{"id":17692,"date":"2022-07-27T00:30:46","date_gmt":"2022-07-26T22:30:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/?p=17692"},"modified":"2022-07-27T00:30:46","modified_gmt":"2022-07-26T22:30:46","slug":"nieudana-inicjatywa-zalozenia-bliskowschodniego-nato-kraje-arabskie-wyjasniaja-nie-bedzie-regionalnego-sojuszu-wojskowego-przeciwko-iranowi-staramy-sie-poprawic-nasze-stosunki-z-n","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/nieudana-inicjatywa-zalozenia-bliskowschodniego-nato-kraje-arabskie-wyjasniaja-nie-bedzie-regionalnego-sojuszu-wojskowego-przeciwko-iranowi-staramy-sie-poprawic-nasze-stosunki-z-n\/17692","title":{"rendered":"Nieudana inicjatywa za\u0142o\u017cenia bliskowschodniego NATO \u2013 kraje arabskie wyja\u015bniaj\u0105 \u2013 nie b\u0119dzie regionalnego sojuszu wojskowego przeciwko Iranowi; staramy si\u0119 poprawi\u0107 nasze stosunki z nim"},"content":{"rendered":"

W tygodniach poprzedzaj\u0105cych wizyt\u0119 prezydenta USA Joe Bidena w Arabii Saudyjskiej na Szczyt Bezpiecze\u0144stwa i Rozwoju w D\u017cuddzie 16 lipca 2022 r. w mediach arabskich i mi\u0119dzynarodowych pojawi\u0142y si\u0119 liczne doniesienia twierdz\u0105ce, \u017ce jednym z g\u0142\u00f3wnych temat\u00f3w, kt\u00f3re mia\u0142y by\u0107 dyskutowane na szczycie, na kt\u00f3rym by\u0142 m.in. Biden i przyw\u00f3dcy dziewi\u0119ciu kraj\u00f3w arabskich \u2013 by\u0142o ustanowienie regionalnego sojuszu wojskowego przeciwko Iranowi.\u00a0Wed\u0142ug doniesie\u0144 sojusz ten mia\u0142 obejmowa\u0107 Izrael obok umiarkowanych kraj\u00f3w arabskich, w tym Arabii Saudyjskiej, Zjednoczonych Emirat\u00f3w Arabskich, Bahrajnu, Egiptu i Jordanii.\u00a0Wielu m\u00f3wi\u0142o o tej inicjatywie jako utworzeniu \u201eregionalnego NATO\u201d.\u00a0<\/span>[1]<\/span><\/a> Uwagi jorda\u0144skiego kr\u00f3la Abdullaha II w wywiadzie udzielonym 24 czerwca dla ameryka\u0144skiej stacji telewizyjnej, \u017ce b\u0119dzie on pierwszym, kt\u00f3ry przyst\u0105pi do regionalnego NATO, jeszcze bardziej zintensyfikowa\u0142y debat\u0119 na ten temat, a arabska i mi\u0119dzynarodowa prasa opublikowa\u0142a wiele artyku\u0142\u00f3w na ten temat.<\/span><\/p>\n

