym, za legitymizacj\u0119 jego drogi do rozwi\u0105zania kryzysu syryjskiego. Z drugiej strony, rozmaite elementy opozycyjne s\u0105 skrajnie krytyczne wobec udzia\u0142u ONZ, stwierdzaj\u0105c, \u017ce organizacja ta bierze obecnie udzia\u0142 w obl\u0119\u017ceniach, g\u0142odzeniu i zbrodniach pope\u0142nianych przez Assada przeciwko ludno\u015bci syryjskiej. Niniejsze opracowanie omawia porozumienia w sprawie Al-Zabadani i Al-Waer w Homs z uczestnictwem przedstawicieli ONZ oraz krytyk\u0119, jak\u0105 wywo\u0142a\u0142o to w\u015br\u00f3d opozycji syryjskiej. [Dalsza cz\u0119\u015b\u0107 opracowania pozostawiona jest bez przek\u0142adu na polski<\/I>] The Al-Zabadani\/Al-Fu’ah\/Kefraya Agreement<\/B> On September 29, 2015, a local ceasefire was signed in Istanbul, with Turkish sponsorship and UN oversight, between the opposition and the regime; the latter was represented by Iran. The ceasefire followed months of intense fighting in and around the city of Al-Zabadani between regime and Hizbullah forces, who heavily besieged the city, and opposition forces led by the Islamic Ahrar Al-Sham movement, which is part of the Jaysh Al-Fatah coalition led by Jabhat Al-Nusra. The agreement tied Al-Zabadani and its surroundings, where Assad and Hizbullah had the upper hand, to the villages of Al-Fu’ah and Kefraya, both Shi’ite enclaves of regime loyalists in the Idlib governorate that were besieged by opposition forces led by Jaysh Al-Fatah. The main sections of the agreement’s first phase included a 48-hour complete ceasefire with an option to extend it; allowing all opposition fighters to leave Al-Zabadani for Idlib with only their small arms, and any civilians who so desire to leave as well; destroying all opposition heavy weaponry in the city; allowing 10,000 women, children, and men below and above fighting age to leave the Shi’ite villages; allowing safe passage for the wounded from both sides; ceasing all offensive action, including the denial of humanitarian passage to the Shi’ite villages and denial of entry into the towns of Madaya, Baqin, and Serghaya, which are adjacent to Al-Zabadani; and establishing a committee of representatives from the UN, Iran, and the armed groups to oversee the implementation of the agreement and deal with any emerging problems (the UN and Iranian representatives would stay in Damascus). In the second phase of the agreements, a six-month ceasefire (hudna<\/I>) is to be declared, and hundreds of prisoners released. The agreement explicitly stated that the first phase would „be implemented with the sponsorship, oversight, and presence of the UN” and that the second phase „could take place under UN supervision.”<\/A> [5] <\/A> According to other reports, the agreement also includes the delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas it covers.<\/A> [6] <\/A> Despite the above, in actuality both sides violated the ceasefire many times, and only a few sections of the agreement were implemented, and with much delay. Only on December 27, 2015, three months after the agreement was signed, did some 130 opposition fighters, most of them wounded, leave Al-Zabadani with their families, along with some 300 families and wounded from Al-Fu’ah and Kefraya. It is not clear how many opposition fighters remain in Al-Zabadani. In the four months between the signing of the agreement and the end of the year, humanitarian aid was brought in to the besieged areas only once. Madaya: Ongoing Siege Despite UN-Sponsored Ceasefire<\/B> One of the regime’s blatant violations of this ceasefire is the ongoing siege of the town of Madaya, near Al-Zabadani. According to opposition reports, the siege was stepped up after the agreement was signed, and the regime and Hizbullah forces surrounding the village mined its entrances so that food could not be brought in. These reports stated that the town’s 40,000 residents, some of them refugees from Al-Zabadani, are suffering from severe shortages of food and medical supplies, and are surviving on weeds and tree bark, and are even killing and eating cats.