Organizatorzy inicjatywy odbyli r\u00f3wnie\u017c szereg spotka\u0144 w kilku krajach przed sztandarowym wydarzeniem inicjatywy, Narodow\u0105 Konferencj\u0105 dla Palestyny\u00a0[2],<\/a>\u00a0kt\u00f3ra ma si\u0119 odby\u0107 17 lutego 2025 r. w Doha, stolicy Kataru. Nale\u017cy zauwa\u017cy\u0107, \u017ce Katar jest patronem Hamasu, a kilka innych kraj\u00f3w arabskich i europejskich odm\u00f3wi\u0142o goszczenia konferencji.\u00a0[3]<\/a><\/p>\n Istnieje wiele przes\u0142anek wskazuj\u0105cych na to, \u017ce Katar faktycznie stoi za t\u0105 inicjatyw\u0105. Najbardziej widocznym z nich jest zaanga\u017cowanie Azmiego Biszary, kt\u00f3ry jest uwa\u017cany za osob\u0119 o du\u017cym wp\u0142ywie na podejmowanie decyzji w Katarze.\u00a0[4]<\/a>\u00a0Inicjatywa zosta\u0142a zainaugurowana na wydarzeniu w lutym 2024 r., sponsorowanym przez katarski instytut badawczy z siedzib\u0105 w Doha, kierowanym przez Biszar\u0119. Ponadto zdecydowana wi\u0119kszo\u015b\u0107 raport\u00f3w na temat kampanii Narodowej Konferencji dla Palestyny \u200b\u200bi przygotowa\u0144 do konferencji zosta\u0142a opublikowana przez katarsk\u0105 gazet\u0119 \u201eAl-Arabi Al-Jadid\u201d, kt\u00f3ra nale\u017cy do katarskiej instytucji medialnej Fadaat Media, nadzorowanej przez Biszar\u0119.\u00a0[5]<\/a>\u00a0Sam Biszara powiedzia\u0142 nawet, \u017ce \u201eKatar i Turcja s\u0105 w stanie odegra\u0107 rol\u0119\u201d w inicjatywie przebudowy OWP.<\/p>\n Ponadto dyskurs i \u017c\u0105dania promowane przez organizator\u00f3w inicjatywy \u2013 przede wszystkim \u017c\u0105danie reformy OWP poprzez w\u0142\u0105czenie Hamasu i pozosta\u0142ych palesty\u0144skich frakcji terrorystycznych do jej kierownictwa oraz wypowiedzenie Porozumie\u0144 z Oslo \u2013 s\u0105 podobne do dyskursu i \u017c\u0105da\u0144 wysuwanych przez Hamas, kt\u00f3ry ma bezwarunkowe poparcie Kataru, tak\u017ce po ataku na Izrael 7 pa\u017adziernika 2023 r.<\/p>\n Najwyra\u017aniej, opr\u00f3cz zapewnienia politycznego przetrwania Hamasu poprzez wch\u0142oni\u0119cie go przez OWP bez konieczno\u015bci rezygnacji z zasady walki zbrojnej przeciwko Izraelowi, inicjatywa ma na celu podwa\u017cenie statusu Autonomii Palesty\u0144skiej kierowanej przez Mahmuda Abbasa i anulowanie zobowi\u0105za\u0144 palesty\u0144skiego przyw\u00f3dztwa w ramach Porozumie\u0144 z Oslo. Przyw\u00f3dcy Autonomii Palesty\u0144skiej i Fatahu, na kt\u00f3rego czele stoi r\u00f3wnie\u017c Abbas i kt\u00f3ry kontroluje instytucje OWP, oskar\u017caj\u0105 organizator\u00f3w kampanii, kt\u00f3rzy, jak twierdz\u0105, s\u0105 wspierani przez \u201eelementy regionalne\u201d, czyni\u0105c aluzj\u0119 do Kataru, o pr\u00f3b\u0119 utworzenia organu, kt\u00f3ry b\u0119dzie dzia\u0142a\u0142 r\u00f3wnolegle lub b\u0119dzie alternatyw\u0105 dla OWP, postrzegaj\u0105c to jako pr\u00f3b\u0119 przeprowadzenia zamachu stanu Hamasu przeciwko \u201elegalnemu\u201d palesty\u0144skiemu przyw\u00f3dztwu.<\/p>\n [Ci\u0105g dalszy tekstu – doniesienia medialne o kampanii na rzecz Narodowej Konferencji dla Palestyny \u2013 nie jest spolszczony]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Azmi Bishara, Advisor To Qatari Emir, Launches Initiative To Establish 'United Palestinian Leadership’ \u2013 To Include Hamas And PIJ<\/strong><\/p>\n The current initiative to reform the PLO in order to establish a united Palestinian leadership which will include Hamas and other resistance factions was first presented in February 2024, during the Annual Palestine Forum at the Sheraton Hotel in Doha, Qatar’s capital. The forum was held on February 10-12.<\/a>[6]<\/a>\u00a0This is an academic forum established in January 2023 by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, directed by Azmi Bishara, advisor to the Qatari emir, and by the Beirut-based Palestinian Studies Institute.<\/a>[7]<\/a><\/p>\n During the three days of the forum, various meetings and seminars were held with academics who presented their research into the Palestinian issue, and discussed, inter alia, the upcoming challenges in the Palestinian political sphere after the current war in Gaza.