Wprowadzenie<\/b><\/p>\n
Oficjalne stanowisko Iranu o publikacji rzekomej fatwy ira\u0144skiego Najwy\u017cszego Przyw\u00f3dcy Alego Chameneiego dotycz\u0105cej broni nuklearnej, wyra\u017cone jest w dw\u00f3ch g\u0142\u00f3wnych \u017ar\u00f3d\u0142ach otwartych:<\/p>\n
1) Wzmiance o rzekomej fatwie w wywiadzie, w kt\u00f3rym prezydent ira\u0144ski Hassan Rohani nawi\u0105za\u0142 do kazania pi\u0105tkowego z 2004 r. wyg\u0142oszonego przez Chameneiego (patrz Aneks: Iranian President Rohani’s May 2012 Reference To Khamenei’s Alleged Fatwa<\/b>, gdzie wspomina o publikacji fatwy, kt\u00f3r\u0105, jak twierdzi, Chamenei wyda\u0142 w listopadzie 2004 r.) oraz wyja\u015bni\u0142, \u017ce sam zainicjowa\u0142 przedstawienie tej fatwy EU3 jako gwarancji, \u017ce Iran nie d\u0105\u017cy do produkcji broni nuklearnej.<\/p>\n
2) W marcu 2012 r. grupa ira\u0144ska poprosi\u0142a Najwy\u017cszego Przyw\u00f3dc\u0119 Chameneiego o wydanie fatwy o broni nuklearnej, a nast\u0119pnie og\u0142osi\u0142a swoj\u0105 odpowied\u017a.<\/p>\n
Poni\u017cej przedstawiamy analiz\u0119 tych dw\u00f3ch \u017ar\u00f3de\u0142, dowodz\u0105c, \u017ce twierdzenie re\u017cimu ira\u0144skiego, i\u017c taka fatwa istnieje, jest k\u0142amstwem:<\/p>\n
Kazanie Chameneiego z pi\u0105tku 5 listopada 2004 r. <\/b><\/p>\n
Przede wszystkim nale\u017cy wyja\u015bni\u0107, \u017ce kiedy prezydent Rohani wspomina rzekom\u0105 fatw\u0119, nawi\u0105zuje on do kazania pi\u0105tkowego Chameneiego z 5 listopada 2004 r. w Teheranie, nie za\u015b do fatwy (patrz Aneks<\/b>). To samo dotyczy wszystkich odno\u015bnik\u00f3w do fatwy, czynionych przez cz\u0142onk\u00f3w re\u017cimu ira\u0144skiego, kt\u00f3rzy twierdz\u0105, \u017ce m\u00f3wi\u0105 o fatwie Chameneiego, ale w rzeczywisto\u015bci m\u00f3wi\u0105 o przem\u00f3wieniach, kazaniach, wypowiedziach lub komunikatach wysy\u0142anych przez Chameneiego do ludzi za granic\u0105. Nigdy i w \u017cadnym wypadku nie by\u0142o odniesienia do fatwy. Chamenei ma dwie witryny internetowe (tutaj<\/A> i tutaj<\/A> ), z kt\u00f3rych obie zawieraj\u0105 specjalny dzia\u0142 po\u015bwi\u0119cony wydanym przez niego fatwom. Kazania, wypowiedzi i komunikaty nie s\u0105 w\u0142\u0105czone do \u017cadnego z tych dzia\u0142\u00f3w fatw.<\/p>\n Ponadto, tre\u015b\u0107 tego kazania z 2004 r. musi zosta\u0107 zanalizowana, \u017ceby zobaczy\u0107, czy zawarte w nim s\u0142owa o broni nuklearnej obejmuj\u0105 prawne orzeczenie, \u017ce bro\u0144 nuklearna jest zabroniona.<\/p>\n W kazaniu tym Chamenei powiedzia\u0142 o broni nuklearnej: \u201cWidz\u0105 oni, \u017ce Islamska Republika [Iranu] trzyma g\u0142ow\u0119 wysoko pod wszystkimi tymi naciskami i wbrew ich oczekiwaniom \u2013 [tj., \u017ce] zdusz\u0105 go pod tymi naciskami \u2013 [Iran] stoi teraz mocno, z wypi\u0119t\u0105 piersi\u0105, dzi\u0119ki \u017cywemu narodowi i ca\u0142ej m\u0142odzie\u017cy, i ignoruje te gro\u017aby.<\/p>\n Wr\u00f3g jest zatem zestresowany i z tego powodu rzuca oskar\u017cenia [przeciwko nam, \u017ce \u201cchcemy rozwin\u0105\u0107 bro\u0144 nuklearn\u0105\u2019. Nie, nie my\u015blimy o broni nuklearnej. M\u00f3wili\u015bmy wiele razy, \u017ce nasz\u0105 broni\u0105 nuklearn\u0105 jest ten nar\u00f3d [ira\u0144ski] Nasz\u0105 broni\u0105 nuklearn\u0105 jest ta m\u0142odzie\u017c. Nie chcemy broni nuklearnej. Ten re\u017cim, kt\u00f3ry ma ca\u0142\u0105 t\u0119 wierz\u0105c\u0105 m\u0142odzie\u017c i ten zjednoczony nar\u00f3d, nie potrzebuje broni nuklearnej.<\/p>\n Bro\u0144 nuklearna, jej produkcja, magazynowanie i u\u017cycie \u2013 wszystko to jest problematyczne. Wyrazili\u015bmy tak\u017ce nasz\u0105 opini\u0119 prawoznawcz\u0105. Jest jasna i wszyscy j\u0105 znaj\u0105. Sp\u00f3r nie jest o tej [kwestii]. Oni [wr\u00f3g] tylko to m\u00f3wi\u0105 [tj. \u017be chcemy broni nuklearnej]; oni sami tak\u017ce wiedz\u0105. S\u0105 rozgoryczeni faktem, Republika Islamska osi\u0105gn\u0119\u0142a taki post\u0119p. To jest kwesti\u0105 [sporn\u0105]”<\/A> [1]<\/A> .<\/p>\n Z powy\u017cszej wypowiedzi wynika jasno, \u017ce Chamenei nie m\u00f3wi o broni nuklearnej jako o prawoznawczym zakazie, ale jako o kwestii [problematycznej\u201d (eszkali<\/i>). Nale\u017cy tak\u017ce zauwa\u017cy\u0107, \u017ce fatwa prawoznawcy jest w swej istocie ustaleniem, co jest zakazane, a co jest dozwolone z punktu widzenia prawoznawczego, nie jest za\u015b tylko przedstawieniem jakiejkolwiek sprawy jako \u201eproblematycznej\u201d.<\/p>\n Nale\u017cy ponadto wyja\u015bni\u0107, \u017ce w dokumentacji kaza\u0144 Chameneiego istnieje wyra\u017ane rozr\u00f3\u017cnienie mi\u0119dzy prawoznawczymi kazaniami \u2013 to jest, fatwami \u2013 a politycznymi; to konkretne kazanie umieszczone jest w sekcji politycznej, nie za\u015b prawoznawczej.<\/p>\n Istotnie, ta polityczna wypowied\u017a, kt\u00f3ra nie zawiera \u017cadnego rodzaju zakazu, nie znajduje si\u0119 tak\u017ce w dziale fatw \u017cadnej z witryn internetowych Chameneiego \u2013 ani jako fatwa sama w sobie, ani w \u017cadnym w og\u00f3le odno\u015bniku do niej.