Jednak w miar\u0119 zbli\u017cania si\u0119 szczytu w D\u017cuddzie kraje arabskie zacz\u0119\u0142y wyja\u015bnia\u0107 \u2013 oficjalnie i wprost lub w artyku\u0142ach prasowych \u2013 \u017ce nie maj\u0105 zamiaru do\u0142\u0105cza\u0107 do regionalnego sojuszu wojskowego przeciwko Iranowi.\u00a0Na przyk\u0142ad przed wyjazdem na szczyt iracki premier Mustafa Al-Kadhimi powiedzia\u0142, \u017ce Irak \u201enie jest stron\u0105 \u017cadnego sojuszu ani koalicji w regionie\u201d i \u017ce \u201eutrzymuje zr\u00f3wnowa\u017con\u0105 polityk\u0119 wobec s\u0105siad\u00f3w i otoczenia\u201d.\u00a0<\/span>[2]<\/span><\/a> Anwar Gargasz, doradca prezydenta ZEA, wyja\u015bni\u0142, \u017ce jego kraj nie do\u0142\u0105czy do takiego sojuszu i w rzeczywisto\u015bci rozwa\u017ca wys\u0142anie ambasadora do Iranu.\u00a0Z doniesie\u0144 wynika, \u017ce \u200b\u200bw dniach poprzedzaj\u0105cych szczyt w D\u017cuddzie Egipt i Jordania r\u00f3wnie\u017c przekaza\u0142y Iranowi tajne depesze uspokajaj\u0105ce za po\u015brednictwem Iraku i Omanu, w kt\u00f3rych podkre\u015bla\u0142y, \u017ce nie przy\u0142\u0105cz\u0105 si\u0119 do regionalnego sojuszu przeciwko niemu i \u017ce nie s\u0105 zainteresowane w eskalowaniu konfliktu z nim.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ostatecznie szczyt w D\u017cuddzie rzeczywi\u015bcie zako\u0144czy\u0142 si\u0119 brakiem wzmianki o sojuszu regionalnym, z Izraelem lub bez.\u00a0Co wi\u0119cej, saudyjski minister spraw zagranicznych Faisal bin Farhan o\u015bwiadczy\u0142 na zako\u0144czenie szczytu, \u017ce \u201edialog i dyplomacja to jedyny spos\u00f3b na poradzenie sobie z ira\u0144skim [programem] nuklearnym\u201d i \u017ce Arabia Saudyjska wyci\u0105ga r\u0119k\u0119 do Iranu.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/span>Prezydent USA Biden i arabskie g\u0142owy pa\u0144stw na szczycie w D\u017cuddzie (\u0179r\u00f3d\u0142o: Al-D\u017cazira, Arabia Saudyjska, 17 czerwca Arab 2022)<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Wydaje si\u0119, \u017ce nawet je\u015bli w pewnym momencie kilka kraj\u00f3w arabskich rozwa\u017ca\u0142o utworzenie regionalnego sojuszu przeciwko Iranowi, szereg wzgl\u0119d\u00f3w i spostrze\u017ce\u0144 sk\u0142oni\u0142 je do odrzucenia tego pomys\u0142u i podkre\u015blenia, \u017ce \u200b\u200bnie d\u0105\u017c\u0105 do konfrontacji militarnej z tym krajem.\u00a0G\u0142\u00f3wn\u0105 kwesti\u0105 jest ich zrozumienie, \u017ce administracja Bidena jest zaanga\u017cowana w osi\u0105gni\u0119cie porozumienia nuklearnego z Iranem i \u017ce postrzega dyplomacj\u0119 jako najlepsz\u0105, je\u015bli nie jedyn\u0105, opcj\u0119 walki z ira\u0144skim programem nuklearnym.\u00a0Dlatego kraje te oceniaj\u0105, \u017ce nie mog\u0105 polega\u0107 na USA w ochronie ich przed Iranem i obawiaj\u0105 si\u0119, \u017ce USA nie przyjd\u0105 im z pomoc\u0105 w przypadku konfrontacji wojskowej z nimi, tak jak nie przysz\u0142y z pomoc\u0105 Ukrainie, kiedy zosta\u0142a zaatakowany przez Rosj\u0119.<\/span><\/p>\n

Co wi\u0119cej, kraje arabskie najwyra\u017aniej obawiaj\u0105 si\u0119, \u017ce USA podpisz\u0105 nowe porozumienie nuklearne z Iranem, kt\u00f3re nie rozwi\u0105\u017ce ich obaw dotycz\u0105cych post\u0119powania Iranu i jego boj\u00f3wek w regionie, i dlatego uzna\u0142y za rozs\u0105dne otwarcie bezpo\u015bredniego kana\u0142u komunikacji z Iranem, zamiast i\u015b\u0107 w kierunku eskalacji wojskowej.\u00a0Wydaje si\u0119, \u017ce kraje te podj\u0119\u0142y strategiczn\u0105 decyzj\u0119 o utrzymaniu spokojnych stosunk\u00f3w z Iranem i d\u0105\u017ceniu do dialogu z nim.\u00a0W rzeczywisto\u015bci w ostatnich miesi\u0105cach odby\u0142o si\u0119 pi\u0119\u0107 rund rozm\u00f3w, za po\u015brednictwem Iraku i Omanu, mi\u0119dzy Arabi\u0105 Saudyjsk\u0105 a Iranem.\u00a0Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie r\u00f3wnie\u017c utrzymuj\u0105 kontakty i dialog z tym krajem i, jak\u00a0<\/span>wspomniano, Egipt i Jordania zrobi\u0142y to samo w ostatnich tygodniach.<\/span><\/p>\n

