{"id":3614,"date":"2015-08-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2015-08-07T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polaco\/artykuly-w-prasie-saudyjskiej-polityczne-rozwiazania-dla-syrii-jedynym-sposobem-radzenia-sobie-z-terroryzmem\/3614"},"modified":"2015-08-07T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2015-08-07T00:00:00","slug":"artykuly-w-prasie-saudyjskiej-polityczne-rozwiazania-dla-syrii-jedynym-sposobem-radzenia-sobie-z-terroryzmem","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/artykuly-w-prasie-saudyjskiej-polityczne-rozwiazania-dla-syrii-jedynym-sposobem-radzenia-sobie-z-terroryzmem\/3614","title":{"rendered":"Artyku\u0142y w prasie saudyjskiej: polityczne rozwi\u0105zania dla Syrii &#8211; jedynym sposobem radzenia sobie z terroryzmem"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!-- Document Body --><br \/>\n<DIV ALIGN=\"justify\" CLASS=\"bodytext\"><br \/>\n<P><I>W dniu 3 sierpnia 2015 roku w stolicy Kataru, Doha, mia\u0142 miejsce cykl spotka\u0144 z udzia\u0142em ministra spraw zagranicznych Rosji Siergieja \u0141awrowa, sekretarza stanu USA Johna Kerry&#8217;ego i ministrami spraw zagranicznych pa\u0144stw Rady Wsp\u00f3\u0142pracy Zatoki (GCC). Spotkania, kt\u00f3re koncentrowa\u0142y si\u0119 na uk\u0142adzie j\u0105drowym z Iranem z 14 lipca 2015 roku &#8211; Wsp\u00f3lny Kompleksowy Plan Dzia\u0142ania (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, w skr\u00f3cie JCPOA) &#8211; oraz na sytuacji w Jemenie i Libii, a tak\u017ce na kryzysie w Syrii i statusie syryjskiego prezydenta Baszara Al-Assada, zako\u0144czy\u0142y si\u0119 na tr\u00f3jstronnym spotkaniu \u0141awrowa, Kerry&#8217;ego i saudyjskiego ministra spraw zagranicznych, Adela Al-Jubeira. Dyskusje na temat kryzysu w Syrii skupi\u0142y si\u0119 na rosyjskiej inicjatywie jego rozwi\u0105zania.<\/I><br \/>\n<P><br \/>\n<P><I>W ostatnich tygodniach Rosja zintensyfikowa\u0142a, do tej pory dyskretne wysi\u0142ki, na rzecz rozwi\u0105zania kryzysu w Syrii, przygotowuj\u0105c inicjatyw\u0119, kt\u00f3rej g\u0142\u00f3wnym elementem jest stworzenie sojuszu w walce z terroryzmem, obejmuj\u0105cej: re\u017cim syryjski, jego g\u0142\u00f3wnych rywali w regionie, czyli Arabi\u0119 Saudyjsk\u0105 i Turcj\u0119, oraz Jordani\u0119. W ramach rosyjskich wysi\u0142k\u00f3w na rzecz tej inicjatywy, prezydent Rosji, W\u0142adimir Putin, spotka\u0142 si\u0119 w dniu 20 czerwca 2015 r. w Rosji z saudyjskim ksi\u0119ciem, Muhammadem bin Salmanem, kt\u00f3ry jest trzecim w kolejce pretendentem do tronu, a w dniu 29 czerwca z Ministrem Spraw Zagranicznych Syrii Walidem Al-Muallem. Na wsp\u00f3lnej konferencji prasowej z Al-Muallem, Putin powiedzia\u0142, \u017ce otrzyma\u0142 sygna\u0142y z Arabii Saudyjskiej, Turcji i Jordanii, \u017ce kraje te b\u0119d\u0105 ch\u0119tne do udzia\u0142u w walce z Pa\u0144stwem Islamskim (ISIS). <\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[1]<\/A> <I>Przedstawiciele syryjskiego re\u017cimu prezydenta Baszara al-Assada r\u00f3wnie\u017c wielokrotnie wyra\u017cali ch\u0119\u0107 wsp\u00f3\u0142pracy w ramach rosyjskiej inicjatywy.<\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[2]<\/A><br \/>\n<P><br \/>\n<P><I>Wydaje si\u0119, \u017ce t\u0142em wznowienia w\u0142a\u015bnie teraz intensyfikacji wysi\u0142k\u00f3w Rosji w celu utworzenia regionalnego sojuszu do walki z terroryzmem w Syrii, jest rozw\u00f3j sytuacji mi\u0119dzynarodowej: walka si\u0142 pomi\u0119dzy Rosj\u0105 i USA; negocjacje nuklearne z Iranem, zako\u0144czone JCPOA; oraz saudyjskie zbli\u017cenie z Rosj\u0105 z powodu rozczarowania Arabii Saudyjskiej polityk\u0105 zagraniczn\u0105 administracji Obamy. Do tych czynnik\u00f3w dochodzi rosn\u0105ce zagro\u017cenie ISIS dla kraj\u00f3w regionu i dla samej Rosji. Dodatkowo post\u0119py syryjskiej opozycji w bastionie syryjskiego re\u017cimu &#8211; na syryjskim wybrze\u017cu oraz r\u00f3wnoleg\u0142e z nimi kurdyjskie post\u0119py w g\u00f3rach p\u00f3\u0142nocno-zachodniej Syrii. Oba jednocze\u015bnie zagra\u017caj\u0105 syryjskiemu re\u017cimowi.