{"id":21072,"date":"2024-03-15T19:09:03","date_gmt":"2024-03-15T18:09:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/?p=21072"},"modified":"2024-03-15T19:09:07","modified_gmt":"2024-03-15T18:09:07","slug":"czterdziesci-lat-po-wycofaniu-sie-organizacji-wyzwolenia-palestyny-owp-z-libanu-hamas-dziala-na-rzecz-zbudowania-tam-militarnej-infrastruktury-za-zacheta-hezbollahu-n-mozes-i-y-yehoshua","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/czterdziesci-lat-po-wycofaniu-sie-organizacji-wyzwolenia-palestyny-owp-z-libanu-hamas-dziala-na-rzecz-zbudowania-tam-militarnej-infrastruktury-za-zacheta-hezbollahu-n-mozes-i-y-yehoshua\/21072","title":{"rendered":"Czterdzie\u015bci lat po wycofaniu si\u0119 Organizacji Wyzwolenia Palestyny (OWP) z Libanu Hamas dzia\u0142a na rzecz zbudowania tam militarnej infrastruktury za zach\u0119t\u0105 Hezbollahu N. Mozes i Y. Yehoshua"},"content":{"rendered":"

Od pocz\u0105tku wojny mi\u0119dzy Izraelem a frakcjami palesty\u0144skimi w Gazie Izrael stoi r\u00f3wnie\u017c w obliczu atak\u00f3w z po\u0142udniowego Libanu.\u00a0Opr\u00f3cz atak\u00f3w Hezbollahu (kt\u00f3rego obecno\u015b\u0107 w po\u0142udniowym Libanie narusza uchwa\u0142\u0119 Rady Bezpiecze\u0144stwa ONZ nr 1701 zakazuj\u0105c\u0105 obecno\u015bci uzbrojonych boj\u00f3wek na po\u0142udnie od rzeki Litani) i innych organizacji liba\u0144skich [<\/span>1]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0, frakcje palesty\u0144skie, takie jak Hamas i Palesty\u0144ski Islamski D\u017cihad (PIJ) r\u00f3wnie\u017c s\u0105 aktywne.\u00a0Ich ataki, kt\u00f3re obejmuj\u0105 pr\u00f3by infiltracji terytorium Izraela i odpalanie rakiet dalekiego zasi\u0119gu, wskazuj\u0105 na istnienie palesty\u0144skiej infrastruktury wojskowej w Libanie. \u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Hamas i PIJ zasadniczo utworzy\u0142y w kraju oddzia\u0142y swoich skrzyde\u0142 wojskowych i zbudowa\u0142y infrastruktur\u0119 wojskow\u0105 zar\u00f3wno wewn\u0105trz, jak i na zewn\u0105trz oboz\u00f3w dla uchod\u017ac\u00f3w palesty\u0144skich w Libanie.\u00a0Tym samym zamienili po\u0142udniowy Liban lub ca\u0142y kraj w kolejn\u0105 aren\u0119 palesty\u0144skich dzia\u0142a\u0144 wojskowych, prowadzonych nie tylko przez boj\u00f3wkarzy palesty\u0144skich i liba\u0144skich, ale tak\u017ce boj\u00f3wkarzy z innych kraj\u00f3w.\u00a0W rzeczywisto\u015bci Hamas og\u0142osi\u0142 niedawno utworzenie oficjalnego nowego oddzia\u0142u w Libanie, Stra\u017cy Przedniej organizacji Potop Al-Aksa.\u00a0Na kr\u00f3tko przed atakiem z 7 pa\u017adziernika PIJ r\u00f3wnie\u017c og\u0142osi\u0142 utworzenie oddzia\u0142u wojskowego w Libanie. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Dzia\u0142alno\u015b\u0107 palesty\u0144skich i liba\u0144skich frakcji zbrojnych w po\u0142udniowym Libanie, obszarze kontrolowanym przez Hezbollah, najwyra\u017aniej odbywa si\u0119 w koordynacji z t\u0105 organizacj\u0105, a by\u0107 mo\u017ce nawet pod jej przewodnictwem, w spos\u00f3b s\u0142u\u017c\u0105cy jej interesom w ramach strategii \u201ejedno\u015bci front\u00f3w\u201d, kt\u00f3remu przewodzi wraz z Iranem.\u00a0Co wi\u0119cej, wydaje si\u0119, \u017ce frakcje te dzia\u0142aj\u0105 jako pe\u0142nomocnicy Hezbollahu, gdy ten chce ograniczy\u0107 zakres w\u0142asnej dzia\u0142alno\u015bci przeciwko Izraelowi.<\/span><\/p>\n