Artyku\u0142 wst\u0119pny w wychodz\u0105cej w Londynie katarskiej gazecie\u00a0\u201eAl-Quds Al-Arabi\u201d, zatytu\u0142owany \u201eCzy Inicjatywa \u2018Arabskie NATO\u2019 zako\u0144czy\u0142a si\u0119 fiaskiem?\u201d, stwierdzi\u0142, \u017ce inicjatywa \u201ezatrzyma\u0142a si\u0119 w miejscu\u201d\u00a0<\/span>[3]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0. Publicysta \u201eAl-Sharq Al-Awsat\u201d, Sulejman D\u017cawda napisa\u0142 w podobnym tonie, \u017ce pomys\u0142 ustanowienia arabskiego NATO przeciwko Iranowi by\u0142 \u201emartwo narodzony”. Wed\u0142ug niego nie powi\u00f3d\u0142 si\u0119, poniewa\u017c by\u0142a to inicjatywa ameryka\u0144ska, a zatem by\u0142 jak ro\u015blina \u201ewyrwana z korzeniami i wsadzona ponownie w obc\u0105 ziemi\u0119, tak \u017ce usch\u0142a i umar\u0142a\u201d.\u00a0Doda\u0142, \u017ce kraje arabskie wierz\u0105, \u017ce jedynym sposobem radzenia sobie z Iranem jest dialog, a nie konfrontacja, wi\u0119c Biden zosta\u0142 zmuszony do zabrania ze sob\u0105 do Waszyngtonu pomys\u0142u na arabskie NATO\u00a0<\/span>[4].<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

[Dalszy tekst – przegl\u0105d komunikat\u00f3w kraj\u00f3w arabskich uspokajaj\u0105cych Iran przed i po szczycie w D\u017cuddzie, a tak\u017ce ich o\u015bwiadcze\u0144, \u017ce nie przy\u0142\u0105cz\u0105 si\u0119 do sojuszu przeciwko Iranowi \u2013 nie jest spolszczony]\u00a0\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

UAE: We Won’t Be Part Of Any Alliance Against Iran; We Are Working To Improve Relations With It<\/b><\/p>\n

The UAE no doubt still views Iran as a significant threat, as evident from statements by senior Emirati officials and from articles in the country\u2019s press. At the same time, in the recent months it seems to be maintaining calm relations with Iran and even a steady dialogue with it. As stated, this appears to be the result of a strategic decision taken by the UAE in light of the Biden Administration\u2019s ongoing pursuit of a nuclear agreement with Iran and rejection of a military confrontation with it, a position that could leave the UAE exposed to Iranian threat. The Emirati position was reflected in a June 19 telephone call between UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, during which the two diplomats emphasized the shared interests of their countries and the mutual desire to develop the relations and continue the dialogue between them. The Iranian foreign minister even invited his Emirati counterpart to visit Iran.<\/span>[5]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

As Biden\u2019s visit and the Jeddah summit drew near, and as reports about the possibility of an Arab NATO proliferated, Emirati officials began voicing reservations about the idea. For example, on June 26, after the\u00a0<\/span>Wall Street Journal<\/span><\/i>\u00a0reported about a secret meeting, initiated by the U.S., that had been held in March in Sharm Al-Sheikh between high-ranking military commanders from Israel and Arab countries, including the UAE, to discuss cooperation against areal threats from Iran, the UAE\u00a0 issued a clarification. It stated that \u201cThe UAE is not party to any regional military alliance or cooperation targeting any specific country\u2026 nor is it aware of any formal discussions relating to any such regional military alliance.\u201d<\/span>[6]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