<\/I><br \/>\n<P><br \/>\n<P><I>W efekcie inicjatywa rosyjska jest kolejnym ogniwem w \u0142a\u0144cuchu politycznych wysi\u0142k\u00f3w Rosji ratowania re\u017cimu Assada i legitymizowania go w oczach spo\u0142eczno\u015bci mi\u0119dzynarodowej, poprzez twierdzenie, \u017ce gwarantuje on eliminacj\u0119 ISIS. Tym sposobem Rosja skutecznie pokona\u0142a \u017c\u0105dania usuni\u0119cia Assada wysuwane przez przeciwnik\u00f3w re\u017cimu. Rosja wykorzysta\u0142a t\u0119 taktyk\u0119 ju\u017c wcze\u015bniej. Na konferencji Genewa II, w styczniu 2014 roku, wzi\u0119\u0142a stron\u0119 re\u017cimu Assada i wezwa\u0142a do uznania walki z terroryzmem za priorytet i pozostawienia kwestii losu Assada na p\u00f3\u017aniej. <\/I><br \/>\n<P><I>Arabskie media, zar\u00f3wno te zbli\u017cone do re\u017cimu Assada, jak i te bliskie Arabii Saudyjskiej, wyrazi\u0142y du\u017ce nadzieje zwi\u0105zane z tr\u00f3jstronnym rosyjsko-ameryka\u0144sko-saudyjskim spotkaniem. Nazywa\u0142y je \u201ekluczowym\u201d dla kryzysu w Syrii i losu Asada.<\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[3]<\/A> <I>Ten optymizm przyszed\u0142 w kontek\u015bcie licznych informacji w arabskich mediach, cz\u0119sto ze sob\u0105 sprzecznych, co do zbli\u017cenia saudyjskiego i rosyjskiego stanowiska w odniesieniu do re\u017cimu Assada, a dotycz\u0105cych rosn\u0105cej elastyczno\u015bci saudyjskiej w tej sprawie. Tak wi\u0119c, na przyk\u0142ad, saudyjski kana\u0142 Al-Arabiya poinformowa\u0142, powo\u0142uj\u0105c si\u0119 na \u201erosyjskie \u017ar\u00f3d\u0142a dyplomatyczne\u201d, \u017ce inicjatywa Rosjan zyska\u0142a saudyjskie i ameryka\u0144skie wsparcie, a tak\u017ce wsparcie ze strony re\u017cimu Assada, i \u017ce w zwi\u0105zku z tym spotkanie wprowadzi w \u017cycie rosyjsk\u0105 inicjatyw\u0119 utworzenia regionalnego sojuszu antyterrorystycznego, w sk\u0142ad kt\u00f3rego ma wchodzi\u0107 syryjski re\u017cim.<\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[4]<\/A> <I>Liba\u0144ski dziennik \u201eAl-Akhbar\u201d, zwi\u0105zany z re\u017cimem syryjskim, poinformowa\u0142, \u017ce 20 czerwca na spotkaniu w Rosji Putina z ksi\u0119ciem Arabii Saudyjskiej, bin Salmanem, bin Salman zosta\u0142 przekonany przez stwierdzenie Putina, \u017ce \u201enawet je\u015bli wbrew jego woli\u201d, nie ma innego wyj\u015bcia ni\u017c wsp\u00f3\u0142praca z syryjskim re\u017cimem w walce z terroryzmem zagra\u017caj\u0105cym r\u00f3wnie\u017c Arabii Saudyjskiej. To porozumienie doprowadzi\u0142o do spotkania w Rijadzie pomi\u0119dzy syryjskim dyrektorem Biura Bezpiecze\u0144stwa Narodowego, Alim Mamloukiem, a arabskim ksi\u0119ciem bin Salmanem, w kt\u00f3rym po\u015bredniczy\u0142a Rosja. Mimo, \u017ce to spotkanie nie przynios\u0142o \u017cadnych efekt\u00f3w, jak wskazano w raportach, istotne by\u0142o, \u017ce w og\u00f3le si\u0119 odby\u0142o.<\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[5]<\/A> <I>Kolejny raport, na stronie internetowej syryjskiej opozycji, donosi, \u017ce podczas spotkania Putin-bin Salman, Putin zgodzi\u0142 si\u0119, \u017ce Assad nie b\u0119dzie kandydowa\u0142 w wyborach prezydenckich, kt\u00f3re maj\u0105 odby\u0107 si\u0119 po okresie przej\u015bciowym ustanowionym podczas konferencji Genewa I w 2012 roku,<\/I><A name=\"_ednref61\"><\/A> <A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[6]<\/A> <I>ale podkre\u015bli\u0142, \u017ce Assad pozostanie przy w\u0142adzy podczas tego okresu, i \u017ce idea regionalnego sojuszu przeciwko ISIS b\u0119dzie realizowana.<\/I><A name=\"_ednref71\"><\/A> <A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[7]<\/A> <I>Wydawany w Wielkiej Brytanii emiracki dziennik \u201eAl-Arab\u201d poinformowa\u0142, \u017ce rosyjsko-arabskie zbli\u017cenie ma miejsce w zwi\u0105zku z rozczarowaniem Rosji Iranem za zniszczenie syryjskich instytucji pa\u0144stwowych, kt\u00f3re Rosja pr\u00f3bowa\u0142a ratowa\u0107. R\u00f3wnie\u017c dlatego, \u017ce Rosja zrozumia\u0142a, \u017ce jedynie pa\u0144stwa Zatoki Perskiej mog\u0105 zagwarantowa\u0107 przysz\u0142e interesy Rosji w Syrii.