Je\u017celi ta zbrojna akcja palesty\u0144ska ma miejsce bez wiedzy w\u0142adz liba\u0144skich, stanowi to ra\u017c\u0105ce naruszenie suwerenno\u015bci pa\u0144stwa liba\u0144skiego.\u00a0A je\u015bli w\u0142adze liba\u0144skie s\u0105 \u015bwiadome tej dzia\u0142alno\u015bci, oznacza to, \u017ce Liban \u015bwiadomie pozwala na przekszta\u0142cenie si\u0119 w centrum dzia\u0142alno\u015bci terrorystycznej. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Rozw\u00f3j sytuacji potwierdza obawy wyra\u017cane przez lata przez wielu Liba\u0144czyk\u00f3w, \u017ce bro\u0144 znajduj\u0105ca si\u0119 w obozach dla uchod\u017ac\u00f3w palesty\u0144skich w Libanie nie pozostanie ograniczona do oboz\u00f3w, ale ponownie przekszta\u0142ci kraj w baz\u0119 dla zbrojnych dzia\u0142a\u0144 palesty\u0144skich przeciwko Izraelowi, tak jak mia\u0142o to miejsce w latach 70. i 80. XX w. \u2013 sytuacja, kt\u00f3ra ostatecznie doprowadzi\u0142a do izraelskiej inwazji na Liban w 1982 r. Ostatnio w Libanie toczy si\u0119 otwarta krytyka palesty\u0144skich dzia\u0142a\u0144 wojskowych w tym kraju oraz przeciwko zgodzie pa\u0144stwa liba\u0144skiego i jego si\u0142 zbrojnych na t\u0119 dzia\u0142alno\u015b\u0107.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ataki rakietowe i infiltracje si\u0142 Hamasu i PIJ w Libanie\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Zaledwie trzy dni po wybuchu wojny w Gazie frakcje palesty\u0144skie zacz\u0119\u0142y przypisywa\u0107 sobie odpowiedzialno\u015b\u0107 za dzia\u0142ania militarne przeciwko Izraelowi z po\u0142udniowego Libanu, a liba\u0144ski oddzia\u0142 Brygad Izz Al-Din Al-Kassam, wojskowego skrzyd\u0142a Hamasu, przyj\u0105\u0142 odpowiedzialno\u015b\u0107 za wi\u0119kszo\u015b\u0107 atak\u00f3w. Wi\u0119kszo\u015b\u0107 atak\u00f3w polega\u0142a na wystrzeleniu dziesi\u0105tek rakiet w kierunku skupisk ludno\u015bci w p\u00f3\u0142nocnym Izraelu, si\u0119gaj\u0105cych a\u017c do Hajfy, co wskazuje na wielko\u015b\u0107 i jako\u015b\u0107 arsena\u0142u, jakim dysponuje Hamas w Libanie. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

W pa\u017adzierniku 2023 r. \u2013 lutym 2024 r. Brygady Al-Kassam przeprowadzi\u0142y nast\u0119puj\u0105ce ataki rakietowe na Izrael z po\u0142udniowego Libanu:<\/span><\/p>\n

10 pa\u017adziernika 2023: atak rakietowy na Galile\u0119 Zachodni\u0105;\u00a0<\/span>[2]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

15 pa\u017adziernika 2023 r.: ostrza\u0142 15 rakiet wystrzelony w kierunku miast Szlomi i Naharija w zachodniej Galilei;\u00a0<\/span>[3]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

19 pa\u017adziernika 2023: ostrza\u0142 30 rakiet, wi\u0119kszo\u015b\u0107 z nich wycelowana w Szlomi i Naharija;\u00a0<\/span>[4]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

29 pa\u017adziernika: ostrza\u0142 16 rakiet na Naharija;\u00a0<\/span>[5]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

2 listopada 2023 r.: ostrza\u0142 12 rakiet na miasto Kirjat Szmona i jego okolice;\u00a0<\/span>[6]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

6 listopada 2023: ostrza\u0142 16 rakiet wycelowany w Naharij\u0119 i \u201epo\u0142udniow\u0105 Hajf\u0119\u201d;\u00a0<\/span>[7]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

12 listopada 2023: rakiety wystrzelone w po\u0142udniow\u0105 Hajf\u0119, Szlomi i Naharij\u0119;\u00a0<\/span>[8]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

10 grudnia 2023: rakiety na cele wojskowe w Galilei Zachodniej;\u00a0<\/span>[9]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

25 grudnia 2023: wystrzelenie rakiet w stron\u0119 bazy wojskowej Liman w Galilei Zachodniej;\u00a0<\/span>[10]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

17 stycznia 2024: ostrza\u0142 20 rakiet na baz\u0119 Liman;\u00a0<\/span>[11]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