<\/p>\n Odpowied\u017a Chameneiego na pro\u015bb\u0119 z 2012 r. o fatw\u0119 w sprawie broni nuklearnej <\/b><\/p>\n W 2012 r. Chamenei zosta\u0142 poproszony przez grup\u0119 ira\u0144sk\u0105 o nazwie \u015awiat\u0142o Wolno\u015bci (Cheragh-e Azadi) o wydanie fatwy na temat zakazu broni nuklearnej, ale powstrzyma\u0142 si\u0119 przed zrobieniem tego. Gdyby Chamenei wyda\u0142 tak\u0105 fatw\u0119 w przesz\u0142o\u015bci, jest logiczne, \u017ce wspomnia\u0142by j\u0105 w odpowiedzi na t\u0119 pro\u015bb\u0119.<\/p>\n Chamenei powstrzyma\u0142 si\u0119 tak\u017ce w kontek\u015bcie tej pro\u015bby o fatw\u0119 od wspomnienia kt\u00f3rejkolwiek ze swoich wypowiedzi, kaza\u0144 i komunikat\u00f3w w tej sprawie \u2013 mimo \u017ce m\u00f3wi\u0142 o nich przy poprzednich okazjach. To jest, powstrzyma\u0142 si\u0119 przed powi\u0105zaniem ich w tym kontek\u015bcie wydawania fatwy.<\/p>\n Odpowiedzi\u0105 Chameneiego dla Cheragh-e Azadi by\u0142o, \u017ce kwestia, kt\u00f3rej dotyczy ich pytanie, nie ma \u017cadnego aspektu prawoznawczego \u2013 i \u017ce kiedy b\u0119dzie mia\u0142a aspekt prawoznawczy, w\u00f3wczas da odpowied\u017a. Jego ko\u0144cowa, prawoznawcza opinia stwierdza\u0142a: \u201e\u017badna odpowied\u017a nie zosta\u0142a udzielona\u201d.<\/p>\n Poni\u017cej podajemy t\u0142umaczenie pro\u015bby Cheragh-e Azadi oraz odpowied\u017a Chameneiego (podkre\u015blenia MEMRI):<\/p>\n P: Wasza Ekscelencja og\u0142osi\u0142a zakaz u\u017cycia broni nuklearnej, bior\u0105c za\u015b pod uwag\u0119, \u017ce bro\u0144 nuklearna jest wymagana do odstraszania i \u017ce celem zdobycia jej jest zastraszenie wrog\u00f3w w celu powstrzymania ich przed dzia\u0142aniami agresywnymi, jak r\u00f3wnie\u017c w \u015bwietle tego co jest napisane w Surat Al-Anfal, werset 60\u2026 czy jest tak\u017ce zabronione zdobycie broni nuklearnej jak wed\u0142ug orzeczenia [Waszej Ekscelencji], \u017ce zabronione jest jej u\u017cycie? <\/b><\/i><\/p>\n O: Wasz list nie ma \u017cadnego aspektu prawoznawczego. Kiedy b\u0119dzie mia\u0142 pozycj\u0119 prawoznawcz\u0105, wtedy b\u0119dzie mo\u017cliwe udzielenie na niego odpowiedzi.<\/p>\n „Podsumowanie: \u017badna odpowied\u017a nie zosta\u0142a udzielona”<\/b><\/A> [2]<\/A> .<\/p>\n Inne wyja\u015bnienia nieobecno\u015bci fatwy Chameneiego o broni nuklearnej <\/b><\/p>\n Wielu obserwator\u00f3w na Zachodzie wypowiada\u0142o rozmaite twierdzenia w pr\u00f3bie wyja\u015bnienia nieobecno\u015bci fatwy Chameneiego o broni nuklearnej, w\u0142\u0105cznie z nast\u0119puj\u0105cymi:<\/p>\n 1) Wypowiedzi Chameneiego same w sobie stanowi\u0105 fatw\u0119<\/p>\n 2) Fatwa mo\u017ce by\u0107 wydana ustnie<\/p>\n 3) Wed\u0142ug bada\u0144 analizuj\u0105cych fatwy \u015bredniowieczne, fatwa nie ma sta\u0142ego formatu; nie zawsze dotyczy kogo\u015b zadaj\u0105cego pytanie, ale mo\u017ce by\u0107 zainicjowana przez samego prawoznawc\u0119.<\/p>\n Raz jeszcze trzeba wyja\u015bni\u0107, \u017ce Chamenei prowadzi dwie witryny internetowe z dzia\u0142ami po\u015bwi\u0119conymi jego fatwom, gdzie publikuje swoje orzeczenia prawoznawcze. Istotne tutaj jest to, jak sam Chamenei publikuje swoje opinie prawoznawcze, nie za\u015b jak to robiono przed wiekami. To jest standard, wed\u0142ug kt\u00f3rego trzeba mierzy\u0107 kwesti\u0119 fatwy zakazuj\u0105cej broni nuklearnej.<\/p>\n Jest niewyobra\u017calne, \u017ceby Chamenei, skrupulatnie trzyma\u0142by si\u0119 ustalonego, zaakceptowanego formatu dla wszystkich fatw, kt\u00f3re wydaje na wszystkie tematy, poza fatw\u0105 na temat broni nuklearnej, kt\u00f3ra ma takie nies\u0142ychane znaczenie mi\u0119dzynarodowe. Nic nie przeszkadza mu jeszcze dzisiaj napisa\u0107 kr\u00f3tkiego orzeczenia prawoznawczego na ten temat i opublikowa\u0107 go na jednej ze swoich witryn internetowych \u2013 w dodatku do publikowania swoich wypowiedzi politycznych. Ponadto by\u0142oby rzecz\u0105 ca\u0142kowicie w\u0142a\u015bciw\u0105, gdyby wszystkie jego wypowiedzi polityczne na temat broni nuklearnej pojawi\u0142y si\u0119 w dzia\u0142ach fatw na jego witrynach internetowych, gdyby chcia\u0142 da\u0107 do zrozumienia, \u017ce sam uwa\u017ca je za fatwy. Nie robi jednak nawet tego; jego wypowiedzi polityczne znajduj\u0105 si\u0119 w innych dzia\u0142ach jego witryn internetowych, nie za\u015b w dzia\u0142ach po\u015bwieconych fatwom i \u017cadna opublikowana przez niego fatwa nie zawiera \u017cadnego odniesienia do broni nuklearnej (patrz MEMRI Seria Specjalnych Komunikat\u00f3w – Nr 5406 – 13 sierpnia 2013 <\/i>Opublikowanie zestawu najnowszych fatw ira\u0144skiego Najwy\u017cszego Przyw\u00f3dcy Chameneiego \u2013 bez rzekomej fatwy o bombie nuklearnej <\/b><\/A> ).