<\/A> [7] <\/A> Although under the agreement the regime undertook to lift the siege and allow aid convoys to enter the town, by December only one aid convoy had been allowed to enter. Residents even reported that there had been some deaths from starvation. It was only after local residents and opposition elements raised an outcry on social networks and in the media about the severity of the situation that the international community acted; following pressure, the regime and Hizbullah allowed aid convoys to enter the town, on condition that similar convoys would be allowed into the Shi’ite villages of Al-Fu’ah and Kefraya. Following a visit to the town, Red Cross and UN representatives confirmed the reports of dire humanitarian conditions, and also reported that there had been several starvation deaths even after the aid convoys were allowed in.<\/A> [8]<\/A> The Al-Wa’er Agreement<\/B> On December 1, 2015, after some two years of siege and heavy shelling by the Syrian army, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the regime and dignitaries from the Al-Wa’er neighborhood in the Old City of Homs along with representatives of the armed opposition factions in the neighborhood. One opposition body reported that the fighters belonged to several factions, including Ahrar Al-Sham and Jabhat Al-Nusra.<\/A> [9] <\/A> UN representatives were present during the negotiations for this agreement also – Khawla Mattar, the head of de Mistura’s Damascus office, and UN Resident\/Humanitarian Coordinator Yacoub Al-Hillo. Al-Wa’er, nicknamed „the capital of the revolution,” was the last bastion of the opposition in the Old City. The other neighborhoods there had been handed over to the regime in „reconciliation agreements” signed in May 2014 after fierce battles and after the humanitarian situation had deteriorated due to the regime’s siege and starvation strategy. Agreements had also been signed concerning Al-Wa’er, but both sides had violated them. There are conflicting reports regarding the details of the December 1 agreement. The regime maintains that after it comes into force, „Al-Wa’er will be completely safe and stable, and will have no weapons other than those of the state, and all state institutions will resume operation, including regime and security elements, and these elements will be responsible for maintaining security.”<\/A> [10] <\/A> However, the opposition forces that signed the agreement contend that the agreement allows them to continue their control of the neighborhood. They do acknowledge that under the agreement only fighters who do not oppose the agreement will be allowed to stay, and that they will not be allowed to possess medium and heavy weapons. These weapons will be turned over to the regime, and regime security and police forces will secure and operate the public and government institutions in Al-Wa’er. They also acknowledge that the agreement stipulates that residents leaving the neighborhood must go through a regime security forces checkpoint, and that wanted men will be turned back until their status vis-\u00e0-vis the regime is resolved.<\/A> [11] <\/A> Both sides, however, agree that in the first phase of the agreement, the siege on the neighborhood will be lifted and humanitarian aid will be allowed in, in return for the gradual exodus of armed elements opposing the agreement, with their families, for the rebel-controlled Idlib. In the second phase, entry and departure from the neighborhood will be permitted, and prisoners will be released. Several days after the agreement was signed, the first phase began to be implemented; some 300 fighters and 100 families left the neighborhood for Idlib, accompanied by a UN vehicle, and humanitarian aid and food were sent in. In addition to the exodus of the fighters and the entry of humanitarian aid, UN representatives are set to meet with teams dealing with aid, humanitarian services, and healthcare in the neighborhood,<\/A> [12] <\/A> apparently in order to observe the rehabilitation process. UN Representatives Praise Al-Wa’er Agreement – Although It Was Arrived At Following Siege, Starvation<\/B> Although the Al-Wa’er agreement was arrived at because of the dire humanitarian situation resulting from the regime’s siege and starvation of the populace, UN representatives praised it and considered it a model for other agreements for other <\/B>battlegrounds, particularly in the wake of UNSCR 2254 that calls for a complete ceasefire in Syria in January 2016. Following the signing of the Al-Wa’er agreement, Farhan Haq, spokesman for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, said on behalf of Steffan de Mistura: „The UN’s clear goal is to reach, as soon as possible, a nationwide ceasefire. [Meanwhile] initiatives like this one bring relief to besieged or isolated communities and have great value… They help the perception that a nationwide ceasefire brokered by the members of the International Syria Support Group is doable and that the UN can and will do its part.”