<\/I><A name=\"_ednref81\"><\/A> <A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[8]<\/A><br \/>\n<P><br \/>\n<P><I>Jednak nadzieje te zosta\u0142y rozwiane. Wypowiedzi ministr\u00f3w spraw zagranicznych oraz dzia\u0142ania r\u00f3\u017cnych urz\u0119dnik\u00f3w w trakcie spotka\u0144 w Doha nie wykaza\u0142y \u017cadnego post\u0119pu w kwestii kryzysu w Syrii. Pokaza\u0142y r\u00f3wnie\u017c, \u017ce obie strony nadal pozosta\u0142y przy swoich stanowiskach. To, \u017ce nie by\u0142o wsp\u00f3lnej deklaracji na koniec tr\u00f3jstronnego spotkania, wykaza\u0142o r\u00f3wnie\u017c g\u0142\u0119boki brak porozumienia stron. Zatem o\u015bwiadczenie, kt\u00f3re USA wyda\u0142y kilka godzin przed tr\u00f3jstronnym spotkaniem, \u017ce b\u0119d\u0105 broni\u0107 wyszkolonych przez USA bojownik\u00f3w opozycji syryjskiej przed wszystkimi, w tym syryjskim re\u017cimem, zosta\u0142o zrozumiane przez ministra spraw zagranicznych Rosji \u0141awrowa jako krzy\u017cuj\u0105ce plany wojny z terroryzmem. W odniesieniu do losu Asada, stwierdzono we wsp\u00f3lnym o\u015bwiadczeniu, wydanym na spotkaniu ministr\u00f3w spraw zagranicznych USA i pa\u0144stw Rady Wsp\u00f3\u0142pracy Zatoki, \u017ce \u201eprezydent Asad straci\u0142 ca\u0142\u0105 legitymacj\u0119\u201d i \u201epodkre\u015blono potrzeb\u0119 nowego rz\u0105du syryjskiego, kt\u00f3ry b\u0119dzie odzwierciedla\u0142 aspiracje narodu syryjskiego.<\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[9]<\/A> <I>R\u00f3wnie\u017c to wydaje si\u0119 by\u0107 sprzeczne z propozycjami inicjatywy rosyjskiej.<\/I><br \/>\n<P><br \/>\n<P><I>Na wsp\u00f3lnej konferencji prasowej ze swoim katarskim odpowiednikiem \u0141awrow o\u015bwiadczy\u0142, \u017ce na konferencji Genewa I nie stwierdzono, \u017ce musi nast\u0105pi\u0107 zmiana re\u017cimu w Syrii, ale \u017ce uczestnicy rozm\u00f3w mieli w jej trakcie zgodzi\u0107 si\u0119, \u017ce zadeklarowany zostanie okres przej\u015bciowy, kt\u00f3rego aspekty zale\u017ce\u0107 b\u0119d\u0105 zar\u00f3wno od syryjskiego re\u017cimu, jak i opozycji syryjskiej. Doda\u0142, \u017ce jego kraj \u201eudziela pomocy militarnej i technicznej syryjskiemu rz\u0105dowi w walce z zagro\u017ceniem [ISIS], i ma powody s\u0105dzi\u0107, \u017ce bez tej pomocy, terytorium kontrolowane przez jednostki terrorystyczne by\u0142oby znacznie wi\u0119ksze\u201d.<\/I><A href=\"file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/Dark%20Angel\/Downloads\/SD%206124.docx\">[10]<\/A><br \/>\n<P><I>Do niedawna zar\u00f3wno urz\u0119dnicy pa\u0144stwowi Arabii Saudyjskiej, jak i media saudyjskie powstrzymywali si\u0119 od wyra\u017cania stanowiska w sprawie, czy nawet wspominania o rosyjskiej inicjatywie. Jednak w ostatnich dniach prasa saudyjska opublikowa\u0142a artyku\u0142y, kt\u00f3re mog\u0105 wskazywa\u0107 jaka jest polityka kr\u00f3lestwa w tej kwestii. Artyku\u0142y te utrzymuj\u0105, \u017ce polityczne rozwi\u0105zanie kryzysu w Syrii ma pierwsze\u0144stwo przed walk\u0105 z ISIS &#8211; co jest sprzeczne z rosyjsk\u0105 inicjatyw\u0105 omawian\u0105 w Doha.<\/I><br \/>\n<P><I>Pozosta\u0142\u0105 cz\u0119\u015b\u0107 raportu, kt\u00f3ra sk\u0142ada si\u0119 z fragment\u00f3w artyku\u0142\u00f3w w prasie saudyjskie po\u015bwi\u0119conych tej sprawie, pozostawiamy w j\u0119zyku angielskim:<\/I><br \/>\n<P><B>Saudi <I>Al-Watan <\/I>Daily To Russia: Agreement Can Be Reached On Removal Of Assad, Status Of The Regime In Syria&#8217;s Future<\/B><br \/>\n<P>The official Saudi daily <I>Al-Watan<\/I> wrote in an editorial: &#8222;&#8230; A solution to the Syrian crisis is the hub to solving the terror crisis. It is necessary to end the crisis in any way whatsoever in order to stop the bloodshed in Syria and restore security to the [country&#8217;s] districts and cities. Possibly the best way is to return to the Geneva I agreement, that stipulates the necessity of establishing an agreed-upon transition government that will lead the country to secure shores.