<\/p>\n Twierdzenie, \u017ce ustne wypowiedzi Chameneiego same stanowi\u0105 fatwy, uniewa\u017cnia znaczenie fatwy prawoznawczej. Gdyby ka\u017cda wypowied\u017a, przem\u00f3wienie lub kazanie Chameneiego by\u0142o uznawane za fatw\u0119, to r\u00f3wnie\u017c by\u0142aby ni\u0105 jego krytyka z 2012 r. przyw\u00f3dcy libijskiego Muammara Kaddafiego za przekazanie wszystkich tajnych instalacji nuklearnych USA w zamian za przywileje od Zachodu. Ta wypowied\u017a Chameneiego jest p\u00f3\u017aniejsza ni\u017c jego wcze\u015bniejsze wypowiedzi w kwestii nuklearnej i dlatego uniewa\u017cnia je. Chamenei powiedzia\u0142 20 marca 2012 r. (Maszhad 1390) w przem\u00f3wieniu na perski Nowy Rok: \u201eTen pan [Kaddafi] zapakowa\u0142 wszystkie swoje instalacje nuklearne, za\u0142adowa\u0142 je na okr\u0119t i dostarczy\u0142 Zachodowi, i powiedzia\u0142 \u2019We\u017acie je!\u2019Sp\u00f3jrzcie w jakiej sytuacji jest nasz nar\u00f3d i w jakiej sytuacji oni [tj. Libijczycy] s\u0105 [teraz]\u201d.<\/A> [4]<\/A> <\/p>\n *Y. Carmon jest prezydentem MEMRI; A. Savyon jest dyrektork\u0105 Iranian Media Project w MEMRI. <\/i><\/p>\n [w poni\u017cszym aneksie (w j\u0119zyku angielskim) znajduj\u0105 si\u0119 artyku\u0142 i wywiad z Rohanim, w kt\u00f3rych m\u00f3wi on o rzekomej fatwie Chameneiego]<\/i><\/p>\n Aneks: Iranian President Rohani’s May 2012 Reference To Khamenei’s Alleged Fatwa<\/b><\/A> [5]<\/A> <\/p>\n The following is an article and interview with Rohani conducted and translated by Muhammad Sahimi, and published by PBS on May 12, 2012. Note: All emphases in the text are added by MEMRI.<\/p>\n „Q&A | Former Iran Nuclear Negotiator: Bush Negotiation Bid Was Rebuffed<\/p>\n „by MUHAMMAD SAHIMI (translator)<\/p>\n „12 May 2012 04:044 Comments<\/A> <\/p>\n „Claims then IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei tried to facilitate direct, comprehensive talks proposed by U.S. president in 2004.<\/i><\/p>\n „[interview]<\/b>Translator’s note:<\/i> Dr. Hassan Fereydoun Rowhani was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator during the second term of former President Mohammad Khatami, and led the crucial negotiations between Iran and the European troika of Britain, France, and Germany from 2003 to 2005 that led to the Sa’dabad Agreement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004. The two agreements opened Iran’s nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and committed Iran to voluntary<\/i> implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. (Iran suspended that implementation in January 2006.)<\/p>\n „Born on November 12, 1948, in Sorkheh, a small town in Semnan province east of Tehran, Rowhani<\/A> moved to Qom in 1961 to begin his seminary education. He was a student of prominent grand ayatollahs, such as Seyyed Mohammad Moghegh Damad, Seyyed Mohammad Reza Golpayegani, and Morteza Haeri. He also studied law at the University of Tehran, where he received his B.A. in 1972. He was active against the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and was arrested numerous times, first in 1964 when he was only 16. In a speech in October 1977 at the memorial for Mostafa Khomeini, the oldest son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, it was Rowhani who referred to the ayatollah as the „Imam<\/A> ” for the first time. In 1978 he moved to Great Britain and received his M.Phil. and then Ph.D. in constitutional law from the University of Glasgow.<\/p>\n „Rowhani was a five-term Majles deputy, serving in parliament from 1980 to 2000; he was first deputy speaker during his final eight years, in the Fourth and Fifth Majles. He also held important military positions during the war with Iraq: armed forces deputy commander-in-chief (1983-84), Khatamolanbia war headquarters commander (1985-88), war effort mobilization chief (1986-88), and national air defense commander (1985-91). After the Constitution of the Islamic Republic was revised in 1989, leading to the formation of the Supreme National Security Council, Rowhani served as its secretary-general and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s representative for 16 years during the administrations of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami. He remains a member of the Security Council, as well as the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council, which Rafsanjani chairs. Rowhani currently heads the Expediency Discernment Council’s Center for Strategic Studies.<\/p>\n „In addition to publishing his memoirs<\/A>, Rowhani is about to come out with a book, Sterateji-ye Amniat-e Melli Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (National Security Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran),<\/i> which has already attracted considerable attention due to the various influential security posts he has held. The magazine Mehr Nameh,<\/i> which received an advance copy of the two-volume work, interviewed<\/A> Rowhani about its many revelations. — Muhammad Sahimi<\/i><\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n „The present administration [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s] has been using the fatwa of the Supreme Leader (SL) banning nuclear weapons, whereas your book points out that this happened quite sometime ago, and was even brought up by the previous nuclear negotiation team that you led<\/i><\/b>. Your book even discusses the fact that it was suggested to write the fatwa into a law to be put to a vote of the Majles. Our first question is, Whose idea was this? Yours? What was the view of the SL about it?”