In the two weeks leading up to Biden\u2019s visit, the London-based Emirati daily\u00a0<\/span>Al-Arab<\/span><\/i>\u00a0published a series of reports and articles that, while acknowledging the regional threat posed by Iran, came out against the idea of a regional military alliance against it. For example,\u00a0 on July 11 the daily\u2019s editor, Haitham Al-Zubaidi, published an article titled \u201cAn Arab NATO Will Cause More Problems than It Will Solve,\u201d and columnist \u2018Ali Al-Sarraf wrote that \u201cthe call to establish an Arab NATO against Iran should now be buried.\u201d<\/span>[7]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On July 15, one day before the Jeddah summit, Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic advisor to the Emirati president, explicitly addressed this issue, telling reporters that his country opposed any regional military alliance against Iran and was working to reestablish relations with it. He added: „Our conversation [with Iran] is ongoing… We are in the process of sending an ambassador to Tehran. All these areas of rebuilding bridges are ongoing\u2026 We must reduce the escalation, find solutions and employ economic cooperation in all spheres.\u201d He\u00a0 noted that the UAE still had concerns about Iran\u2019s regional activities but wanted to make efforts towards finding diplomatic solutions. Asked about the option of an alliance against Iran, he replied an Arab NATO was a „theoretical” concept and confrontation was not an option for his country, and added: „We are open to cooperation, but not cooperation targeting any other country in the region and I specifically mention Iran. The UAE is not going to be a party to any group of countries that sees confrontation as a direction.\u201d He clarified that the UAE could be part of anything that protects it from drones and missiles as long as it did not target a third country.<\/span>[8]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Articles published in the UAE press after the Jeddah summit stressed that the UAE had informed the U.S. that joining alliances and axes targeting specific countries was contrary to its strategic policy, which seeks to maintain open channels of communication and diplomacy vis-\u00e0-vis Iran, end the tensions in the Middle East and complete the peace process.<\/span>[9]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Egypt In Reassuring Message To Iran Ahead Of Biden Visit: We Will Join No Regional Alliances; We Do Not Seek Confrontation<\/b><\/p>\n

Egypt conveyed reassuring messages to Iran even before Biden\u2019s visit, during President \u2018Abd Al-Fattah Al-Sisi\u2019s visit to Oman on June 27, 2022. According to reports in a Qatari daily, during Al-Sisi’s visit a meeting was held between senior Egyptian and Iranian officials, at which the Egyptians conveyed that Egypt opposes regional alliances and seeks to improve its relations with Iran. The report also claimed, citing Egyptian sources, that the opposition within Egypt to the notion of an Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran was led by figures in the Egyptian army and General Intelligence Directorate. The sources assessed that the rapprochement with Iran was meant to prevent it from forming ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, which opposes Al-Sisi’s regime.<\/span>[10]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

In a July 17, 2022 article in the Egyptian\u00a0<\/span>Al-Masri Al-Yawm\u00a0<\/span><\/i>daily, journalist Mohammed Amin explained that „Egypt\u2019s refusal to join an Arab military alliance does not stem from any willingness to leave the security of the Gulf open to threats, but is based on a consistent position dating back to [the days of] the Baghdad Pact.\u201d<\/span>[11]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0He added: \u201cSo far, the threats against the Gulf have been merely verbal, so [Egypt] has no intention of joining any pact sponsored by the West!…\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

„This,\u201d he explained, \u201cdoes not mean that Egypt is leaning toward Iran. Iran knows that the security of the Gulf is a red line in Egyptian politics. But the important point, as I see it, is that Egypt does not follow the herd\u2026 and its decision-making is independent and cannot be bought or sold\u2026 Egypt also refrained from joining the coalition [fighting] in Yemen. It does not fight for anyone and does not fight beyond its borders. These have been Egypt’s principles for generations. The participation of the [Egyptian] army in the [1990-1991] Gulf War was an exception. The objective [back then] was to liberate an independent Arab country, i.e. Kuwait, from the Iraqi invasion, and that was part of [ensuring] the security of the Gulf\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n