28 lutego 2024 r.: ostrza\u0142 40 rakiet Grad wycelowanych w kilka cel\u00f3w w rejonie Beit Hillel i w Kirjat Szmona.\u00a0<\/span>[12]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Podejmowano tak\u017ce pr\u00f3by infiltracji terytorium Izraela z Libanu.\u00a015 pa\u017adziernika Brygady Al-Kassam poinformowa\u0142y, \u017ce dwa dni wcze\u015bniej grupa agent\u00f3w Nuchby (si\u0142 specjalnych) zbli\u017cy\u0142a si\u0119 do granicy liba\u0144sko-izraelskiej, star\u0142a si\u0119 z \u017co\u0142nierzami IDF i zdo\u0142a\u0142a wycofa\u0107 si\u0119 bez szwanku.\u00a014 pa\u017adziernika grupie boj\u00f3wkarzy uda\u0142o si\u0119 prze\u0142ama\u0107 p\u0142ot graniczny przy u\u017cyciu materia\u0142\u00f3w wybuchowych i zaatakowa\u0107 pozycj\u0119 armii izraelskiej w pobli\u017cu Margaliot.\u00a0Wed\u0142ug doniesie\u0144 trzech cz\u0142onk\u00f3w grupy zgin\u0119\u0142o w wyniku ostrza\u0142u z helikoptera.\u00a0Dw\u00f3ch z nich pochodzi\u0142o z obozu dla uchod\u017ac\u00f3w Ajn Al-Hilweh na po\u0142udniowy wsch\u00f3d od Sydonu, a jeden z obozu Wadi Al-Zina niedaleko Bejrutu.\u00a0Organizacja opublikowa\u0142a nazwiska i zdj\u0119cia zabitych cz\u0142onk\u00f3w.\u00a0<\/span>[13]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ataki na Izrael z po\u0142udniowego Libanu oraz kaliber zaanga\u017cowanych w nie funkcjonariuszy obna\u017caj\u0105 zakres dzia\u0142alno\u015bci wojskowej Hamasu w tym kraju.\u00a022 listopada Hamas ujawni\u0142, \u017ce jeden z jego agent\u00f3w, Chalil Hamed Charraz, znany r\u00f3wnie\u017c jako Abu Chaled, z obozu dla uchod\u017ac\u00f3w Al-Raszida niedaleko Tyru, zgin\u0105\u0142 w izraelskim ataku na granicy liba\u0144sko-izraelskiej.\u00a0Wed\u0142ug o\u015bwiadczenia by\u0142 on \u201edow\u00f3dc\u0105\u201d odpowiedzialnym za \u201erozszerzanie wsparcia i pomocy dla ruchu oporu w [Palestynie] i poza ni\u0105\u2026 i od dziesi\u0119cioleci by\u0142 aktywny na wszystkich frontach d\u017cihadu\u201d. <\/span>[14]<\/span><\/a> Doniesienia \u017ar\u00f3de\u0142 liba\u0144skich twierdzi\u0142y, \u017ce Charraz by\u0142 dow\u00f3dc\u0105 Al-Kassam w Libanie.\u00a0Tego samego dnia Hamas poinformowa\u0142 o \u015bmierci czterech innych agent\u00f3w Al-Kassam, dw\u00f3ch Turk\u00f3w i dw\u00f3ch Liba\u0144czyk\u00f3w.\u00a0Wed\u0142ug doniesie\u0144 prasy arabskiej i tureckiej zgin\u0119li oni wraz z Charrazem, co sugeruje, \u017ce byli to wy\u017csi rang\u0105 funkcjonariusze organizacji.\u00a0<\/span>[15]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Fakt, \u017ce Hamas najwyra\u017aniej werbuje zagranicznych bojownik\u00f3w, wskazuje na zakres jego swobody dzia\u0142ania w po\u0142udniowym Libanie.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

[Ci\u0105g dalszy tekstu \u2013 opis dzia\u0142alno\u015bci grup palesty\u0144skich, wsp\u00f3\u0142pracy z Hezbollahem i reakcji rz\u0105du liba\u0144skiego \u2013 nie jest spolszczony]<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>
\n<\/span>Hamas’ announcement of Kharraz’s death<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

On January 2, 2024, Saleh Al-Arouri, the deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in Beirut in a strike attributed to Israel, along with two senior Al-Qassam fighters \u2013 Azzam Husni Al-Aqra, who was in charge of the movement’s military action abroad, and Samir Fandi, who was responsible for its military activity in South Lebanon<\/span>[16]<\/span><\/a>\u2013 as well as four other operatives. \u00a0In a statement issued in response to their killing, Hamas said that the assassination was proof that „fighting and deterring [Israel] is a duty incumbent upon every member of our [Islamic] nation in every arena and on every front\u2026 Sheikh Salah and his brethren acted [to perform this duty] and mobilized all the nation’s forces to this end\u2026”<\/span>[17]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On January 18, 2024 Hamas reported that another activist, from the Mieh Mieh camp near Sidon, had been killed in South Lebanon.<\/span>[18]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

The PIJ launches attacks on Israel from South Lebanon as well. On October 10, 2023 it announced that two of its fighters, Riad Muhammad Qiblawi from the Ayn Al-Hilweh camp and Hamza Hassan from the Al-Burj Al-Shamali camp near Tyre, had been killed after exchanging fire with IDF forces on the border.<\/span>[19]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

On October 22 the PIJ announced that four of its operatives, two from Syria and two from Lebanon, had been killed one day earlier during activity in „northern Palestine.” The announcement featured pictures of the four, three of them in PIJ uniform.<\/span>[20]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

On October 29 two PIJ fighters were killed in an exchange of fire with IDF forces after trying to infiltrate the border in the Hanita area,<\/span>[21]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and on December 7 the organization reported the death in South Lebanon of two operatives from the Khan Danoun camp near Damascus, Syria, who were members of the Syria-based Shahid Ali Al-Usoud Brigade.<\/span>[22]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On December 29 the PIJ again reported that two operatives \u2013 one from the Shahid Ali Al-Usoud Brigade and another from the Shahid Abu Hamza Al-Majdoub Brigade \u2013 had \u00a0been killed „in the line of duty” on the Lebanon-Israel border,<\/span>[23]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and on February 12, 2024 it announced that two more members of the Shahid Ali Al-Usoud Brigade had fallen there too.<\/span>[24]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0The death in South Lebanon of two additional fighters from this brigade was reported on February 24, 2024.<\/span>[25]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Hamas’ And PIJ’s Activity In Lebanon Takes Place With Hizbullah’s Consent And In Coordination With It<\/b><\/p>\n