<\/b><\/i><\/p>\n „The fatwa was first discussed by the SL in a Friday prayer sermon [many years ago].”<\/b><\/p>\n „Did the content of the fatwa include both production of nuclear weapons and their use?” „Was this your idea, or had it already been discussed in the think tank of the nezaam [the Islamic Republic’s political system]?” „Did the Europeans know the concept of fatwa?” „Did they know the concept of fatwa? Did they know its religious implication?” „How was the legislation going to transform the fatwa into a law? Was this intended to give the Europeans more confidence to? Why did this not happen, and the fatwa did not become the law of the land?” „When was this discussed? In the Sixth [2000-04] or Seventh Majles [2004-08]?” „According to your book, the failure of the negotiations with Europe was caused by two factors. One was the change in the balance of power in the country [after Ahmadinejad was elected president], and the second was the pressure by the United States. Which one do you think was more influential?” „Why did Iran not negotiate with the U.S., like the present where the U.S. is directly involved?” „Was there a debate about negotiating with the U.S. at all that resulted in the decision?” „The request was not accepted?” „In fact, the Americans had taken the first step [toward negotiation].” „In your book you say that in the relations with Saudi Arabia a comprehensive and strategic agreement was being reached, meaning that you, as the authoritative envoy of the nezaam, negotiated with the Saudis. But it was stopped in the new [Ahmadinejad] government. Was this not a policy of the nezaam to reach agreement with the Arabs and Saudi Arabia, and advance the nuclear negotiations?” „In your book, you said that both Arabs and Israel were creating obstructions to nuclear dossier [negotiations]. Israel[’s action] is understandable. But why the Arabs?” „The next nuclear negotiation team [under Ahmadinejad] turned toward the East. Did you not think about negotiating with China and Russia? And, after the eastward turn failed, the same policy was pursued with Brazil and Turkey, which is still continuing with Turkey. Why did you not pay attention to such issues and choices?” „Were these issues not discussed in the SNSC, given that you were still the SL’s representative to the Council?” „What about Turkey and Brazil? Are they only intermediary, or are they effective powers that can be used?” „South Africa also had nuclear power, right?” „Thus, we helped Turkey to become a player.” „What about Brazil?” „In your book, you talk about your meeting with [Jacques] Chirac, former French president, and pointed out his request for Iran’s help regarding Hezbollah in Lebanon and the region’s problems. Do you think that the change in the government in Iran [after Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005] and in France [after Nicolas Sarkozy was elected president in 2007] caused the failure of nuclear negotiations at that time?” „What about [former British Prime Minister Tony] Blair? Was he not Bush’s replacement in his antagonism toward Iran?”<\/i> „What is the reason for the lack of a comprehensive regional vision in our country? What is our nezaam’s strategy? Do we want to stand up to the West and confront them, or do we want to have relations with them, while preserving our identity and independence?” „You mention in your book that Mr. [Gholam Reza] Aghazadeh [then president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)] gave a report to the SL, and after reading it the SL had doubts about the [November 2004] Paris Agreement. Thus, such hasty actions have also been taken from our side.” „No one was predicting it?” „If it had been foreseen, would the risk have been taken?” „The first time that the SL told us to begin the operation of the Isfahan site was on April 27, 2005, whereas the new government took over in August of that year. Thus, the decision had nothing to do with Ahmadinejad’s government. I told the SL about the problems and consequences of our action, but the SL said that we should start the operations of the Isfahan site. I informed the Europeans about our decision. They did not have much problem with it, but could not obtain the U.S.’s agreement. […] The U.S. wanted to wait to see who would replace Mr. Khatami and wait until the next government took over.”<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n „In his book, Rowhani also mentions that he and Mir Hossein Mousavi were the first officials to visit the Isfahan uranium enrichment facility while it was still under construction. According to Rowhani’s account, Mousavi said at some point that uranium enrichment was as important to Iran as oil nationalization had been.