{"id":17612,"date":"2022-07-04T23:04:00","date_gmt":"2022-07-04T21:04:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/?p=17612"},"modified":"2022-07-04T23:04:49","modified_gmt":"2022-07-04T21:04:49","slug":"w-niezwyklym-artykule-saudyjski-uczony-wzywa-do-dostarczenia-islamskiej-aprobaty-religijnej-dla-normalizacji-stosunkow-z-izraelem-izrael-jest-czescia-spolecznosci-miedzynarodowej-jest-przywilejem-wl","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/w-niezwyklym-artykule-saudyjski-uczony-wzywa-do-dostarczenia-islamskiej-aprobaty-religijnej-dla-normalizacji-stosunkow-z-izraelem-izrael-jest-czescia-spolecznosci-miedzynarodowej-jest-przywilejem-wl\/17612","title":{"rendered":"W niezwyk\u0142ym artykule saudyjski uczony wzywa do dostarczenia islamskiej aprobaty religijnej dla normalizacji stosunk\u00f3w z Izraelem: Izrael jest cz\u0119\u015bci\u0105 spo\u0142eczno\u015bci mi\u0119dzynarodowej; Jest przywilejem w\u0142adcy decydowanie o zawarciu z nim pokoju"},"content":{"rendered":"

Przed wizyt\u0105 prezydenta USA Bidena na Bliskim Wschodzie, zaplanowan\u0105 na po\u0142ow\u0119 lipca 2022 r., w mediach ponownie pojawi\u0142y si\u0119 spekulacje na temat mo\u017cliwej normalizacji stosunk\u00f3w mi\u0119dzy Arabi\u0105 Saudyjsk\u0105 a Izraelem.\u00a0Tajne kontakty mi\u0119dzy krajami trwaj\u0105 od jakiego\u015b czasu, ale Arabia Saudyjska jak dot\u0105d powstrzymywa\u0142a si\u0119 od przy\u0142\u0105czenia si\u0119 do niekt\u00f3rych swoich sojusznik\u00f3w w podpisaniu porozumienia pokojowego z Izraelem.\u00a0Wi\u0105\u017ce normalizacj\u0119 stosunk\u00f3w z rozwi\u0105zaniem problemu palesty\u0144skiego w oparciu o arabsk\u0105 inicjatyw\u0119 pokojow\u0105 z 2002 roku.<\/span><\/p>\n