As stated, this is the first time in 40 years that the Palestinian factions have claimed responsibility for ongoing offensive action against Israel from South Lebanon. In the 1970s such action by armed Palestinian factions, chief of them the PLO, led to a civil war in Lebanon and later to an extensive Israeli operation in the south of the country. In that period the Palestinian factions did as they pleased in Lebanon without coordinating with local elements. Today, although their action is not coordinated with the Lebanese state and armed forces, it is definitely directed and approved by the true boss in Lebanon, namely by Hizbullah.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hamas officials state explicitly that they operate under Hizbullah’s sponsorship and in coordination with it. Hamas representative in Lebanon Ahmad Abd Al-Hadi clarified: „The operations of the Al-Qassam Brigades in South Lebanon confirm that the Palestinians in Lebanon are a key element in the campaign [against Israel]. These [operations] are carried out in coordination with our brethren in Hizbullah.”<\/span>[26]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Walid Al-Kilani, Hamas’ spokesman in Lebanon, made similar remarks, saying: „Our participation [in the fighting] in South Lebanon is meant to show solidarity [with Gaza], and it is sponsored by Hizbullah and carried out in coordination with it.”<\/span>[27]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

PIJ representatives in Lebanon stressed their right to operate in South Lebanon without the consent of the Lebanese government. PIJ official Imad Al-Rifa’i said: „The Lebanese state and armed forces are unable to confront Israel, for a variety of reasons\u2026 We appreciate Lebanon’s situation, but there is a people that is being slaughtered, and we cannot sit idly by\u2026 Our only way to prevent [Israel] from expelling [the Palestinians from Gaza] is through resistance. There are 450,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon, and they will not allow another Nakba to occur.”<\/span>[28]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Another indication of the coordination between the Palestinian factions and Hizbullah is a report by the online daily Al-Rai Al-Yawm that Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades and Saraya Al-Quds, the military wing of the PIJ, had asked Hizbullah to grant them greater independence and freedom of action in fighting Israel from South Lebanon. They also asked Hizbullah to suffice with receiving advance notice of their operations and exempt them from seeking its specific approval for each action. In addition, they requested permission to recruit Palestinians residing in Lebanon to their ranks.<\/span>[29]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Indications That Hamas Is Building Permanent Infrastructure For Operations From Lebanon<\/b><\/p>\n

Hamas’ acknowledgement that it is using Lebanon as a base for military action against Israel is a strategic turning point in the policy of this organization, because for many years it stressed that its military activity was confined to the Palestinian territories and Israel. Cracks in this policy began to appear over the last decade, when targeted killings by Israel exposed Hamas combatants operating abroad. \u00a0The most prominent of these operatives were Hamas’ drone engineer Muhammad Al-Zawi, killed in Tunisia in 2016, and rocket expert Fadi Al-Batsh, killed in Malaysia in 2018, both of whom were engaged in developing the movement’s military capabilities in the Palestinian territories.<\/span><\/p>\n

In fact, Hamas announced its intention to start operating outside Palestine already in 2015. At a February 2 political rally in Gaza, Hamas political leader Mahmoud Al-Zahhar called on Lebanon and Syria to allow the formation of military cells subordinate to the Al-Qassam Brigades in the Palestinian refugee camps on their soil, which would take part in liberating Palestine.”<\/span>[30]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0In 2018 Hamas leader Islma’il Haniya said, in response to the killing of the organization’s rocket expert Fadi Al-Batsh in Malaysia, that „the battle with Israel has moved outside the occupied lands.”<\/span>[31]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

The characteristics of Hamas’ activity from South Lebanon since the start of the current war indicate that this activity is not the result of hasty preparations made after the outbreak of the war, but of planning and preparation in advance that included efforts by Hamas to tighten its relations with Hizbullah and to deepen its influence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, as well as unofficial military activity in Lebanon over the years, among other moves. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Hamas’ activity in Lebanon clearly requires the consent of Hizbullah, which controls South Lebanon and apparently the country as a whole. Therefore, after several years in which the relations between the two organizations cooled somewhat, due to Hamas’ support for the rebellion against the Syrian regime, which is an ally of Hizbullah and Iran, Hamas took pains to restore its relations with them. Hamas’ desire for rapprochement with Hizbullah accorded with the interests of this organization and of its patron Iran, which sought to tighten their grip on Hamas and thereby on the Palestinian arena as a whole, and to implement their strategy of „the unity of the fronts,” according to which an attack on any part of the resistance axis prompts an extensive response by all the components of this axis, in every arena.<\/span><\/p>\n