<\/p>\n It is interesting that this interview has been released now, given that Iranian news outlets reported Rowhani’s visit to Vienna in March without his clerical garb. As noted here<\/A>, sources close to Ahmadinejad have alleged that Rowhani and people close to him and Rafsanjani were active behind the scenes leading up to the recent Istanbul talks<\/A> concerning Iran’s nuclear activities.”<\/p>\n „Copyright \u00a9 2012 Tehran Bureau”<\/p>\n Przypisy (nie spolszczone):<\/p>\n <\/A> [1]<\/A> www.leader.ir<\/A>, November 5, 2004.<\/p>\n <\/A> [2]<\/A> http:\/\/www.facebook.com\/note.php?note_id=10150621838771859<\/A> . See also MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 825, Renewed Iran-West Nuclear Talks \u2013 Part II: Tehran Attempts to Deceive U.S. President Obama, Sec’y of State Clinton With Nonexistent Anti-Nuclear Weapons Fatwa By Supreme Leader Khamenei<\/A>, August 19, 2012.<\/p>\n <\/A> [3]<\/A> http:\/\/www.facebook.com\/note.php?note_id=10150621838771859<\/A> . See also MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 825, Renewed Iran-West Nuclear Talks \u2013 Part II: Tehran Attempts to Deceive U.S. President Obama, Sec’y of State Clinton With Nonexistent Anti-Nuclear Weapons Fatwa By Supreme Leader Khamenei<\/A>, August 19, 2012.<\/p>\n <\/A> [4]<\/A> The text of Khamenei’s address can be read on Khamenei’s website<\/A> and a video of it can be viewed here<\/A> . The following is the original Persian:<\/p>\n \u062b\u0644\u0627\u064b \u062f\u0631 \u0644\u064a\u0628\u0649 \u0628\u0627 \u0627\u064a\u0646\u0643\u0647 \u0642\u0630\u0627\u0641\u0649 \u062f\u0631 \u0633\u0627\u0644\u0647\u0627\u0649 \u0627\u0648\u0644\u0650 \u0631\u0648\u0649 \u0643\u0627\u0631 \u0622\u0645\u062f\u0646\u060c \u06af\u0631\u0627\u064a\u0634 \u0636\u062f \u063a\u0631\u0628\u0649 \u0646\u0634\u0627\u0646 \u0645\u064a\u062f\u0627\u062f\u060c \u0627\u0645\u0627 \u062f\u0631 \u0633\u0627\u0644\u0647\u0627\u0649 \u0627\u062e\u064a\u0631 \u062e\u062f\u0645\u0627\u062a \u0628\u0632\u0631\u06af\u0649 \u0628\u0647 \u063a\u0631\u0628\u0649\u200c\u0647\u0627 \u0643\u0631\u062f. \u0622\u0646\u0647\u0627 \u0647\u0645 \u0628\u0647 \u0686\u0634\u0645 \u062e\u0648\u062f\u0634\u0627\u0646 \u062f\u064a\u062f\u0646\u062f \u0643\u0647 \u0628\u0627 \u064a\u0643 \u062a\u0647\u062f\u064a\u062f \u062e\u0634\u0643 \u0648 \u062e\u0627\u0644\u0649\u060c \u0627\u064a\u0646 \u0622\u0642\u0627 \u0627\u0645\u0643\u0627\u0646\u0627\u062a \u0647\u0633\u062a\u0647\u200c\u0627\u0649 \u062e\u0648\u062f\u0634 \u0631\u0627 \u062c\u0645\u0639 \u0643\u0631\u062f\u060c \u0647\u0645\u0647 \u0631\u0627 \u0633\u0648\u0627\u0631 \u0643\u0634\u062a\u0649 \u0643\u0631\u062f\u060c \u062f\u0627\u062f \u0628\u0647 \u063a\u0631\u0628\u0649\u200c\u0647\u0627\u060c \u06af\u0641\u062a \u0628\u0628\u0631\u064a\u062f! \u0628\u0628\u064a\u0646\u064a\u062f \u0645\u0644\u062a \u0645\u0627 \u062f\u0631 \u0686\u0647 \u0648\u0636\u0639\u064a\u062a\u0649 \u0642\u0631\u0627\u0631 \u062f\u0627\u0631\u062f\u060c \u0622\u0646\u0647\u0627 \u062f\u0631 \u0686\u0647 \u0648\u0636\u0639\u064a\u062a\u0649 \u0642\u0631\u0627\u0631 \u062f\u0627\u0631\u0646\u062f.<\/b><\/A> [5]<\/A> PBS, May 12, 2012, http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/tehranbureau\/2012\/05\/qa-former-iran-nuclear-negotiator-bush-negotiation-bid-was-rebuffed.html#ixzz2gkG0EJlr<\/A> Wprowadzenie Oficjalne stanowisko Iranu o publikacji rzekomej fatwy ira\u0144skiego Najwy\u017cszego Przyw\u00f3dcy Alego Chameneiego dotycz\u0105cej broni nuklearnej, wyra\u017cone jest w dw\u00f3ch g\u0142\u00f3wnych \u017ar\u00f3d\u0142ach otwartych: 1) Wzmiance o rzekomej fatwie w wywiadzie, w kt\u00f3rym prezydent ira\u0144ski Hassan Rohani nawi\u0105za\u0142 do kazania pi\u0105tkowego z 2004 r. wyg\u0142oszonego przez Chameneiego (patrz Aneks: Iranian President Rohani’s May 2012 Reference To […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4490,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[827,833,835,837],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3091","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-iran","category-badania-i-analizy","category-archiwum","category-kraje"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3091","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3091"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3091\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4492,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3091\/revisions\/4492"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4490"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3091"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3091"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3091"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![](\"http:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polaco\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/16679.jpg\")
\n Pytanie do Chameneiego o zakaz broni nuklearnej<\/A> [3]<\/A> <\/i><\/p>\n