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;Although the Geneva I agreement did not explicitly determine that Bashar Al-Assad must be removed from power, this can be agreed upon, given the changes and circumstances, if the powers are interested in helping solve the problem &#8211; particularly Russia, that has more than once used its veto [power] in the [UN] Security Council in order to defend the Syrian regime\u2026<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;As for the regime&#8217;s status in Syria&#8217;s future, this is another topic that must be agreed upon, either by modifying its structure or by its immediate or gradual removal. However, the most important thing is that the state should not be left without an internal leadership capable of managing things, preventing chaos, and cooperating in order to eradicate the terror organizations.&#8221;<A name=\"_ednref11\"><\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_edn11\"><SUP>[11]<\/SUP><\/A> <SUP><\/SUP><br \/>\n<P><B>&#8217;Al-Riyadh&#8217; Daily: The Assad Regime&#8217;s Continued Existence Will Make Waging War On ISIS More Difficult<\/B><br \/>\n<P>In his August 3 editorial for the official Saudi daily <I>Al-Riyadh, <\/I>Ayman Al-Hamad wrote, under the title &#8222;Alliance Against ISIS &#8211; Or To Rescue Assad?&#8221;: &#8222;In the past, Russia had thrown a lifeline to the Syrian regime, in the form of [Syria&#8217;s] conceding its chemical weapons stockpile in order to prevent an American attack. Today, however, it is trying to prevent [the Syrian regime] from collapsing with a lifeline that actually cannot save it from falling and drowning &#8211; [even though] the regime has acknowledged its losses and the reduction of its influence in Syria.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;Russia is gradually joining the war on ISIS. A few weeks ago, Moscow, which to date has monitored from close up the international [anti-terrorism] coalition&#8217;s operations that have been underway for the past two years against ISIS positions in Iraq and Syria, proposed an initiative whose actualization, according to the [Syrian] regime&#8217;s foreign minister, Walid Al-Mu&#8217;allem, would be a miracle &#8211; [even though] he is almost always wrong.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;[In this initiative] Russia spoke about a coalition for a war on ISIS of which the Syrian regime would be part. We do not know what Russia is basing this initiative on, because ISIS is the Assad regime&#8217;s pampered child. Indeed, the Syrian army and its militias are incessantly shelling cities where Syrian opposition forces are entrenched, and they do not flinch from killing civilians &#8211; while the ISIS areas are safe from attacks by the Syrian regime, with their explosive barrel [bombs]. We have rarely seen battles between the army of the [Syrian] regime and the ISIS terrorist organization.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;What Russia must do is find a diplomatic exit from the Syria crisis &#8211; even though the [June 30, 2012] Geneva I [Action Group for Syria Final Communiqu\u00e9 dealing with a political solution], that Moscow welcomed and that it had sponsored from the beginning, is today not accepted by the Syrian regime itself, which has decided to fight terrorism before anything [else] &#8211; and, according to Assad&#8217;s definition, [this] 'terrorism&#8217; is the Syrian opposition forces&#8230; Therefore, it is better for Moscow to pressure the [Syrian] regime to carry out a political transition that will guarantee stability of what remains of the Syrian institutions, so they will serve as the foundation [for the next stage], thus preventing a governmental vacuum<B>.