The tighter cooperation between Hamas and Hizbullah was manifest in frequent meetings between the leaders of the two organizations and in visits by Hamas officials in Lebanon. Hamas leader Isma’il Haniya, for example, has made at least three visits to Lebanon since 2020, during which he met with Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and also made highly visible tours of the Palestinian refugee camps. Haniya’s visit sparked intense criticism from Hizbullah’s opponents in Lebanon, which expressed concern that the country would be dragged into a confrontation with Israel.<\/span>[32]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>Meeting between Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas delegation headed by Isma’il Haniya in April 2023 (Image: Ar.irna.ir, April 7, 2023)<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Hamas Tightens Its Grip On Palestinian Refugee Camps In Lebanon, At Fatah’s Expense<\/b><\/p>\n

As part of establishing itself in Lebanon, Hamas has also tightened its grip on the Palestinian refugee camps there. According to an article in the Lebanese daily\u00a0<\/span>Al-Mudun<\/span><\/i>, this process started already in the 1990s, but Hamas was initially careful to conceal its military presence there. Not so today. In an interview on Al-Jazeera in late 2023, Muhammad Ibrahim Madhoun, head of Hamas’ refugee department, addressed the importance ascribed by the movement to the refugee camps in Lebanon. He said that these camps „are most like Gaza. Hamas has a strong organizational, political and military presence in them\u2026 Hamas’ presence in the refugee camps in Lebanon can be said to exist on two levels. [One level is] the popular support it enjoys there as the leader of the resistance in Gaza, and the other involves organizational, political and military presence. It would be no exaggeration to say that, for Hamas, these military camps [Al-Madhoun used the Arabic word\u00a0<\/span>mu’askarat<\/span><\/i>] are second only to Gaza in terms of the movement’s organizational power and presence.”<\/span>[33]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

The military presence of the Al-Qassem Brigades in the refugee camps was highly visible during Haniya’s visit to Ayn Al-Hilweh in September 2020. According to reports, Al-Qassam operatives, armed with anti-tank rockets and other weapons, provided security during the visit, and this was „the first official and open appearance of these Brigades in Lebanon.”<\/span>[34]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>Haniya on a visit to the Ayn Al-Hilweh refugee camp in September 2020 (Image: Lebanonfiles.com, September 8, 2020)<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

<\/span>Al-Qassam Brigades operative at the Ayn Al-Hilweh refugee camp (Image: Army-tech.net, September 7, 2020)<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Suspicion That Hamas Is Establishing Military Industry In Lebanon<\/b><\/p>\n

On December 10, 2021 an explosion shook the Burj Al-Shamali refugee camp in Lebanon. Hamas claimed it was caused by an electrical short circuit in a warehouse storing oxygen tanks for Covid-19 patients, but other sources in Lebanon claimed that it was caused when a fire that broke out in a mosque that housed a Hamas munitions warehouse. One man was killed in the blast: Hamza Shaheen, an engineer from a refugee camp in Jordan who had been arrested there for „supporting the resistance,” i.e., Hamas.<\/span>[35]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Unclaimed Rocket Attacks From Lebanon<\/b><\/p>\n

In addition to these indications of Hamas’ entrenchment in Lebanon, since 2014 there have been rocket attacks on Israel from Lebanon for which no organization took credit, but which were ascribed to Hamas. For example, on August 25, 2014, during the round of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, several rockets were fired from South Lebanon into northern Israel.<\/span>[36]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Half an hour later, Imad Zaqout, the news director for Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV, claimed that they had been fired by elements „operated” by the Al-Qassam Brigades.<\/span>[37]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On May 13, 2021, also during a round of fighting in Gaza, three rockets were fired into Israel from Lebanon. This time a Palestinian source told the Lebanese\u00a0<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>\u00a0that „Palestinian factions” were responsible, and that the attack was meant to convey that „the resistance is one, in Lebanon and Palestine.” The daily reported that the Lebanese armed forces were looking for the launchers in the vicinity of the Al-Rashidieh refugee camp.<\/span>[38]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On July 19, 2021 two rockets were fired from Lebanon at Israel, presumably by Palestinian elements,<\/span>[39]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and on April 23, 2022 one rocket was fired. No organization claimed credit for launching it, but the IDF assessed that pro-Palestinian activists were responsible.<\/span>[40]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

On April 6, 2023, a barrage of 34 rockets was fired in an unclaimed attack, and Israel held Hamas responsible. According to reports in the Lebanese press, the attack came one day after a meeting in the Iranian embassy in Beirut between high-ranking figures in the resistance axis: Esmail Qaani, commander of the Iranian IRGC’s Qods Force, the leaders of Hizbullah, Hamas and the PIJ, and the heads of other militias backed by Iran. The reports claimed that the decision to launch the rockets had been taken at that meeting.<\/span>[41]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Hamas Establishes Official Affiliate In Lebanon: 'The Vanguards Of the Al-Aqsa Flood’ \u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

In seems that Hamas has grown confident and seeks to expand the military activity waged by Palestinian factions against Israel from Lebanon, in flagrant violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty. \u00a0On November 9, 2023, Hamas official Ali Baraka called on the Palestinian factions to establish military branches in Lebanon’s refugee camps. Speaking at a rally titled „Al-Aqsa Flood” [Hamas’ name for its October 7, 2023 attack on Israel] in the Burj Al-Shamali camp, Baraka said: „I’m not saying that [these] military branches must fight right now, but that they must prepare for the campaign of liberation and return to Palestine in a year or two. We must participate in the campaign of liberation along with the [factions] inside [Palestine] and the Islamic resistance in Lebanon [i.e., Hizbullah]\u2026 We in the [Lebanese] refugee camps must be part of the liberation, along with Hizbullah, the Syrians, the Iranians, the Iraqis and the Yemenis\u2026 We must prepare and train.”<\/span>[42]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