„There is no cause for alarm. There is no disaster or any suspicious behavior, at least on Egypt’s part. Every country has the right to determine its own interests as it pleases. Certain countries had an interest in a military alliance, but Egypt explained that an Arab NATO was contrary to its principles. These countries, as well as America, understood that Egypt would not do this and that no one could force it to join [such an] alliance.”<\/span>[12]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Jordan In Messages To Iran Ahead Of Jeddah Summit: There Will Be No Military Alliance With Israel; Despite Threats On Our Borders, We Want Normal Relations With You<\/b><\/p>\n

As for Jordan, the days and weeks leading up to the Jeddah summit saw a notable shift in its declared policy towards Iran. Only two months ago, in a May 18, 2022 interview with the Hoover Institution public policy think tank at Stanford University, King Abdullah II restated his concern about the Iranian presence on the Syria-Jordan border.<\/span>[13]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0 Nor was this the first time that these concerns \u2013 which were also expressed in the Jordanian media over the past weeks<\/span>[14]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 have been voiced. For many years now King Abdullah has been warning about Iran\u2019s attempts to expand its presence in the region and to form a geographical continuum from its own territory to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria, a continuum he referred to in 2004 as \u201cthe Shi\u2019ite Crescent.\u201d Following the civil war in Syria and the Iranian penetration of this country, Jordan\u2019s concerns about the Iran and about the presence of the pro-Iran militias on the Syria-Jordan border grew even further. The Jordanians have clarified on more than one occasion that they view this Iranian-Shi\u2019ite presence on their border as a strategic threat.<\/span>[15]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0In fact, in the recent weeks the Jordanians reported thwarting a series of attempts to smuggle drugs, weapons, and ammunition into Jordan via the border with Syria, in which Iran-backed militias in southern Syria had been involved.<\/span>[16]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0These concerns may have been the motivation for King Abdullah\u2019s statement in\u00a0a June 24, 2022 interview on the American CNBC network, that he \u201cwould be one of the first people that would endorse a Middle East NATO.\u201d\u00a0<\/span>[17]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Although he did not explicitly mention either Israel or Iran, the King\u2019s statements in this interview were understood as an official expression of Jordan\u2019s willingness to join a military alliance against Iran that would include Israel. Hence, the remarks sparked an uproar in the Arab world and prompted Jordan to qualify them. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi, sent to clarify the king\u2019s position, told Al-Jazeera on June 28 that \u201cthere has been no discussion of a military alliance of which Israel is a part, and we have heard no such proposal to date.\u201d<\/span>[18]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Reports subsequently published in the Jordanian press also expressed reservations about entering an alliance with Israel against Iran.<\/span>[19]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

The\u00a0<\/span>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/span><\/i>\u00a0daily speculated that Al-Safadi had conveyed these reassurances to Iran\u00a0 due to Jordan\u2019s fear of a harsh Iranian response that would threaten its interests, and also due to Jordan\u2019s realization that other Arab countries were not interested in joining such an alliance or in launching a military confrontation with Iran. The daily stated that Jordan had decided to convey a message to Iran\u00a0 that it was not interested in confrontation with it.<\/span>[20]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Furthermore, reports in the Arab press indicate that, in the days leading up to the Jeddah summit, indirect dialogue took place between Jordan and Iran, mediated by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi and his associates, with the aim of reducing the tension between the countries. According to these reports, the exchange of messages resulted in general understandings. The online daily Raialyoum.com stated that Iran had urged Jordan to refrain from taking an extreme position towards Iran under the influence of America, Israel or the Gulf states, while clarifying that it was not interested in a crisis with Jordan and that it respected its security and sovereignty. Jordan, for its part, expressed its growing concern about the involvement of Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and of the Iran-backed militias in the smuggling of drugs and weapons from Syria into Jordan, and received assurances from Iran that it would not allow this and would keep the militias 40 km away from the Jordanian border.<\/span>[21]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This dialogue, and the understandings it yielded, led Jordanian officials to make surprising and very conciliatory statements on the eve of the Jeddah summit. Prime Minister Bisher Al-Khasawneh and Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi said that Jordan was open to normal relations with Iran.<\/span>[22]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Al-Khasawneh even added, \u201cwe have never regarded Iran as a threat to our national security.\u201d<\/span>[23]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