<\/A> [13] <\/A> UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien said that he hoped to see more local ceasefires like the Al-Wa’er ceasefire<\/A> [14] <\/A> – a statement that the regime might interpret as acceptance of its siege and starvation policy. Several days later, O’Brien clarified that humanitarian aid should not be conditional upon such agreements.<\/A> [15] <\/A> UN Resident\/Humanitarian Coordinator Al-Hillo also praised the agreement: „This is an historic day in Homs – a clearly Syrian-Syrian day, because the agreement was reached among the Syrians themselves.” Downplaying the UN’s role in it, he said: „The UN is on the ground as an element to reassure, and to build trust between the sides, and not as a party to the agreement.”<\/A> [16]<\/A> Syrian Regime: The Ceasefire Mandated By UNSCR 2254 Will Be Achieved Via Local Reconciliation Agreements<\/B> Naturally, the Syrian regime welcomed the UN’s involvement in the recent agreements, and saw it as a legitimization of the path it was taking in order to resolve the Syrian crisis. At the same time, the regime is seeking, successfully, to limit UN involvement to logistical aspects only, in order to show that these agreements are intra-Syrian and do not include foreign intervention. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu’allem stressed, at a meeting with O’Brien, that it is crucial for relevant UN bodies to undertake to act in the capacity of their humanitarian and aid-providing roles<\/A> [17] <\/A> – that is, that they should not interfere in the political aspects of the of the situations. The governor of Homs, Talal Al-Barazi, also underlined that „there is no international participation in the content of the Al-Wa’er neighborhood agreement, which was achieved via Syrian-Syrian dialogue several months ago.” He continued: „The role of the UN and the Arab Syrian Red Crescent is only to participate in the logistical operations and in the evacuation [of fighters and citizens].”<\/A> [18] <\/A> Al-Thawra<\/I> columnist Ahmad 'Orabi Ba’aj wrote about the Syrian regime’s view of these agreements and of the ceasefire mandated by UNSCR 2254: „The achievements of the Syrian Arab army forced the terrorist organizations to retreat, and have resulted in local reconciliations… that prepare the ground for the removal of weapons and the return of those areas to the lap of the state. This is the most precise translation of the term 'ceasefire’ that recently appeared in Security Council resolutions. There can be no ceasefire with the presence of terrorist or armed organizations that do not hand their weapons over to the legitimate regime anywhere in the world – and the same goes for Syria as well…”<\/A> [19]<\/A> Syrian Opposition Elements: The UN Is Party To Assad’s Starvation Crimes, And Isn’t Trying To Stop Them<\/B> Conversely, elements in the Syrian opposition harshly criticized the UN’s involvement in these agreements – particularly in light of its inability to bring about an end to the Syria war which has been raging for nearly five years, or even to pressure the regime to stop using barrel bombs and its strategy of siege and starvation. One of the opposition’s main arguments is that the UN is legitimizing the regime’s siege and starvation strategy, and is thus violating UNSCR 2139 that calls on all parties in Syria to allow the transfer of humanitarian aid. Ali Hamidi, of the oppositionist website Orient-News, wrote: „In both cases [i.e., the agreements in Al-Wa’er and Qudsaya] the UN was present and was a direct partner, as well as [being involved through the mediation of] Special Envoy de Mistura. This is unprecedented in the history of this organization, which is overseeing the regime’s crimes in Syria instead of attempting to put a stop to them. In fact, [the UN] is cooperating to a large extent with the regime in subduing the areas… which increases the possibility that the Assad regime will continue to use siege scenarios in other areas so as to reach agreements and ceasefires with the UN’s consent and sponsorship…”<\/A> [20] <\/A> The Saraya Al-Ghurabaa organization, which operates under the auspices of the FSA in Al-Wa’er and which opposed the ceasefire agreement, stated that the UN, by being party to the agreements, had violated Security Council resolutions. It said in a statement following the Al-Wa’er agreement: „The humanitarian bodies, especially those belonging to the UN, are not neutral. They should have transferred aid to the neighborhood without turning to the regime, in accordance with UNSCR 2139 and 2165.”