On December 4, 2023 Hamas announced the establishment of a new affiliate, the Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood organization. Addressed to „the Palestinian people in Lebanon and the heroic jihad fighters,” the announcement stated that the organization was meant „to emphasize the role of the Palestinian people, wherever it is found, in resisting the occupation by all available and legitimate means, in order to complete what was achieved by Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.” The announcement called on Palestinian men and youth to join the organization and take part in „shaping the future of your people and liberating Jerusalem and the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque.” Hamas’ representative in Lebanon, Ahmad Abd Al-Hadi, claimed that the new organization was not a military one, but other Hamas elements implied otherwise. Walid Al-Kilani, Hamas’ spokesman in Lebanon, said that the movement’s decision to recruit people to the new organization „does not mean that all of them will join the military action or the resistance action. Each [recruit will find] his [proper] place.”\u00a0<\/span>[43]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

The PIJ, too, recently announced the establishment of a new force in Lebanon. It should be mentioned that, unlike Hamas, which for many years took pains to hide its military presence in Lebanon and started to declare it openly and claim responsibility for it only during the current war, the PIJ has long been open about operating against Israeli forces both in Lebanon and from Lebanon.<\/span>[44]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On October 6, 2023, one day before the October 7 attack, it announced the establishment of a new brigade in Lebanon named after Mahmoud Al-Majdoub, the commander of its military wing in the country, who was killed by Israel in Sidon in 2006.<\/span>[45]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0The same day, a PIJ-affiliated Telegram channel posted photos showing members of the new brigade holding a ceremony in Beirut to mark the PIJ’s anniversary.<\/span>[46]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>Fighters of the PIJ’s Mahmoud Al-Majdoub Brigade hold a ceremony in Beirut to mark the movement’s anniversary<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Criticism In Lebanon Of Palestinian Factions’ Activity From Lebanese Soil<\/b><\/p>\n

The military activity of Hamas and the PIJ from Lebanese territory, and the presence of their senior commanders in the country, remind many in Lebanon of the time, during the 1970s and 1980s, when Palestinian factions headed by Fatah were active there, with devastating consequences for Lebanon. Lebanese politicians and journalists, especially those identified with the camp opposed to the resistance axis, expressed concern about the possible recurrence of these events and pointed out that the Palestinian activity is taking place with Hizbullah’s knowledge and consent. Criticism was also leveled at the government, which is doing nothing to stop this activity despite the danger of a harsh Israeli response against Lebanon.<\/span><\/p>\n

About a month after the start of the war in Gaza, Alan Sarkis, a columnist for the\u00a0<\/span>Nidaa Al-Watan<\/span><\/i>\u00a0daily, addressed the attacks launched against Israel from South Lebanon by various Lebanese and Palestinian factions, and warned: „South Lebanon has once again become a lawless war zone, and the Lebanese people’s dream of a proper state has evaporated\u2026 The south is on the brink of a volcano and nobody knows when it will erupt\u2026” Sarkis wondered: „Where do these fighters come from? Why don’t the state and the [security] apparatuses apprehend them, especially given that they control the entrances and exists of the [Palestinian] refugee camps? We are not talking about the smuggling of furniture, fuel or flour. Some people are taking rocket launchers and firing them without the knowledge of the legitimate authorities, [while disregarding] the harm that may be caused to Lebanon by the enemy\u2026”<\/span>[47]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Hamas’ announcement about the establishment of its new affiliate in Lebanon, the Vanguards of the Al-Aqsa Flood organization, was regarded by these circles as a provocation and an act of defiance against the state’s authority and sovereignty. They called on the state to enforce its control of South Lebanon and deploy the armed forces along the Israeli border.<\/span>[48]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The criticism intensified following the January 2, 2024 killing, attributed to Israel, of Saleh Al-Arouri, the deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, in the Dahya in southern Beirut. Lebanon’s former prime minister Fouad Al-Siniora wondered: „Is it proper for this number of armed organizations, Palestinian and other, to be [present] in many parts of Lebanon, including in Beirut’s southern Dahya?…”<\/span>[49]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Journalist May Chidiac, who is known for her criticism of Hizbullah and even survived an assassination attempt, wrote on her X account: „The Lebanese state wants to file a complaint with the UN in protest against the enemy’s [attacks] on its soil! Perhaps it is right, but how will it explain [the fact] that Hamas officials hold meetings on Lebanese soil to plan their operations, and hold press conferences in which they threaten Israel from Lebanon and put the security of the Lebanese people in danger in the name of [the principle of] the 'unity of the fronts’?! Enough! We don’t need to pay the price of anyone else’s [war].”<\/span>[50]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Some even demanded to expel Hamas from the country for endangering the lives of the Lebanese. Political activist Racha Itani wrote on X: „After the airstrike on the Dahya today, we demand to expel all the commanders of Hamas and the jihadist movements from Lebanon in order to protect the Lebanese people.”<\/span>[51]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Media figure and actress Carine Salameh wrote: „Attack me as much as you want. The Lebanese people does not want to continue paying the price of anyone else’s war. Leave us alone, let us be. You have been killing us since 1975\u2026 Shame on you\u2026”<\/span>[52]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Criticism was also directed at the Lebanese authorities, for allowing the presence and activity of the Palestinian factions on Lebanese soil. Former MP Fares Sou’aid wrote on X: „(1) The Lebanese government is aware of the danger posed by the presence in Lebanon of a commander of the caliber of Saleh Al-Arouri, [but] it was lenient in handling this matter; (2) The feebleness of the government places Lebanon, all of Lebanon, [in danger]. Today it was the southern Dahya, and tomorrow it will be Jounieh, Tripoli and Al-Beqaa\u2026”<\/span>[53]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Following Hamas’ launching of 40 rockets at Israel on February 28, Rosana Bou Monsef, a columnist for the\u00a0<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>\u00a0daily, wrote that Hamas and the other Palestinian factions are operating in South Lebanon in coordination with Hizbullah, and slammed the Lebanese government for doing nothing to stop this. In her article, titled „The Al-Qassam Rockets in South Lebanon Are Cause for Concern, Yet There Is No Response,” she noted that „the Lebanese armed forces have never arrested any Palestinian or other element for firing rockets at Israel from South Lebanon, even though [UN] Resolution 1701 obligates them to do so\u2026” One of the consequences of this, she added, \u00a0is „the postponement or cancellation” of a conference that was supposed to be held in France and Italy regarding the provision of aid to the Lebanese armed forces. She called on Hamas to act responsibly and not disregard the consequences of its actions for Lebanon, just as Hamas itself expects the international organizations to discharge their duty regarding the events in Gaza. Urging the government to represent all the Lebanese, „not just one sector, which grants the Palestinian organizations freedom to launch rockets from the south,” she wondered: „Does Lebanon benefit from the escalation of the Palestinian [activity] in the south[?] Is it is aware of the possibility of war with Israel if the Al-Qassam [Brigade’s] rockets hit Israel and prompt a harsh military response against Lebanon?… [The government] is behaving as though what is happening in the south does not interest it, although it will be the one to bear full responsibility during and after the war, if it breaks out.”<\/span>[54]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