The Jordanian press also published several articles calling for rapprochement with Iran. In a July 6 column in\u00a0<\/span>Al-Dustour<\/span><\/i>, Journalist Fares Al-Habashneh called for dialogue between the two countries, for improving their relations, and for establishing a new political-economic axis comprising Jordan, Iran and Iraq, in light of the shifting power-balances and the \u201cinterest-driven\u201d American policy in the region.<\/span>[24]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

On July 18 journalist Hussein Rawashdeh, a columnist for\u00a0<\/span>Al-Ghad<\/span><\/i>, addressed the Jordanian prime minister\u2019s conciliatory statements about Iran, writing: \u201cAmman understands that Iran does not pose any direct threat to Jordan\u2019s national security, and that it is time to heed the messages it has conveyed more than once about improving and warming the relations, [especially considering] the inclination of Arabs, and in particular of the Gulf, to calm [the situation vis-a-vis] Tehran\u2026 Jordan has an interest in softening its attitude towards Tehran, whether in order to secure its northern border with southern Syria, where several pro-Iranian militias are deployed \u2013 especially now that clashes with drug dealers have increased \u2013 or\u00a0 in order to facilitate Jordan\u2019s diplomatic efforts in Iraq, where several pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians and religious authorities have prevented the Iraqi government from [promoting] economic openness towards Jordan\u2026 It appears that the option of mutual understandings between the Arabs, including Jordan, and Iran are now clearly the need of the hour, not just in order to adjust to the shifting power balances but because the region cannot become stable unless the historical neighbors reach mutual understandings based on common ground that will allow them to coexist in security and stability\u2026\u201d<\/span>[25]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

However, despite this exchange of reassuring messages and these conciliatory press articles, following the Jeddah summit King Abdullah reiterated that Jordan still felt threatened by Iran, and especially by the pro-Iranian militias deployed near Jordan\u2019s border with Syria, which are involved in smuggling drugs and weapons into the kingdom. He expressed these concerns in a July 20 meeting with tribal leaders in norther Jordan near the Syrian border, and in a July 24 interview with the Jordanian state daily\u00a0<\/span>Al-Rai<\/span><\/i>.<\/span>[26]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Saudi Foreign Minister Following Jeddah Summit: Iran Is Still A Source Of Concern; No Arab NATO Or Military Cooperation With Israel<\/b><\/p>\n

Statements against an Arab NATO and against military cooperation with Israel were also heard from Saudi Arabia at the conclusion of the Jeddah summit. The kingdom expressed that, although Iran was still a source of concern, Saudi Arabia preferred finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict with it. At a press conference at the close of the summit, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said that „dialogue and diplomacy are the only solutions to [the issue of] Iran’s nuclear program.”<\/span>[27]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Addressing the issue of a military alliance against Iran that would include Israel, the Saudi foreign minister denied any intention of forming one. He said that „no kind of military or technical cooperation with Israel was suggested” at the Jeddah summit, and added, „There is no such thing as an Arab NATO, and the issue is not on the agenda.” Bin Farhan mentioned that, five years ago, Saudi Arabia had proposed establishing a joint Arab defense mechanism to raise the level of security coordination, but said that this plan, too, had not been discussed at the summit.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran he said that Saudi Arabia\u2019s hand was extended to Iran in a bid to attain normal relations, and explained: „We seek to find a path to conduct normal relations with our neighbor Iran, which involves reaching understandings that will address the concern regarding the Iranian activity. This concern is felt not only by Saudi Arabia but\u00a0 by all countries of the region.” Reiterating his country\u2019s commitment\u00a0 to the dialogue taking place between Saudi Arabia and Iran with Iraqi mediation, he expressed hope that it „will yield positive developments and that the Iranian neighbors will move in that direction as well.” Bin Farhan leveled criticism at Iran in the context of the crisis in Yemen, saying that „the Iranian weapons are part of the reason for the continuation of the conflict\u201d in that country. He also said that Saudi Arabia was making earnest efforts „to bring about a comprehensive and final ceasefire” in Yemen and added, hinting at Iran, that „the Houthis must understand that the welfare of Yemen lies in peace and dialogue, and not in regional agendas.”<\/span>[28]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