\n <\/i><\/b>„When the SL discussed it, he mentioned production, storage, and use. I believe it was in early November 2004 that the SL talked about it at the University of Tehran [where the capital’s Friday Prayers are held].<\/b>That was when we were on the verge of [signing] the Paris Agreement. The agreement mentioned Iran’s guarantees [to not produce nuclear weapons], but the European troika emphasized strong guarantees and strong commitments. My first negotiation with the European ministers [following the fatwa] was on December 13, 2004, a month after the fatwa. I told them that our most important discussion should be reaching an agreement about our guarantees, and your guarantees and strong commitments<\/b>. […] In a negotiation session, the discussions were over the type of guarantees that the Europeans could give us. The representative of [Javier] Solana [then European Union foreign policy chief] suggested the word mohkam<\/i> [strong], and our team accepted it. But our European counterparts did not appear happy with the suggestion of Solana’s representative. I told the three European ministers that they should know about two explicit guarantees from our side, one of which is the fatwa of the SL. He issued the fatwa and declared the production of nuclear weapons haram<\/i> [forbidden]. This fatwa is more important to us than the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and its Additional Protocol, more important than any other law.”<\/b><\/p>\n
\n <\/i><\/b>„No, it occurred to me right there to bring it up.”<\/b><\/p>\n
\n <\/i><\/b>„Yes, they had heard about the word „fatwa” and understood its meaning.”<\/b><\/p>\n
\n <\/i><\/b>„In principle, the Europeans are more or less familiar with fatwa. The word was even used without translation in articles written by Westerners, similar to the way „ayatollah” is used precisely. At the same time, they also knew about the fatwa concerning Salman Rushdie [issued by Khomeini in 1989, sentencing the author to death]. Thus, they were aware of the religious significance of fatwa.<\/b> The second guarantee that I gave them was that expanding our relations with the troika was by itself a guarantee. If our economic and political relations with you [the troika] are expanded to the point of being strategic relations, that would be the best guarantee, because a country that has the highest relations with Europe will not be willing to hurt those relations in order to produce nuclear weapons. The French team kept repeating that they wanted strategic relations with us.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i><\/b>„We were not pursuing this. Under certain conditions, it was possible for the government to introduce the legislation that [would guarantee that] we would not leave the NPT. This was a confidence-building measure for the West to be sure that our nuclear program would not be deviated [from its peaceful path]. They were saying that the SL’s fatwa is very good, and if it becomes the law, it will eliminate the West’s concerns.”<\/b><\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„In the Seventh Majles.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„The most important factor was the obstructionism of the Americans. The Europeans said this later. In 2006, I traveled to Berlin, when I was no longer secretary-general of the SNSC [Supreme National Security Council], and met with [Joschka] Fischer, who was no longer Germany’s foreign minister. He told me that we [the Europeans] had reached an agreement with you [Iran], but the U.S. stopped it. I believe we could have easily reached an agreement about [the uranium conversion facility in] Isfahan, and the agreement had been reached, but the Americans were the impediment. Because the United State was not a participant in the negotiations, it was exerting pressure from outside.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„It was the decision of the nezaam<\/i> not to negotiate with the U.S. This was the decision and, thus, the U.S. was set aside. At that time, I said in an interview that we had to choose between a bicycle, a Paykan [a notoriously unreliable Iranian car, no longer produced], and a Mercedes-Benz. Well, the decision was made not to ride in the Mercedes [the U.S.], so we stayed with the Paykan [the Europeans] and the bicycle [the nonaligned nations]. Thus, we rode Paykan. As a matter of fact, the Europeans complained about this and told us that we had insulted them.