*N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI; Y. Yehoshua is MEMRI Vice President for Research.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0The Forces of Dawn (Quwat Al-Fajr) militia, affiliated with the Sunni Lebanese Jama’a Al-Islamiya organization, has claimed responsibility for firing rockets into Israel (<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>, Lebanon, October 20, 2023; Telegram.me\/farok80,\u00a0 October 29, 2023). The Shi’ite Amal movement has reportedly carried out attacks as well, and announced that several of its operatives have been killed in South Lebanon. See MEMRI JTTM reports:\u00a0<\/span>Lebanese Daily: Hundreds Of Hizbullah-Allied Amal Movement Operatives Deployed On Lebanon-Israel Border, Carrying Out Attacks On Israel<\/span><\/a>, November 14, 2023; \u00a0<\/span>Hizbullah-Allied Amal Movement Announces 'Martyrs’ In Israeli Strikes In Southern Lebanon<\/span><\/a>, February 15, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/Hamas Movement, October 10, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, October 15, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[4]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, October 19, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[5]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, October 29, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[6]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, November 2, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, November 6, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[8]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, November 12, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[9]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Arabic.rt.com, December 10, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[10]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, December 25, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[11]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, January 17, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[12]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, February 28, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[13]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/hamasps, October 15, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[14]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/Hamas official, November 22, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[15]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI JTTM Report,\u00a0<\/span>Two Operatives With Turkish Citizenship Have Been Killed In Southern Lebanon, Including The Son Of A Mujahid Who Fought In Afghanistan And Chechnya<\/span><\/a>, November 22, 2023.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[16]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Al-jazeera.net, January 3, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[17]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, January 3, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[18]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/qassambrigades, January 18, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[19]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/jihad_press, October 10, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[20]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/sarayaps, October 22, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[21]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/sarayaps, October 29, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[22]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/sarayaps. December 12, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[23]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/sarayaps, December 29, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[24]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/sarayaps, February 12, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[25]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/sarayaps, February 24, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[26]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/ansarollah1, October 30, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[27]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Lebanon), February 7, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[28]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), October 30, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[29]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 10944,\u00a0<\/span>Arab Daily: Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad Are Asking Hizbullah To Give Them Greater Freedom To Operate Against Israel From South Lebanon<\/span><\/a>,\u00a0November 7, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[30]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Wattan.net, February 5, 2015.<\/span><\/p>\n

[31]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 7450 –\u00a0<\/span>Following The Murder In Malaysia Of Palestinian Engineer Fadi Al-Batsh, Hamas Supporters Debate Whether To Act Against Israel Abroad<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 May 1, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n