<\/p>\n In his speech opening the forum, Bishara commended the armed Palestinian resistance, underlining that Palestinian terror factions must be part of the PLO. He said: „If the resistance factions [of Palestine, i.e. Hamas and other terror factions] want to take part in determining the future of the Palestinian people and the occupied territories, and to translate their struggle and sacrifices into political gains, they must join the PLO \u2013 the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people \u2013\u00a0 and the various parties must reach an agreement over the terms of their membership.” Bishara noted that „one of the roles of Palestinian intellectuals today is to exact pressure on the mainstream Palestinian political forces to unite in a joint Palestinian leadership as part of the PLO, in order to prevent a situation where all these sacrifices are in vain,” and to prevent Israel from exploiting the situation to impose „arrangements for the so-called 'day-after [the war]’ without a just solution to the Palestinian issue…”[8]<\/a><\/p>\n On the final day of the forum, a panel titled „The Palestinian National Project after the Aggression in Gaza” discussed the day after the war. Speakers included Palestinian figures who are known for their opposition to the PA headed by President Mahmoud Abbas, such as Mustafa Al-Barghouti, secretary-general of the Palestinian National Initiative movement; PLO National Council Member Ahmad Ghanim, who heads the campaign calling for the release of top Fatah official Marwan Barghouti;<\/a>[9]<\/a>\u00a0journalist Mu’een Al-Taher, a former member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council and former commander in its military arm during the 1970s and 80s<\/a>[10]<\/a>, and academic Adeeb Ziadeh, a senior lecturer at Qatar University.<\/a>[11]<\/a>\u00a0Like Bishara, they commended the Palestinian resistance „in all its forms,” i.e., including armed resistance, and emphasized the need to include all the factions in the PLO.<\/a>[12]<\/a><\/p>\n After the forum, Bishara continued to call for „rebuilding the PLO on democratic foundations” and for including Hamas and other non-member terror organizations, while also criticizing the PA, arguing it is bound to the Oslo Accords, and therefore compelled to „protect Israel’s security”. For example, in a February 2024 interview on the Qatari Al-Araby channel, he called for „rebuilding the PLO, so that it includes all the Palestinian groups, including Hamas and PIJ.”<\/a>[13]<\/a><\/p>\n In another interview, in April 2024, Bishara again emphasized the need to „unite the [Palestinian] leadership as part of rebuilding the PLO,” and added that „Turkey and Qatar can play role in achieving this.”<\/a>[14]<\/a>\u00a0Further, in a July 2024 interview, Bishara claimed that the PLO „has been sidelined and has become nothing more than an apparatus or department of the PA, when it should [actually] be the source of the PA’s authority.” He called for founding „a body that is free of the Oslo [Accords] which will include all the Palestinian powers, including the political leaders of the Palestinian resistance.”<\/a>[15]<\/a><\/p>\n A Call For A National Conference For Palestine That Will Rebuild The PLO And Include The Resistance<\/strong><\/p>\n In March 2024, a month after the Doha conference where the call to establish a united Palestinian leadership was first presented, efforts to implement it commenced, and a campaign was launched for a National Conference for Palestine that would be in charge of establishing this leadership.<\/p>\n On March 26, 2024, an article by Mu’een Al-Taher\u00a0<\/em>titled „On Advancing a National Conference for Palestine” was published by the Qatari\u00a0Al-Arabi Al-Jadid\u00a0<\/em>daily that was founded and is overseen by Azmi Bishara. In it, Al-Taher argued that there is „an urgent call to establish a National Conference for Palestine that will unite important figures and energetic activists in the public, civil and economic institutions.” These figures, he continued, „will include fighters and freed prisoners, young people, political and social activists \u2013 from among the leaders of the popular campaign [for the Palestinians] in the Arab world, in Europe, and in the U.S. \u2013 including writers, poets, artists, academics, and businesspeople. This is so that everyone will meet their responsibility together, through joint action, in order to take advantage of the opportunities and to deal with the risks.”