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„There was always this discussion. Once even Mr. [Mohamed] ElBaradei [then IAEA director-general] went to Washington and called me. It was March 2004. He said he wanted to come to Tehran, and arrived here quickly. I was surprised that he came here so quickly. He supposedly came to Tehran for matters between Iran and the IAEA. But he told me that he wanted to talk to me privately. In the private meeting, he told me that he was in Washington the week before and had told [President George W.] Bush that the U.S. should participate in the negotiations to address the nuclear problems. Bush responded, Why [just] the nuclear issue? Why should we not resolve all the issues between us? Bush had told ElBaradei that he was not familiar with the situation in Iran and who has the ultimate power, but an Iranian representative with the authority to make a deal should go to the U.S. and Bush himself would personally lead the negotiations. „Why should we have differences, and our problems remain unsolved,” Bush said [according to ElBaradei]. ElBaradei told me that this was a good opportunity, and the Americans are willing and have stepped forward. Send someone from Iran to the U.S. with authority to solve the problems. There are so many problems in the region, and their solution is tied to the resolution of your problems with the U.S.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„At that time, the decision was that we should not negotiate with the U.S.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„Yes.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„There was a consensus that we should have good relations with Saudi Arabia. No one within the nezaam<\/i> was opposed to it. I went to Saudi Arabia for the first time in 1998. At that time Saudi Arabia had accused us of involvement in the Khobar [Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. military personnel and one Saudi]. I went to Saudi Arabia as the secretary-general of the SNSC. From their side, [Prince] Nayef [ibn Abdul-Aziz al-Saud] took part in the negotiations. The negotiations began at 10 p.m. and lasted until 5 a.m. the next morning. We finally agreed on a security agreement. I returned to Saudi Arabia in 2005, and had extensive discussions about the region, mutual problems between us, and the nuclear problems. We agreed with Nayef to form four committees. They were supposed to convene every few months and pursue the issues. After I left [the post of] secretary-general, none of the committees were formed and there were no meetings.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„The Arabs were unhappy that the balance of power had shifted [after the U.S. invasion of Iraq]. They always thought that there was a balance of power between Iran and Iraq [under Saddam Hussein]. Iran was a major power, [but the] Iraq military was also a power in the region, and the Arabs thoughts that it could stand up to Iran. After Saddam was overthrown, the balance was gone. Saudi Arabia had helped the Taliban [in Afghanistan] to create problems for Iran, but their government too was overthrown. Thus, Iran’s position was strengthened. It was then that the nuclear issue was brought to the fore. Thus, they [the Arabs] tried to pressure Iran through the nuclear issue, because they considered nuclear power Iran’s strength. We knew that they were pressuring [the West to pressure Iran], but did not know that the pressure was high. The Europeans told us to try to lower the pressure of our neighbors. Currently, Israel, the U.S., and the Arabs are pressuring us.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„China and Russia had their own rationale regarding Iran’s nuclear program. For example, Russia believed that Iran must not possess the complete cycle for producing nuclear fuel, which was the same as the West’s view, except that their tone was different. When the European ministers wrote letters to us demanding that we suspend our nuclear fuel cycle, the Russians did the same. They do not want us to have the nuclear fuel cycle. We did negotiate with Russia, but it was not acceptable to us to set aside the West and try to reach an agreement with China and Russia. We were saying that we should take maximum advantage of Russia and China, because they have a role to play. China and Russia were saying the same, telling us that they cannot by themselves resolve the nuclear issue, and that we should not lose [the opportunity to negotiate with] the West. I do not know how the next negotiating team reached the conclusion [that they must negotiate with Russia and China].”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„No, I first heard of it in the interview with Mr. [Ali] Larijani [who was appointed chief nuclear negotiator in 2005]. He was going to Vienna. There, he said that he was surprised that we even negotiate with the European countries and that this was none of Europe’s business. Mr. Larijani was present in all the discussions [within the nezaam<\/i>] and was aware of the problems. I do not know why he said what he did. Then, they negotiated with China and Russia, but we saw that they voted against us when the first [United Nations Security Council] resolution was issued against us [in 2007].”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„It is, of course, always good to use any country in our diplomatic activities. Brazil had, and still has, some weight. It was very active in the Non-Aligned Movement at that time. The country that was highly active, both in the [IAEA] Board of Governors and at the United Nations, was South Africa.