Wydaje si\u0119 jednak, \u017ce saudyjski ksi\u0105\u017c\u0119 Muhammad bin Salman naciska na zmian\u0119 konserwatywnej polityki swojego ojca, kr\u00f3la Salmana bin 'Abd Al-’Aziza, wobec Izraela.\u00a0Bin Salman uwa\u017ca Izrael nie za wroga, ale za potencjalnego sojusznika i wierzy, \u017ce tworzenie wi\u0119zi mo\u017ce s\u0142u\u017cy\u0107 interesom gospodarczym, politycznym i bezpiecze\u0144stwa kr\u00f3lestwa.<\/span>[1]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Takie powi\u0105zania mog\u0105 by\u0107 pomocne np. w przyspieszeniu ambitnego programu rozwoju i wzrostu promowanego przez bin Salmana w ramach Wizji 2030. Mog\u0105 by\u0107 r\u00f3wnie\u017c pomocne w konfrontacji z zagro\u017ceniem ze strony Iranu, a nawet w poprawie napi\u0119tych relacji mi\u0119dzy Arabi\u0105 Saudyjsk\u0105 i USA, kt\u00f3re osi\u0105gn\u0119\u0142y nadir po zab\u00f3jstwie saudyjskiego dziennikarza D\u017camala Chaszod\u017ciego w 2019 roku.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ponadto nieformalne kontakty, kt\u00f3re mia\u0142y miejsce mi\u0119dzy tymi krajami w ostatnich latach, oraz podpisanie Porozumie\u0144 Abrahamowych mi\u0119dzy Izraelem a kilkoma krajami arabskimi, w tym Zjednoczonymi Emiratami Arabskimi, nieco naruszy\u0142y demoniczny obraz Izraela w oczach Saudyjczyk\u00f3w, zw\u0142aszcza w\u015br\u00f3d m\u0142odego pokolenia.\u00a0Intelektuali\u015bci, dziennikarze i aktywi\u015bci medi\u00f3w spo\u0142eczno\u015bciowych w kr\u00f3lestwie zacz\u0119li otwarcie wyra\u017ca\u0107 tolerancyjne, a nawet pozytywne nastawienie do Izraela, widz\u0105c pok\u00f3j z nim jako nieunikniony w tych okoliczno\u015bciach i jako niezb\u0119dny do powstrzymania ira\u0144skiego zagro\u017cenia.\u00a0Wielu kieruje r\u00f3wnie\u017c ostr\u0105 krytyk\u0119 pod adresem Palesty\u0144czyk\u00f3w, kt\u00f3rzy, jak twierdz\u0105, nie prowadz\u0105 realistycznej polityki sprzyjaj\u0105cej rozwi\u0105zaniu konfliktu z Izraelem i przywr\u00f3ceniu stabilno\u015bci w regionie.\u00a0Wiele tego przyk\u0142ad\u00f3w prezentowa\u0142 w ostatnich latach MEMRI (patrz Aneks do tego opracowania).\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Jednak pomimo rosn\u0105cej legitymizacji politycznej stosunk\u00f3w dyplomatycznych z Izraelem w ostatnim okresie, Arabia Saudyjska \u2013 kt\u00f3ra jest zasadniczo pa\u0144stwem religijnym i uwa\u017ca si\u0119 za przyw\u00f3dc\u0119 \u015bwiata islamskiego \u2013 b\u0119dzie mia\u0142a trudno\u015bci z nawi\u0105zaniem oficjalnych stosunk\u00f3w z Izraelem bez uprzedniego ustalenie zasadno\u015bci tego posuni\u0119cia z perspektywy szariatu (prawa islamskiego).\u00a0Ponadto, Porozumienia Abrahamowe, podpisane za przyzwoleniem kr\u00f3lestwa, ju\u017c w rzeczywisto\u015bci wywo\u0142a\u0142y dyskusj\u0119 na temat religijnej legitymizacji normalizacji stosunk\u00f3w.\u00a0W ramach tej debaty duchowni sprzeciwiaj\u0105cy si\u0119 Porozumieniom stwierdzili, \u017ce normalizacja stosunk\u00f3w z Izraelem jest aktem zdrady wobec Allaha i proroka Mahometa, kt\u00f3ry walczy\u0142 z \u017bydami.\u00a0<\/span>[2]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Nale\u017cy wspomnie\u0107, \u017ce orzeczenia religijne sankcjonuj\u0105ce zwi\u0105zki z Izraelem wyda\u0142 ju\u017c w latach 90. szejk 'Abd Al-’Aziz ibn Baz, kt\u00f3ry od 1993 r. do \u015bmierci w 1999 r. pe\u0142ni\u0142 funkcj\u0119 saudyjskiego muftiego. W orzeczeniach, wydanych na tle porozumie\u0144 z Oslo mi\u0119dzy Izraelem i Palesty\u0144czykami, stwierdzono, \u017ce kraj mo\u017ce podpisa\u0107 porozumienie pokojowe z \u017bydami, czyli z Izraelem, je\u015bli takie porozumienie uzna za le\u017c\u0105ce w interesie (<\/span>maslaha<\/span><\/i>) jego muzu\u0142ma\u0144skich obywateli.\u00a0Jako dow\u00f3d swojego stanowiska Ibn Baz przytoczy\u0142 Traktat Hudajbijja, podpisany przez proroka Mahometa z plemieniem Kurajszyt\u00f3w z Mekki w 628.\u00a0<\/span>[3]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Jednak starsi cz\u0142onkowie obecnego religijnego establishmentu kr\u00f3lestwa jak dot\u0105d powstrzymywali si\u0119 od zaj\u0119cia si\u0119 t\u0105 kwesti\u0105. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Je\u015bli Arabia Saudyjska zdecyduje si\u0119 podnie\u015b\u0107 poziom reprezentacji dyplomatycznej w Izraelu, b\u0119dzie potrzebowa\u0142a religijnego establishmentu, kt\u00f3ry poprze ten krok i zapewni na to sankcj\u0119 prawn\u0105.\u00a0Takie wsparcie prawdopodobnie przyjmie z zadowoleniem\u00a0<\/span>de facto<\/span><\/i>\u00a0w\u0142adca kr\u00f3lestwa, nast\u0119pca tronu Muhammad bin Salman, kt\u00f3ry wyg\u0142asza daleko id\u0105ce o\u015bwiadczenia na temat reformy religijnej jako \u015brodka post\u0119pu kr\u00f3lestwa i sprostania wyzwaniom wsp\u00f3\u0142czesno\u015bci.\u00a0W wywiadzie, kt\u00f3rego udzieli\u0142 w 2021 roku kilku saudyjskim kana\u0142om telewizyjnym, w pi\u0119\u0107 lat po rozpocz\u0119ciu Vision 2030, stwierdzi\u0142, \u017ce zawsze mo\u017cna zastosowa\u0107 niezale\u017cny os\u0105d (<\/span>ijtihad<\/span><\/i>) i interpretowa\u0107 szariat zgodnie z duchem czasu i miejsca.\u00a0<\/span>[4]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