A pithy expression of the Saudi position, and of the Arab position at large, was provided by Egyptian journalist Suleiman Goda in his column in the\u00a0<\/span>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/span><\/i>\u00a0daily. He wrote\u00a0 that the idea of forming a regional NATO against Iran, which many thought would be declared during Biden\u2019s visit to the region, was \u201cstillborn.\u201d The initiative, he elaborated, was essentially an American one that started circulating among the countries in the region, but it gradually became apparent that none of them was willing to endorse it. \u201cOfficial Arab declarations politely declining the idea came one after the other, despite the tempting proposals that had accompanied it,\u201d he said. \u201cThis idea, in all of its stages, was like a plant that someone uprooted and tried to plant in foreign soil, and every time it withered and died\u2026\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Goda added: \u201cThe countries that openly declared their rejection of the Arab NATO [initiative] did not do so out of a desire to express support for Iran, God forbid, but out of a belief that the [Iranian] problem can only be resolved via dialogue, not through war or confrontation. By openly rejecting this initiative, they conveyed to the government of Iran\u2019s [Supreme] Leader that it should take note their rational approach to their relations with Iran and that they expected it to take a similar approach\u2026\u201d He concluded: \u201cThis is why the Arab NATO idea never stood a chance in the region. If the Biden administration floated it as a trial balloon\u00a0 ahead of his visit, the master of the White House no doubt ended up taking it back with him on his plane to Washington!…\u201d<\/span>[29]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran In Response: Egypt\u2019s Position Is Commendable; We Welcome Saudi Arabia\u2019s Openness<\/b><\/p>\n

Iran, for its part, welcomed the conciliatory tone of the Arab officials\u2019 statements. Mohammad Hossein Soltanifard, the head of Iran’s Interests Section in Egypt, thanked Egypt for its position, tweeting: \u201cThe position of Egypt, which voiced opposition to America\u2019s ludicrous fantasy of forming an alliance against Iran, while other countries participating in the Jeddah summit kept silent, is commendable and understandable. This plan, just like the \u2018Greater Middle East\u2019 plan and \u2018the Deal of the Century,\u2019 will be stillborn, Allah willing.\u201d<\/span>[30]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

In an interview on Qatar\u2019s Al-Jazeera, Kamal Kharazi, the head of Iran\u2019s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, welcomed Saudi Arabia\u2019s statements about extending a hand to Iran, and said that Iran was ready to talk and to renew its relations with the kingdom. Iran and Saudi Arabia are important regional countries, he said, and resolving the disagreements between them will bring about change throughout the region. He added that a Middle East NATO was a superficial idea and that Saudi Arabia had emphasized that it had not even come up in the Jeddah summit.<\/span>[31]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

* H. Varulkar is Director of Research at MEMRI; Y. Yehoshua is Vice President for Research and Director of MEMRI Israel; H. Harel is a research fellow at MEMRI.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0For example, on June 26, 2022,\u00a0<\/span>The Wall Street Journal<\/span><\/i>\u00a0reported that in March 2022 the U.S. had organized a secret meeting in Sharm Al-Sheikh, Egypt, attended by officers from the IDF and Arab armies, to discuss the threat posed by Iranian drones and rockets. According to the report, the meeting included IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi; Saudi Chief of Staff\u00a0 Fayyad bin Hamed Al-Ruwaili;<\/span>\u00a0<\/b>then<\/span>–<\/b>CENTCOM commander<\/span>\u00a0<\/b>Kenneth McKenzie, and senior figures from the armies of Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and Qatar. It was also reported that the participants had reached an agreement in principle for rapid notification when aerial threats are detected. Wsj.com, June 26, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 15, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 17, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[4]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 21, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[5]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), isna.ir, June 19, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[6]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Wsj.com, June 26, 2022. The journal stated that Israel and the Arab states had declined its request to respond to the report, with the exception of the UAE, which issued the clarification quoted above.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Arab<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(UAE), July 6, 11, 14, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[8]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Arabic.cnn.com, reuters.com, June 15, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[9]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See e.g.,\u00a0<\/span>Al-Ittihad<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(UAE), July 19, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[10]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/span><\/i>, (London) June 28, 2022, July 6, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[11]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0The Baghdad Pact was a political and military alliance between Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran between 1955 and 1979.\u00a0 Initiated by the U.S., it was meant to form a barrier along the Soviet Union\u2019s southwestern frontier and prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. The U.S. urged and even pressured the Arab countries to join it while promising them economic benefits, but most of them declined. In fact, the U.S. itself never officially joined the pact, which is considered to be one of the less successful alliances of the Cold War era.<\/span><\/p>\n