<\/B><br \/>\n<P>&#8222;Currently, it is not logical that we would hear from Russia about its intention to discuss forming an anti-ISIS coalition, because the countries of the region, and of the world, have vomited out the Syrian regime; there is no possibility of turning back the clock, after the sacrifices made by the Syrians and the rivers of blood shed with the barbarity that pained the conscience of the world. What can usefully be done now is to seek an urgent exit from the Syria crisis, by means of Geneva I, and to not bring this crisis into new mazes and [lengthy] corridors that will lead only to [the shedding of] more Syrian blood, and to the strengthening of ISIS and the extremist organizations &#8211; which themselves are a product of the foot-dragging and hesitation of the Americans and the international [community] since the crisis began, on the pretext of 'letting history run its course.&#8217;<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;In light of today&#8217;s developments, with Turkey&#8217;s and the U.S.&#8217;s forceful entry into the war on ISIS, it should be said that the Syrian regime&#8217;s continued existence will make the efforts [against] and the [ultimate] triumph over ISIS lacking. The continuation of the Syria crisis means the continuation of ISIS&#8217;s existence&#8230;&#8221;<A name=\"_ednref12\"><\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_edn12\">[12]<\/A><br \/>\n<P><B>Former 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat&#8217; Editor: Resolving Syrian Crisis &#8211; The Key To Resolving The Problem Of ISIS <\/B><br \/>\n<P>Tariq Al-Homayed, former editor of the London-based Saudi daily <I>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/I>, wrote that the Syria issue was the test of how serious Russia is about turning over a new leaf in its relations with the Gulf states: &#8222;The Russian foreign minister will hold a tripartite meeting with his Saudi and American counterparts in Qatar&#8230; today [August 3]. The meeting will discuss peace efforts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the anti-ISIS coalition, and Gulf stability. The most striking aspect of the Russian [foreign ministry] statement [that referred to the Qatar talks]is that it does not mention the nuclear agreement with Iran&#8230;<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;The knottiest and most important problem in our region today &#8211; the Syria crisis &#8211; is [also] the key to a solution in the battle against ISIS, in ending Iran&#8217;s influence in the region, and, above all, in stopping Assad&#8217;s crimes. As long as the Syrian crisis is not dealt with, the problem of ISIS [will not be resolved], and the struggle against terrorism will not succeed &#8211; it will be just a waste of time, effort, and lives, and after ISIS, more groups [like] ISIS, but worse, will emerge.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;If Russia wants to turn over a new leaf [in its relations with] the Gulf, and play a more active role, the starting point, and the test of Russia&#8217;s seriousness, must be Syria. The real solution for the struggle against terrorism, ending Iranian expansionism, and restoring the balance in Iraq lies in Syria, and nowhere else.&#8221;<A name=\"_ednref13\"><\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_edn13\"><SUP>[13]<\/SUP><\/A><br \/>\n<P><B>Senior Saudi Diplomat Turki Al-Faisal: The Political Solution In Syria Takes Precedence Over War On Terror<\/B><br \/>\n<P>On July 30, 2015, the London-based Saudi daily <I>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/I> published an article coauthored by former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the U.S. Turki Al-Faisal, former Egyptian foreign minister and Arab League chairman 'Amr Moussa, former Jordanian foreign minister Abdulilah Khatib, and former Kuwaiti foreign minister Muhammad Al-Salem Al-Sabbah. The article, titled &#8222;Let the Syrians [Themselves] Decide Their Future,&#8221; presents a new initiative for resolving the Syria crisis, the gist of which is holding a national Syrian conference in which all political streams and forces, from both the regime and the opposition, will participate, in order to reach understandings about Syria&#8217;s future and on the form its future regime will take.