20 czerwca 2022 r. w saudyjskiej gazecie pa\u0144stwowej \u201eAl-Jazirah\u201d ukaza\u0142 si\u0119 niezwyk\u0142y artyku\u0142 na temat religijnej legitymacji stosunk\u00f3w dyplomatycznych z Izraelem, kt\u00f3ry mo\u017ce sprzyja\u0107 zbli\u017ceniu Arabii Saudyjskiej z tym krajem.\u00a0Artyku\u0142, zatytu\u0142owany \u201e<\/span>Fiqh<\/span><\/i> [prawoznawstwo] dotycz\u0105ce\u00a0<\/span>al-siyasa al-shar’iyya <\/span><\/i>\u2013 oparta na szariacie polityka a pa\u0144stwo Izrael\u201d napisa\u0142 Chalid bin Muhammad Al-Jousuf, starszy wyk\u0142adowca prawa mi\u0119dzynarodowego na Islamskim Uniwersytecie\u00a0 Muhammada bin Sauda w Rijadzie oraz sekretarz generalny Rady Najwy\u017cszej Uniwersytetu. Twierdzi on, \u017ce w nowoczesnych czasach nast\u0105pi\u0142a znacz\u0105ca zmiana w postrzeganiu pa\u0144stwa i w regu\u0142ach gry w stosunkach mi\u0119dzynarodowych. Wed\u0142ug tych nowych regu\u0142, pisze on, Izrael jest istniej\u0105c\u0105 rzeczywisto\u015bci\u0105 tak jak ka\u017cdy inny kraj \u015bwiata i jest cz\u0142onkiem ONZ. Dlatego musi by\u0107 traktowany zgodnie z zaakceptowanymi w spo\u0142eczno\u015bci mi\u0119dzynarodowej normami. Al-Jousuf wzywa saudyjskich duchownych do ponownego zbadania sfery stosunk\u00f3w mi\u0119dzynarodowych i do sformu\u0142owania nowego religijnego pojmowania ich, zgodnego z tym nowymi normami, co umo\u017cliwi w\u0142adcy pa\u0144stwa islamskiego dokonywanie niezale\u017cnego os\u0105du i nawi\u0105zywanie wi\u0119zi z Izraelem, je\u015bli uzna, \u017ce \u200b\u200ble\u017cy to w interesie jego kraju.\u00a0Podkre\u015bla, \u017ce \u200b\u200bnormalizacja stosunk\u00f3w z Izraelem pozwoli wielu muzu\u0142manom przyjecha\u0107 i modli\u0107 si\u0119 w Jerozolimie i \u201eodbudowa\u0107 j\u0105\u201d, czego nie mo\u017cna zrobi\u0107 bez utrzymywania wi\u0119zi z Izraelem.<\/span><\/p>\n