<\/p>\n Al-Taher added: „The call is to rebuild the PLO on democratic foundations, so that it will include all members of the Palestinian people, wherever they may be, as well as [all] of its existing [political] forces, public organizations, and political, social, economic, and academic elites, and so that it will constitute a source of political authority and unified leadership adhering to the principles of the Palestinian people and its right to self-determination.” He emphasized: „This is a fateful and urgent mission that must not be delayed.”<\/p>\n Explaining that „no one is denying that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people,” he said that the need „to rebuild it” must be seriously considered, because the PLO had, he said, become subordinate to the PA and had adopted the PA’s political plan and obligations as part of the Oslo Accords.<\/a>[16]<\/a>\u00a0He added that, as a result of the PLO’s „mistaken and entangled” relationship with the PA, which is subordinate to the Israeli occupation, the PLO-Hamas schism had deepened and the efforts to establish a united Palestinian leadership had failed. He also said that, since the PA’s establishment, the PLO had become a marginal body whose institutions no longer functioned properly, convened in an organized fashion or held elections as set out in law \u2013 hinting that the current PLO leadership was no longer legitimate.<\/p>\n He also indirectly criticized Fatah \u2013 the party that rules the PA and the leading body in the PLO \u2013 for suspending the armed struggle against Israel, stating that Fatah had deviated from its original goals as a national liberation movement, and had thus weakened „the fighting national democratic stream in Palestine.”<\/a>[17]<\/a><\/p>\n The National Conference For Palestine Petition: Establishing A United Palestinian Leadership Together With Hamas Is The Order Of The Day<\/strong><\/p>\n A day after Al-Taher’s article was published, on March 27, the petition of the National Conference for Palestine campaign was posted online. Titled „A Call to Unify the Palestinian Leadership,” its main points were in line with the messages of his article as well as with those heard at the Annual Palestine Forum in Doha in February 2024. They included a demand for the PLO „to be rebuilt” and to establish a „unified Palestinian leadership” that would include all factions, including Hamas, and would control all PA territories, both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The petition stated: „…It is no longer possible to move forward without a unified leadership, both in this perilous phase and in the aftermath of the current onslaught. We are calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization to be rebuilt on a basis of unity that includes all political forces and civil, national, and economic organizations and institutions\u2026”<\/p>\n The petition also emphasized that „this task cannot be postponed,” in light of the war and the plans of „Israel and its allies” to ensure Israel’s security oversight of the Gaza Strip on the day after the war. Stressing the need for a unified political source of authority within the PLO that would pave the way for reforms in the organization, it called for „the urgent formation of a unified political reference within the framework of the PLO, envisioning how it can be rebuilt on democratic foundations, to include the Palestinian people in their entirety”. It added: „We call for the organization of a Palestinian national conference to bring together personalities and activists representing all segments of the Palestinian people to advance this demand.”<\/a>[18]<\/a><\/p>\n The day after the petition was posted, on March 28, the National Conference for Palestine launched accounts on various social media platforms.<\/a>[19]<\/a>\u00a0The official website of the National Conference for Palestine went live as well; it too explained that the main reason for the creation of the organization was the desire „to rebuild the PLO so it would encompass all the major political forces in the Palestinian arena, including the resistance,” because the PLO has been „marginalized” since the Oslo Accords and subjugated to the PA.<\/a>[20]<\/a><\/p>\n The Similarity Between The Discourse Of The National Conference For Palestine And Of Hamas<\/strong><\/p>\n As noted, there was clearly a great similarity between the discourse and demands advanced by the National Conference for Palestine and the discourse of Hamas and the demands it has presented for years to the PA and the PLO \u2013 first and foremost the demand for reform in the PLO, the downgrading of the PA’s dominance in the organization, and the renunciation of the Oslo Accords.