<br \/>\n<P>The article states: &#8222;The Syrian people&#8230; is rooted deep within human civilization. Its history, which goes back thousands of years, is rich with cultural achievements and achievements in governance, and, if we allow it to do so, it will find its own way to save itself. Modern Syrian history includes an example [of this] in which the Syrians take pride and which they consider an honorable chapter of their political history: the 1919-1920 Syrian National Congress following the liberation of Syria during World War I. [At that time,] the Syrians themselves, with no intervention, decided to convene the congress in order to formulate the shape of the state that they wanted, and the regime it would have. Though their plan did not succeed, because France occupied their country&#8230; this [congress] is nevertheless a model to be emulated in building a new and promising future for Syria.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;We, the coauthors of this article, sincerely believe that convening an inclusive national Syrian conference, in which representatives of all the political forces, parties, and social elements in Syria will participate &#8211; [including] representatives of civil society and of cities, villages and tribes [across the country], both regime loyalists and regime opponents, however many they are &#8211; will ensure that the Syrians arrive at an understanding on the form of government and constitution that they want and that will meet their aspirations. [This will be possible] as long as they are provided with the conditions necessary for success.&#8221;<br \/>\n<P>The authors go on to stress that foreign countries and elements must have no hand in the conference, neither in selecting participants nor in directing it, setting its agenda, running its sessions, or influencing its decisions. Once the Syrians reach an understanding regarding the future of their state, they said, it will be easier to wage the fight against the extremist terrorist organizations: &#8222;The propaganda that is being spread constantly by the Syrian regime [notes] the option of holding such a constituent conference, [but of doing so only] after it has successfully eliminated what it calls terrorism. But Syria could sink and disintegrate even more, and even disappear as a single united country, if the regime insists, impossibly, on turning back the clock &#8211; and it will never manage to do this. Therefore, if the regime [truly] wants what is good for Syria, it must agree to the option of the conference, in order to save the state and its people.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;It might be difficult to think about a proposal like this under the current conditions, and under the shadow of the ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra presence in large areas of Syria. But this could be the only way to [separate] the Syrian crisis from [the issue of] terrorism and the fight against it. This is because when the Syrians agree on the solution to their problem, the distinction [between the political crisis and the war on terror] will be clear to all the forces in the Syrian arena, both making it easier to combat terrorism and legitimizing [the war on terror] among all the forces in the region&#8230;&#8221;<A name=\"_ednref14\"><\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_edn14\"><SUP>[14]<\/SUP><\/A><br \/>\n<P><B>&#8217;Al-Hayat&#8217; Editor: Diplomatic Compromise Is The Only Way Out Of The Current Hell <\/B><br \/>\n<P>Against the backdrop of the previous articles, an article by Ghassan Charbel, editor of the London-based Saudi daily <I>Al-Hayat<\/I>, stood out in contrast. Charbel argued that any future diplomatic solution attained in Syria would have no victor or vanquished. All the parties involved in the Syrian fighting, he wrote, including the countries that had supported them, would have to make painful