<\/A> [21]<\/A> Syrian Oppositionist: „Dracula’s Grandson” De Mistura Sucks The Blood Of Syrians, Delights At Their Corpses<\/B> Following the reports of the severe starvation in Madaya resulting from the ongoing siege, that was in direct violation of the Al-Zabadani\/Al-Fu’ah\/Kefraya agreement, oppositionist writer Iyad 'Issa penned a personal attack on UN Special Envoy Steffan de Mistura, calling him „Dracula’s grandson and rightful heir” and accusing him of accepting bribes from the Syrian regime. He wrote: „The more appropriate name [for de Mistura], which is more fitting of this situation, is Dracula, after Count Dracula, the famous original model for vampires. It is no coincidence that both have the title of Count… [De Mistura] was born to an Italian father and has dual Italian and Swedish citizenship, but he is more likely Dracula’s grandson and rightful heir… „The 'grandfather’ Dracula was a respected killer. According to legend, throughout his life he sucked the blood of only 40,000 people. However, his grandson de Mistura sees the attempt to eradicate a similar number in the starvation-struck Madaya as a mere appetizer to the 500,000 victims of the Syrian 'roasted meat banquet’ that has been raging for five years with UN sponsorship. Since we [first] had the honor of becoming acquainted with de Mistura, the special envoy for the great murderers club falsely known as the Security Council, in July 2014, who served as… mediator in the 'starve or submit’ reconciliations, he has been more like a hyena than a vampire, since vampires prefer warm blood rather than feasting on carrion or delighting in corpses, as de Mistura did in Homs’s Al-Wa’er neighborhood and in Qudsaya before that, and as he is currently doing in Madaya, Al-Zabadani, Darayya, Al-Ma’adamiyeh, Duma, Al-Qabun, and dozens of occupied Syrian cities, towns, and villages. [He does this] in return for a public monthly salary [from the UN] and a hidden salary [from the Assad regime]…”<\/A> [22]<\/A> UN Enabling The Regime To Enact A Policy Of Expulsion And Uprooting<\/B> Opposition elements are also claiming that the UN is enabling the Syrian regime and its allies to forcibly relocate local Sunni populations with the aim of creating contiguous Shi’ite territory, by helping expel residents from areas covered by local ceasefires. Thus, for example, after the signing of the Al-Wa’er agreement, and concurrent with the implementation of the second phase of humanitarian aid transfer, several dozen residents protested against what they called „the organized expulsion being carried out by the Assad regime with UN backing.” Dr. Riad Na’asan Agha, spokesman for the opposition’s Syrian Supreme Commission for Negotiations, said that the UN’s actions in favor of these ceasefire agreements and its participation in them are dangerous and overstep the UN’s mandate. This, he said, is because they include removing the original residents of the areas where the agreements are signed, leading to demographic shifts that are based on ethnicity.<\/A> [23] <\/A> ’Amar Shahda, writing in the oppositionist website Orient-News, argued that the UN was an accomplice in the expulsion and uprooting of Syrian civilians from their homes: „Recently there has been a clear increase in the local 'reconciliations and arrangements’ in several Syrian governorates, the most difficult and painful of which [involved] the forceful uprooting of residents from their areas via agreements for organized expulsion, all of which are godfathered by the UN. In this way, the UN violated one of the main articles of its human rights declaration. Videos documenting the forceful removal of residents of the Al-Wa’er neighborhood, which, under siege, was the last bastion of the revolution in its capital of Homs, showed devastating sights of forceful uprooting of people from their areas, under an agreement organized by the UN… Homs was emptied [of its original residents] under the auspices of the UN… „All the agreements for expelling