[32]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See e.g., MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 10100 –\u00a0<\/span>Hamas Political Bureau Head Isma’il Haniya’s Visit To Lebanon Sparks Criticism In Country: He Is Embroiling Lebanon In Regional Conflicts In Service Of Iran<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 July 27, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[33]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Al-Jazeera.net, September 15, 2023. It should be noted that Hamas has been careful not to take part in the armed clashes between various Palestinian factions that periodically break out in the camps (Almodon.com, October 19, 2023). Moreover, at least in the clashes that broke out in the Ayn Al-Hilweh camp in 2023, it took care to position itself as a mediator between Fatah and the Islamist factions, in an attempt to increase its influence in the camp. This is despite the fact that, according to some, Hamas was the one that incited these Islamist factions to clash with Fatah in the first place, in order to weaken it and perhaps also in order to blacken its public image (<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>, Lebanon, September 13, 2023; janoubia.com, July 31, 2023).<\/span><\/p>\n

[34]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Army-tech.net, September 7, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

[35]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Almodon.com, October 19, 2023. Special Dispatch No. 9689 –\u00a0<\/span>Following Explosion Of Hamas Arms Depot In South Lebanon Mosque, Lebanese Politicians, Journalists Call To Remove Palestinian Weapons From Country<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 December 21, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

[36]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Ynet.co.il, August 25, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[37]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5966 –\u00a0<\/span>Hamas Al-Aqsa TV News Chief: Rockets From Lebanon In Recent Gaza War Were Fired On Instructions By Hamas Military Wing<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 February 17, 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

[38]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Lebanon), May 13, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

[39]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Ynet.co.il, July 20, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

[40]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Ynet.co.il, April 25, 2022.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[41]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 10562 –\u00a0<\/span>Lebanese Media Reports: On The Evening Before The April 6, 2023 Rocket Attack On Israel, Iranian Qods Force Commander Esmail Qaani Visited Lebanon, Met With Officials From Hizbullah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 April 13, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[42]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Elnashra.com, November 13, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[43]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1732,\u00a0<\/span>„Public Uproar In Lebanon Following Hamas-Lebanon’s Announcement Of New Resistance Organization: We Don’t Want 'Hamas-Land’ In Lebanon,”<\/span><\/a>\u00a0December 12, 2023.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[44]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On May 28, 2022, the PIJ’s Lebanon branch issued a video reviewing the attacks carried out over the years by the organization’s military wing in Lebanon under the command of Mahmoud Muhammad Al-Majdoub. Most of the attacks were on the IDF forces in Lebanon (during the time they were present in the south of the country), apart from two attacks inside Israel carried out by PIJ operatives from Lebanon: one in Misgav Am in October 1993 and the other in Shlomi in March 2002. The video shows a group of PIJ operatives in a room looking at maps and operation plans. Towards the end of the video, a figure wearing a ring characteristic of senior Shi’ite leaders appears and is saluted by the operatives, which reflects the PIJ’s deference to Iran and Hizbullah (Telegram.me\/ma7warbrigades, May 28, 2022). According to the organization’s statements, Syria and Lebanon are not the only arenas of its military activity abroad. In 2003 it announced that its first „self-sacrificing fighters” (<\/span>fida’iyoun<\/span><\/i>) had arrived in Baghdad to fight the American and British invasion. The PIJ’s representative in Lebanon, Abu Imad Al-Rifa’i, clarified that these fighters were Palestinians from the diaspora, from several countries. He did not disclose their number, saying only that\u00a0\u00a0 „many” of them would arrive in Iraq. He stressed that fighting the American occupation in Iraq was part of defending the Palestinian people (Aljazeera.net, March 30, 2003).<\/span><\/p>\n

[45]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Samanews.ps, October 6, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[46]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Telegram.me\/ahfadalbahaa, October 6, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[47]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Nidaa Al-Watan<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Leanon), November 9, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[48]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1732 –\u00a0<\/span>Public Uproar In Lebanon Following Hamas-Lebanon’s Announcement Of New Resistance Organization: We Don’t Want 'Hamas-Land’ In Lebanon<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 December 12, 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

[49]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), January 4, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[50]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Twitter.com\/may_chidiac, January 2, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[51]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Twitter.com\/RachaItani, January 2, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[52]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Twitter.com\/SalamehCarine, January 2, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[53]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Twitter.com\/FaresSouaid, January 3, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

[54]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Nahar<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Lebanon), March 1, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Od pocz\u0105tku wojny mi\u0119dzy Izraelem a frakcjami palesty\u0144skimi w Gazie Izrael stoi r\u00f3wnie\u017c w obliczu atak\u00f3w z po\u0142udniowego Libanu.\u00a0Opr\u00f3cz atak\u00f3w Hezbollahu (kt\u00f3rego obecno\u015b\u0107 w po\u0142udniowym Libanie narusza uchwa\u0142\u0119 Rady Bezpiecze\u0144stwa ONZ nr 1701 zakazuj\u0105c\u0105 obecno\u015bci uzbrojonych boj\u00f3wek na po\u0142udnie od rzeki Litani) i innych organizacji liba\u0144skich [1]\u00a0, frakcje palesty\u0144skie, takie jak Hamas i Palesty\u0144ski Islamski […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":21074,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824,828,835,837,841],"tags":[945,949,957,989],"class_list":["post-21072","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-specjalne-komunikaty","category-autonomia-palestynska","category-archiwum","category-kraje","category-liban","tag-liban","tag-egypt","tag-pakistanie","tag-palestinians"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21072","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=21072"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21072\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":21079,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21072\/revisions\/21079"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21074"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21072"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=21072"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=21072"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}