compromises and &#8222;drink from the poisoned chalice,&#8221; because ISIS and the other terrorist organizations represented a greater danger to the countries supporting the Syrian opposition than to the Assad regime. He wrote:<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;As of now, no one can claim victory in this difficult war [in Syria]. The maximum that each party can claim is half a victory and half a defeat. The cruelest thing is that no solution in Syria can provide any party with gains or guarantees that can balance out the losses that it incurred. No party will obtain in negotiations the maximum that it failed to obtain in the battle arena. It is possible that for this reason some prefer the disasters involved in the continuation of the war to the disappointments that will be involved in a diplomatic solution &#8211; even despite the knowledge that this is the only way out of the current hell.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;The Syrian opposition cannot claim victory. Obviously it has managed to undermine the regime that has ruled in the country for over five decades with tough security control, and compelled it to retreat from part of the Syrian lands. But it has not managed to completely uproot it. Additionally, at the start of the protests, the opposition demanded a united and democratic Syria &#8211; but the areas [that it has conquered], and which should presumably be under its control, are ruled by anti-democratic and anti-pluralist elements that are opposed by a wide range of Syrians, as well as by regional and international parties.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;[Likewise], the regime cannot claim victory. [It is true that] it boasted repeatedly [of its victory,] but it later retreated and withdrew into an area representing 20% of Syrian soil&#8230; The regime can view its very survival as half a victory, but it is undeniable that its weakening constitutes half a defeat.<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;The states that supported the [Syrian] regime cannot claim victory [simply] because they prevented its removal. They can speak of half a victory, that guarantees the [regime&#8217;s] representatives a seat around the [diplomatic] solution table, and guarantees their places in the framework of efforts to attain the solution. Nevertheless, these countries cannot deny that they [have suffered] half a defeat, manifested in their fighting against the majority [of the Syrian people] and by the fact that their ally [Assad] is [now] situated on only a fraction of the Syrian map. Neither can the elements that supported the opposition complete victory, because the regime that they dreamed of removing still exists, even if it is weakened and defeated. They cannot deny that ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra, and their ilk pose a greater danger to them than the Assad regime and its alliance with Iran&#8230;<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;Any diplomatic solution in Syria will make each of the sides, inside and outside Syria, drink not insignificantly from the poisoned chalice. There is no solution in Syria that will give all the parties something to counterbalance the loss in life and other damage caused them. This is true for both the Sunnis and the 'Alawites&#8230; There is no solution that will give Iran a status similar to what it enjoyed before the outbreak of the fighting&#8230;<br \/>\n<P>&#8222;I k that the expression 'half a victory and half a defeat&#8217; is very painful to someone who lost dear ones to the barrel [bombs] and other weapons, to those scattered in wretched refugee camps, to those waiting a long time in the refugee camps of Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, and to those suffering the horror of the sunken [refugee] death ships. But this is the reality. No one won by a knockout. The one certain thing is that Syria itself was killed in the war &#8211; it is the biggest fatality.