<\/p>\n Hamas is not actually a member of the PLO, but for years it has declared its desire to join it, provided that it cancel the Oslo Accords with Israel, return to armed struggle against it, and establish a joint leadership that will in effect end Fatah’s control of the PLO institutions and\u00a0 give Hamas and its allies a significant foothold in them. Moreover, over the years, Hamas has moved to undermine the PLO’s status, and has even attempted to take it over from within \u2013 further deepening the schism between it (Hamas) and Fatah.<\/a>[21]<\/a><\/p>\n On the other hand, the Fatah and PA leadership are demanding that, if Hamas wants to join the PLO, it must recognize its current political plan and its international obligations \u2013 including the Oslo Accords. It must also recognize the legitimacy of its current leadership, whose declared direction is a political arrangement with Israel via diplomacy and popular resistance.<\/a>[22]<\/a>\u00a0Mu’een Al-Taher’s criticism of Fatah’s relinquishing the armed struggle was also largely in line with the positions of Hamas, which advocates armed struggle.<\/p>\n The Petition Signatories: Senior Hamas Officials, Terrorists, PA Opponents<\/strong><\/p>\n Moreover, the signatories to the National Conference for Palestine petition included senior Hamas officials and elements close to Hamas. To date, it has been signed by some 1,900 prominent Palestinians from around the world; in addition to their names, they provide their professions and countries of residence, apparently in order to demonstrate, as the campaign’s leaders intend, that its supporters are the Palestinian elite representing „all political forces and civil, national and economic organizations and institutions.”<\/p>\n It does appear, however, that the senior Hamas signatories attempted to downplay their organizational affiliation when they signed the campaign petition. For example, Ibrahim Al-Madhoun identified himself as a „writer and political commentator”; Mahmoud Mardawi said he was an „academic,” and the head of the Hamas branch in Austria; Adel Doughman, recently sanctioned by the U.S.,<\/a>[23]<\/a>\u00a0called himself „chairman of the Coordinating Council for Palestine.” The petition was also signed by Diab Al-Jaro, the mayor of Deir Al-Balah under Hamas, who was killed by Israel in December 14, 2024 for his activity in Hamas’ military wing.\u00a0<\/a>[24]<\/a><\/p>\n Some signatories identified themselves as „freed prisoners,” the most prominent of them Ahlam Al-Tamimi, the Hamas terrorist freed in the 2011 Shalit deal who now resides in Jordan and is wanted in the U.S. Tamimi was involved in the Sbarro pizzeria bombing in Jerusalem in August 2001 in which 15 were killed, including two Americans; she had brought the suicide bomber to the location.<\/a>[25]<\/a><\/p>\n Others described themselves as journalists, such as the freed prisoner Fayez Abu Shamala, who served as mayor of Khan Younis under the Hamas regime and today writes a column in the Hamas daily\u00a0Filastin\u00a0<\/em>and is known for his extremist statements and his support for the organization.\u00a0\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n It should be noted that among the signatories were also Fatah activists who oppose the leaderships of Fatah and the PA, and officials in the PLO institutions, several of whom are even among the campaign organizers. For example, the campaign’s preparatory committee included Ahmad Ghanim, a PLO National Council member who heads the campaign to free Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah Central Committee member who is incarcerated in Israel. Fatah Revolutionary Council member Fakhri Al-Barghouti is also a member of the campaign preparatory committee.<\/a>[26]<\/a>\u00a0Preparatory committee member Omar Assaf, a leading anti-PA activist, confirmed that some Fatah activists affiliated with Marwan Barghouti were participating in the campaign.<\/a>[27]<\/a><\/p>\n Preparations For The National Conference For Palestine Planned For February 17, 2025 In Qatar<\/strong><\/p>\n Over the past year, the\u00a0Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/em>\u00a0daily has reported on numerous meetings held by the campaign’s preparatory committee \u2013 the committee that promotes the National Conference for Palestine, whose members include senior campaign figures. At an August 10, 2024 committee meeting in Istanbul, Mu’een Al-Taher said that it had been decided to hold the National Conference for Palestine in Doha, the Qatari capital, because Qatar was the only country that had agreed to host it. Several Arab and European countries had refused.