the original residents from their areas, under the slogan of 'arrangements, ceasefires, and reconciliations,’ went through UN channels. The international organization is knowingly and deliberately violating one of the main articles in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights… which states that every person has the right to travel and choose his place of residence within the borders of his country. The only result of the UN’s efforts after some five years of war against the Syrian people was the uprooting and expulsion of residents from [various] areas in Syria… while this organization and its various branches… failed to stop the daily killing and the bombardment with barrel bombs and missiles… and to end the policy of siege and starvation implemented by Assad’s forces and the Shi’ite militias in Homs and the Rif Dimashq [governorate]… „This time, the UN took these steps with clear Russian backing and with a green light from America, especially after Barack Obama’s recent announcement of support for 'regional solutions’…”<\/A> [24] <\/A> * N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI.<\/I> Endnotes: <\/A> [1] <\/A> See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1069, Syria Regime’s Tactic Against Opponents: 'Surrender Or Starve’<\/A>, February 13, 2014. Visit the MEMRI site in Polish: <\/B>http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/<\/B><\/A>
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\n![](\"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polaco\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/26536.jpg\")
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\nSocial media campaign „Madaya Calls To You”: „One of the sections of the agreement is the delivery of aid to Madaya. Where is it?” (Source: „Lift Siege from Madaya” Facebook hashtag, January 3, 2016)<\/I>
\n![](\"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polaco\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/26537.jpg\")
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\nHashtag: „Madaya Dying of Starvation” (Source: Orient-news.net, January 3, 2016)<\/I>
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\n![](\"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polaco\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/26538.jpg\")
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\nFighters leave Al-Wa’er accompanied by UN representatives (Source: <\/I>Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, December 9, 2015)<\/I>
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\n![](\"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polaco\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/26539.jpg\")
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\nAl-Wa’er residents protesting: „Revolutionaries are our people. [It is] Al-Assad regime who is killer. United Nations [does] what…?!” (Source: Orient-news.net, December 12, 2015) <\/I>
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\n<\/A> [2] <\/A> SANA News Agency (Syria), December 2, 2015.
\n<\/A> [3] <\/A> Enabbaladi.org, December 6, 2015.
\n<\/A> [4] <\/A> Whitehouse.gov, December 1, 2015.
\n<\/A> [5] <\/A> Al-Safir<\/I> (Lebanon), December 29, 2015.
\n<\/A> [6] <\/A> Al-Akhbar<\/I> (Lebanon), December 28, 2015.
\n<\/A> [7] <\/A> Syriahr.com, December 30, 2015.
\n<\/A> [8] <\/A> Al-Hayat<\/I> (London), January 19, 2015.
\n<\/A> [9] <\/A> Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/I> (London), December 9, 2015.
\n<\/A> [10] <\/A> Champress.net, December 9, 2015.
\n<\/A> [11] <\/A> Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/I> (London), December 4, 2015.
\n<\/A> [12] <\/A> Orient-news.net, December 16, 2015.
\n<\/A> [13] <\/A> Un.org, December 11, 2015.
\n<\/A> [14] <\/A> Reuters.com, December 11, 2015.
\n<\/A> [15] <\/A> Reliefweb.int, December 14, 2015.
\n<\/A> [16] <\/A> Champress.net, September 9, 2015.
\n<\/A> [17] <\/A> Al-Watan<\/I> (Syria), December 14, 2015.
\n<\/A> [18] <\/A> Champress.net, December 9, 2015.
\n<\/A> [19] <\/A> Al-Thawra<\/I> (Syria), December 30, 2015.
\n<\/A> [20] <\/A> Orient-news.net, December 10, 2015.
\n<\/A> [21] <\/A> All4syria.info, December 24, 2015.
\n<\/A> [22] <\/A> Orient-news.net, January 6, 2016.
\n<\/A> [23] <\/A> Alarabiya.net, January 5, 2016.
\n<\/A> [24] <\/A> Orient-news.net, December 12, 2015.
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