&#8221;<A name=\"_ednref15\"><\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_edn15\"><SUP>[15]<\/SUP><\/A><br \/>\n<P>Endnotes:<br \/>\n<P><A name=\"_edn1\"><\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref1\">[1]<\/A> <I>Al-Watan<\/I> (Syria), June 30, 2015.<A name=\"_edn2\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref2\">[2]<\/A>  Dp-news.com, July 22-23, 2015.<A name=\"_edn3\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref3\">[3]<\/A>  Elaph.com, August 2, 2015. <A name=\"_edn4\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref4\">[4]<\/A>  Alarabiya.net, August 1, 2015<A name=\"_edn5\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref5\">[5]<\/A> <I>Al-Akhbar<\/I> (Lebanon), July 31, 2015.<A name=\"_edn6\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref6\">[6]<\/A>  See MEMRI <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/6562.htm\" target=\"_blank\">Inquiry &#038; Analysis No. 867<\/A>, <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/6562.htm\">Amidst Accusations Of Collaborating With Assad, Russia, And Iran, UN Envoy Annan Resigns In Failure<\/A>, August 02, 2012.<A name=\"_edn7\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref7\">[7]<\/A>  Orient-news.net, August 3, 2015. <A name=\"_edn8\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref8\">[8]<\/A>  Alarab.co.uk, August 1, 2015. <A name=\"_edn9\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref9\">[9]<\/A> <I>Al-Watan <\/I>(Saudi Arabia), August 4, 2015; State.gov\/r\/pa\/prs\/ps\/2015\/08\/245619.htm, August 3, 2015. <A name=\"_edn10\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref10\">[10]<\/A>  Mid.ru, August 3, 2015. <A name=\"_edn11\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref11\">[11]<\/A> <I>Al-Watan<\/I>, (Saudi Arabia), August 4, 2015. <A name=\"_edn12\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref12\">[12]<\/A> <I>Al-Riyadh <\/I>(Saudi Arabia), August 3, 2015. <A name=\"_edn13\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref13\">[13]<\/A> <I>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/I> (London), August 3, 2015.<A name=\"_edn14\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref14\">[14]<\/A> <I>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/I> (London), July 30, 2015.<A name=\"_edn15\"><BR><br \/>\n<\/A> <A href=\"http:\/\/www.memri.org\/report\/en\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/0\/8691.htm#_ednref15\">[15]<\/A> <I>Al-Hayat <\/I>(London), August 3, 2015.<br \/>\n<P><br \/>\n<P><B>Visit the MEMRI site in Polish: <\/B><A href=\"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/\"><B>http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/<\/B><\/A><br \/>\n<P><B>If you wish to reply, please send your email to <\/B><A href=\"javascript:void(0)\"><B>memri@memrieurope.org<\/B><\/A> <B>. <\/B><br \/>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>W dniu 3 sierpnia 2015 roku w stolicy Kataru, Doha, mia\u0142 miejsce cykl spotka\u0144 z udzia\u0142em ministra spraw zagranicznych Rosji Siergieja \u0141awrowa, sekretarza stanu USA Johna Kerry&#8217;ego i ministrami spraw zagranicznych pa\u0144stw Rady Wsp\u00f3\u0142pracy Zatoki (GCC). Spotkania, kt\u00f3re koncentrowa\u0142y si\u0119 na uk\u0142adzie j\u0105drowym z Iranem z 14 lipca 2015 roku &#8211; Wsp\u00f3lny Kompleksowy Plan Dzia\u0142ania [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824,826,835,837],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3614","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-specjalne-komunikaty","category-arabia-saudyjska","category-archiwum","category-kraje"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3614","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3614"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3614\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3614"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3614"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3614"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}