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„It was a nation that had produced nuclear bombs, but had set them aside [in the post-apartheid era]. It did possess nuclear power. South Africa was highly active among the nonaligned nations. But Turkey was not a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. It was a member of NATO, and did not have much weight.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„Both sides benefited. It was possible that Turkey benefited more, because it was us who brought up Turkey as an intermediary. Of course, Turkey is our neighbor, and there should not be any problem if we, under a certain diplomatic condition, give some weight to our neighbor. A neighbor always has a special position. But I do not believe Turkey can play an important role in our nuclear problems.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„Brazil is different. At that time we were looking for countries that think like us. We were thinking that if our negotiations with Europe failed, we should replace them such countries. Naturally, we had done the preliminary work. Brazil, India, and South Africa were the countries that we were considering.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„Chirac was a highly experienced politician. In the negotiations, he used various techniques in the discussions. I did not detect the same in [former German Chancellor Gerhard] Schroeder.”<\/p>\n
\n „The Persian Gulf is very important to the European, especially France. The United States has taken control of this region. Iran was an important and independent country. In our negotiations with the European troika, the only country that kept saying it wanted strategic relations with Iran was France. Britain and Germany were saying that they wanted comprehensive and good relations with Iran, but France wanted relations at a higher level, because of both the Persian Gulf and Syria and Lebanon. France considered Syria and Lebanon as its backyard, because of which it wanted strategic relations with Iran. […]”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„If we want to answer this question regarding the nuclear problems, I must say that the conditions were such that at the end of Mr. Khatami’s administration there was no time to reach any agreement. The last thing that Europe did [in late July 2005] was to send us a plan, which we rejected in the strongest possible way. We even told them that they had insulted the Iranian nation and demanded an apology. At the same time, the nezaam<\/i> had decided that it was going to begin the operation of the Isfahan [uranium conversion] complex. I believe that the Europeans acted very hastily and irrationally by immediately trying to send our nuclear dossier to the U.N. Security Council. This was done in haste, because nothing new had happened. We had told them way in advance that we were going to begin operating the Isfahan complex, and they knew it. When the new [Ahmadinejad] government took over, it merely began the operation of the Isfahan facility. It did not begin uranium enrichment right away.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„The AEOI was always in a hurry, and had its own reasons. They had an organization and staff. They had hired engineers and some technical experts. Thus, when the activity was suspended, it was difficult for them. Their thesis was that we should finish the job. There was always a debate as to whether they could finish the job that they had begun. Since we were taking a first step along the nuclear path, and did not have prior experience, the AEOI wanted to prove that it could finish the job, because it also faced some opposition. I remember that a group of physics professors met with me and told me that Iran cannot do this [set up the nuclear fuel cycle]. They were saying that those who work on the project were our own students, and we believe this is not doable. The AEOI was also aware that it had opposition. Thus, it wanted to prove that it could be done and encourage its own engineers. Thus, naturally, they wanted to end the suspension [of Iran’s nuclear program, which lasted from October 2003 to August 2005]. But they did not want Iran’s nuclear dossier to be sent to the U.N. Security Council.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„Most people did not believe that our dossier would go to the U.N. Security Council [prompted] by just starting up the Isfahan site.”<\/p>\n
\n <\/i>„I cannot say that the risk would not have been taken. It was the decision of the nezaam<\/i> for Iran to have uranium enrichment. There was a consensus about this. In the meetings that we had to discuss this, no one had any doubt about starting enrichment. The same thing was true about the Isfahan site. Some people might have wanted to start the site sooner or later, but there was consensus about beginning its operation. The behavior of the West [toward Iran] caused the radicalization of our side. At the same time, when a new team takes over, it wants to advance its own agenda. […]<\/p>\n
\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"