[12]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Masri Al-Yawm<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Egypt), July 17, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[13]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Raialyou,com, May 18, 2022;\u00a0<\/span>Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), May 19, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[14]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See e.g., ammonnews.net. May 22, 2022;\u00a0<\/span>Al-Dustour, Al-Ghad<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Jordan), June 27, 2022;\u00a0<\/span>Al-Rai<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Jordan), June 29, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[15]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI\u00a0<\/span>Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1359 – Concern In Jordan Over Pro-Iranian Forces On Border – 11\/16\/17<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

[16]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See e.g., alarabiya.net, May 22, 2022;\u00a0<\/span>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), May 23, 2022; Al-Rai (Jordan), June 16, 2022; almamlakatv.com, May 23, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[17]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Cnbc.com, June 24, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[18]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Aljazeera.net, June 29, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[19]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI\u00a0<\/span>Special Dispatch No. 10064 – Strong Opposition In Jordanian Press To Kingdom\u2019s Participation In Regional Military Alliance With Israel Against Iran – 07\/06\/22<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

[20]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 4, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[21]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Raialyoum.com, July 16, 2022. Jordanian officials did not conform the existence of this indirect, Iraqi-brokered exchange of messages, but\u00a0 Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein confirmed the reports in a June 30, 2022 interview on Al-Arabiya. Former Jordanian information minister Samih Al-Ma\u2019aytah likewise addressed this issue in a July 14 article, claiming that the communication between Jordan and Iran was meant to calm the situation on the Jordan-Syria border and put an end to the smuggling of drugs into the kingdom over this border. Ammonnews.net, July 14, 2022.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[22]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Raialyoum.com, July 11, 2022;\u00a0<\/span>Al-Arabi Al-Jadid<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 15, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[23]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Raialyoum.com, July 11, 2022. Despite these remarks from the prime minister, a senior Jordanian source said it was early to speak of appointing a Jordanian ambassador to Iran and that this issue was not yet on the agenda. Raialyoum.com, July 18, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[24]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Dustour<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Jordan), July 6, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[25]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Ghad<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Jordan), July 18, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[26]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>Al-Ghad<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Jordan), July 21, 2022;\u00a0<\/span>Al-Rai<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(Jordan), July 24, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[27]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Arabnews.com, July 16, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[28]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 17, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[29]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(London), July 21, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[30]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Irna.ir, July 14, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[31]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Aljazeera.net, July 17, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

W tygodniach poprzedzaj\u0105cych wizyt\u0119 prezydenta USA Joe Bidena w Arabii Saudyjskiej na Szczyt Bezpiecze\u0144stwa i Rozwoju w D\u017cuddzie 16 lipca 2022 r. w mediach arabskich i mi\u0119dzynarodowych pojawi\u0142y si\u0119 liczne doniesienia twierdz\u0105ce, \u017ce jednym z g\u0142\u00f3wnych temat\u00f3w, kt\u00f3re mia\u0142y by\u0107 dyskutowane na szczycie, na kt\u00f3rym by\u0142 m.in. Biden i przyw\u00f3dcy dziewi\u0119ciu kraj\u00f3w arabskich \u2013 by\u0142o […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":17694,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824,828,835,837],"tags":[912,957],"class_list":["post-17692","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-specjalne-komunikaty","category-autonomia-palestynska","category-archiwum","category-kraje","tag-konflikt-arabsko-izraelski","tag-pakistanie"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17692","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17692"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17692\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17695,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17692\/revisions\/17695"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/17694"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17692"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17692"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17692"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}