<\/a>[28]<\/a>\u00a0It was later reported that the conference would take place on February 17-19, 2025.<\/p>\n The preparatory committee also met in the UK on May 22; in Qatar on June 6; in Kuwait on June 9; in Spain and Belgium on June 23; in France on July 3; in the U.S. on August 8; in the Netherlands on July 10, in Lebanon on July 20, in Istanbul on August 10 and in Qatar on October 12-13. All these meetings proceeded in a similar fashion: a group of local Palestinian activists who had signed the petition met in person, and other activists, including preparatory committee members, joined via Zoom. Reports about these meetings published in\u00a0Al-Arabi Al-Jadid\u00a0<\/em>were not particularly informative, since they largely reiterated the main points of the petition. The prominent speakers from the committee were Al-Taher, Azmi Bishara and Mustafa Al-Barghouti.<\/a>[29]<\/a><\/p>\n PA Leadership: The Campaign Organizers Are Plotting To Replace The PLO, With The Encouragement Of Foreign Elements<\/strong><\/p>\n The National Conference for Palestine campaign was not welcomed by the leaderships of the PA and Fatah, who consider it subversion against the leadership of President Abbas. Their displeasure was reflected in two announcements published in early June 2024, which did not mention the campaign by name and hinted at a Qatari involvement in it. The June 8 statement by the Fatah Central Committee noted: „A group that is not part of the Palestinian national ranks and is supported by regional and international elements has conspired with them to circumvent the [authority of the] PLO, which is the only legitimate representative [of our people], and its legitimate frameworks.” It added that the Palestinian people would thwart all attempts to destroy Palestinian nationalism, as „this group, which is not part of the national ranks, and those who stand behind it and fund it” are doing.\u00a0<\/a>[30]<\/a><\/p>\n The Fatah Executive Committee published a statement, also on June 8, noting similarly that „groups supported and funded by regional elements are launching [campaigns] using national names in a desperate attempt to assemble a framework that is parallel to and an alternative to the PLO and its legitimate elected institutions\u2026” It added that the Executive Committee condemns „all these toxic attempts” to create a framework that is a parallel and an alternative to the PLO institutions, and condemns „whoever is behind them and funding them.”<\/a>[31]<\/a><\/p>\n These statements were echoed in articles published by the PA’s\u00a0Al-Hayat Al-Jadida\u00a0<\/em>daily. For example, in his June 26, 2024 column, Omar Hilmi Al-Ghoul wrote that „the fact that Hamas is putting a spanner in the works of the meeting [in Beijing, for reconciliation among the Palestinian factions] is in line with the steps currently being taken in Doha, London, Berlin, Switzerland and in other capital cities to establish an alternative to the PLO \u2013 to the point where the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. has begun to support [these] steps led by Azmi Bishara, Mu’een Al-Taher, and Mustafa Al-Barghouti, who aspire to create an alternative to the PLO, the sole legitimate representative [of the Palestinians]\u2026”<\/a>[32]<\/a><\/p>\n The newspaper’s July 10, 2024 editorial again stressed that „in all these dubious efforts, the\u00a0Al-Arabi Al-Jadid\u00a0<\/em>gang focuses [its hostility] only on the legitimate leadership of the PLO, attributes to it every flaw in the Palestinian arena, and calls for taking over its decision[-making authority] \u2013 [and all this] under imported slogans calling for reform, renewal, democratization and unity!… [This gang] calls [for establishing] a new source of political authority that will be controlled by partisan and political forces that benefit from regional funding [hinting at Hamas, which is supported by Qatar and Iran]. This means that the people who are calling for this are a new kind of coup instigators, no more and no less\u2026”<\/a>[33]<\/a><\/p>\n Its July 23 editorial mused: „Where is the flaw in the PLO’s policy that the\u00a0Al-Arabi Al-Jadid\u00a0<\/em>gang must rectify with [such] profligate funding and multiple slogans and performative expressions, to the point that some among us began to echo them indiscriminately without understanding their destructive aim [?]\u2026”<\/a>[34]<\/a><\/p>\n The PA leadership even threatened sanctions against any Fatah member who joined the campaign.<\/a>[35]<\/a><\/p>\n In response to the Fatah and PLO statements, the campaign’s preparatory committee rejected the accusations, particularly the claims of conspiring with foreign elements and receiving aid from them. The campaign organizers argued that „no regional country is behind this initiative, or funds it,” but stressed also their desire that „an Arab country” would host the conference, the campaign’s flagship event. The announcement reiterated that the initiative was not trying to replace the PLO but „to rebuild it on democratic foundations.”<\/a>[36]<\/a><\/p>\n * S. Schneidmann and L. Alon are Research Fellows at MEMRI; Varulkar is Director of Research at MEMRI.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/a>[1]<\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 6842\u00a0– Palestinian-Jordanian Terrorist Ahlam Al-Tamimi To Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Mouthpiece: 'As Long As The Zionists Remain On Our Land, The Jihad Must Continue’<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 March 23, 2017.<\/p>\n <\/a>[2]<\/a>\u00a0The name of the conference has special connotations in Palestinian political discourse, since it is identical to the name of the conference that convened in 1964 to establish the PLO. Info.wafa.ps, August 5, 2010.<\/p>\n <\/a>[3]<\/a>\u00a0Raialyoum.com, July 19, 2024; refugeesps.net, August 12, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[4]<\/a>\u00a0Azmi Bishara was formerly a member of the Israeli Knesset, but defected to Qatar in 2007 after being suspected of spying for Hizbullah.<\/p>\n <\/a>[5]<\/a>\u00a0Al-Yawm Al-Sabi’<\/em>\u00a0(Egypt), October 19, 2020;\u00a0Al-Akhbar<\/em>\u00a0(Lebanon), August 23, 2022.<\/p>\n <\/a>[6]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk, May 22, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[7]<\/a>\u00a0Dohainstitute.org\/ar\/AboutUs\/Pages\/VisionAndMission.aspx, accessed February 12, 2025.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a>\u00a0Dohainstitute.org,\u00a0February 11, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[9]<\/a>\u00a0Marwan Barghouti is serving five life sentences in Israeli prison for planning terror attacks during the Second Intifada that killed many Israelis.<\/p>\n <\/a>[10]<\/a>\u00a0Dohainstitute.org, October 14, 2018.<\/p>\n <\/a>[11]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk,\u00a0February 3, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[12]<\/a>\u00a0Dohainstitute.org, February 12, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[13]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk,\u00a0February 11, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[14]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk,\u00a0April 21, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[15]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk,\u00a0July 28, 2024. In June 2024, in one of the preparatory meetings for the National Conference for Palestine, Bishara reiterated the position that „there is a need to form a unified Palestinian leadership and create a political source of authority for the Palestinian people. It would be best if it could be in the framework of the PLO, in preparation for rebuilding it on democratic foundations that will include all the Palestinian factions and political forces.” Alaraby.co.uk, June 6, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[16]<\/a>\u00a0This claim is false, since the PLO was in fact the body that signed the Oslo Accords, which created the PA.<\/p>\n <\/a>[17]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk, March 26, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[18]<\/a>\u00a0Ncpalestine.org\/petition, accessed February 13, 2025.<\/p>\n <\/a>[19]<\/a>\u00a0See for example Twitter.com\/ncpalestine.<\/p>\n <\/a>[20]<\/a>\u00a0Ncpalestine.org\/about-us, accessed February 13, 2025.<\/p>\n <\/a>[21]<\/a>\u00a0See for example MEMRI reports: Special Dispatch No. 10627 –\u00a0Pro-Hamas Conference In Sweden Sparks Debate Among Palestinians About PLO’s Status<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 May 25, 2023; Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 699 –\u00a0The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Was There an Agreement?\u00a0\u2013 June 24, 2011; Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 516 –\u00a0Hamas Challenges PLO’s Legitimacy as Sole Representative of Palestinian People<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 June 8, 2009.<\/p>\n <\/a>[22]<\/a>\u00a0Following the talks held between Fatah and Hamas in China in July 2024, the Qatari daily\u00a0Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/em>\u00a0reported that the leadership of Fatah and the PA „relinquished” the demands it had made to Hamas as conditions for joining the PLO; however, the Saudi daily\u00a0Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/em>\u00a0claimed that the conditions remained in place (alaraby.co.uk, July 25, 2024; aawsar.com, July 23, 2024).<\/p>\n <\/a>[23]<\/a>\u00a0Home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/jy2632, October 7, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[24]<\/a>\u00a0Facebook.com\/profile.php?id=61557577202870, December 16, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[25]<\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 6842\u00a0– Palestinian-Jordanian Terrorist Ahlam Al-Tamimi To Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Mouthpiece: 'As Long As The Zionists Remain On Our Land, The Jihad Must Continue’<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 March 23, 2017.<\/p>\n <\/a>[26]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk, June 12, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[27]<\/a>\u00a0Madanews, June 30, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[28]<\/a>\u00a0Refugeesps.net, August 12, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[29]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk, May 22, 2024; June 6, 9, 12, 23, 2024; July 3, 8, 10, 20, 2024; August 13, 2024; October 14, 2024; In September the committee held two more meetings via Zoom (Facebook.com\/profile.php?id=61557577202870, September 17, 29, 2024).<\/p>\n <\/a>[30]<\/a>\u00a0Wafa.ps, June 8, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[31]<\/a>\u00a0Wafa.ps, June 8, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[32]<\/a>\u00a0Al-Hayat Al-Jadida\u00a0<\/em>(Palestinian Authority), June 26, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[33]<\/a>\u00a0Al-Hayat Al-Jadida\u00a0<\/em>(Palestinian Authority), July 10, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[34]<\/a>\u00a0Al-Hayat Al-Jadida\u00a0<\/em>(Palestinian Authority), July 23, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[35]<\/a>\u00a0Raialyoum.com, July 19, 2024.<\/p>\n <\/a>[36]<\/a>\u00a0Alaraby.co.uk, June 9, 2024.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 17 lutego 2025 r. w Doha, stolicy Kataru, odb\u0119dzie si\u0119 Narodowa Konferencja dla Palestyny, kt\u00f3rej celem b\u0119dzie w\u0142\u0105czenie Hamasu do OWP. Jednocze\u015bnie z przygotowaniami do konferencji w Strefie Gazy podejmowane s\u0105 pr\u00f3by odsuni\u0119cia Hamasu od w\u0142adzy. Konferencja odbywa si\u0119 w ramach inicjatywy, kt\u00f3r\u0105 w ubieg\u0142ym roku zainicjowa\u0142a grupa znanych Palesty\u0144czyk\u00f3w na rzecz reformy instytucji OWP, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":22635,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[828,833,835,837,840],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22634","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-autonomia-palestynska","category-badania-i-analizy","category-archiwum","category-kraje","category-zatoka-perska"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22634","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22634"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22634\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22640,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22634\/revisions\/22640"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22635"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22634"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22634"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22634"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Picture1-3.jpg\")
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