Argumentuj\u0105c za swoim stanowiskiem, Al-Jousef przywo\u0142uje orzecznicz\u0105 zasad\u0119\u00a0<\/span>al-siyasa al-shar’iyya<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(polityka oparta na szariacie).\u00a0Ta zasada, kt\u00f3ra godzi polityk\u0119 (<\/span>siyasa<\/span><\/i>) i prawo islamskie (<\/span>szariat<\/span><\/i>), jest wa\u017cnym narz\u0119dziem religijnym, kt\u00f3re pozwala kr\u00f3lestwu saudyjskiemu zachowa\u0107 jego konserwatywny charakter, ale jednocze\u015bnie sprosta\u0107 wyzwaniom wsp\u00f3\u0142czesno\u015bci i dostosowa\u0107 swoj\u0105 polityk\u0119 do zmieniaj\u0105cych si\u0119 okoliczno\u015bci.\u00a0Zasada ta zasadniczo umo\u017cliwia islamskiemu w\u0142adcy kierowanie si\u0119 w\u0142asnym os\u0105dem w rz\u0105dzeniu pa\u0144stwem i promowaniu jego interes\u00f3w, o ile jego posuni\u0119cia nie s\u0105 ra\u017c\u0105co sprzeczne z szariatem.\u00a0<\/span>[5]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Artyku\u0142 najwyra\u017aniej ma na celu zapewnienie aprobaty orzeczniczej dla politycznego ruchu polegaj\u0105cego na utrzymywaniu stosunk\u00f3w dyplomatycznych z Izraelem przy jednoczesnym zachowaniu religijnej i teokratycznej wiarygodno\u015bci Arabii Saudyjskiej, a nawet wzmocnieniu religijnej legitymacji jej re\u017cimu.<\/span><\/p>\n

[Dalszy tekst – przegl\u0105d argument\u00f3w przedstawionych przez Al-Jousufa w jego artykule \u2013 nie jest spolszczony.]<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

Israel Is A Sovereign State And A Member Of The UN<\/b><\/p>\n

Al-Yousuf’s article begins with a short introduction which notes that, in the existing circumstances, Israel is a sovereign state recognized by the international community. He writes:<\/span><\/p>\n

„First of all, what is Israel today?<\/span><\/p>\n

„In the contemporary international community, [Israel] is a sovereign state that has the character of a state according to the modern global perception. It is a member of the UN, and since it is recognized as a state, it operates in the contemporary international community vis-\u00e0-vis all the other states, just like any other country \u2013 whether in the framework of mutual legal recognition [between it and other states], or in practice, based on reality, according to the requirements of the contemporary circumstances.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

„Examples of the first [type of recognition] are, for example, official mutual visits by state leaders, the opening of embassies, direct trade, and the like. Examples of the second [kind of ties, based on the requirements of reality are the existence of] maritime zones and airspace; the use of shipping routes; indirect trade, for example by transferring goods through third parties, in free trade zones and through [individuals with] dual citizenship; meetings between official delegations at international forums, and encounters as part of various sports events. A state cannot be part of the international community without taking an active part in international forums\u2026”\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Contemporary Perception Of The State Is Different Than It Was In The Past; We Need New Jurisprudence That Reexamines Reality<\/b><\/p>\n

Following this introduction, Al-Yousuf stresses that the modern perception of the state is different than the past perception: The state no longer represents only the ruler, but is a legal entity with commitments, duties and rights in which there is a clear legal affiliation between the authorities and the citizens. Moreover, he states, some of the familiar Islamic principles, such as the classical distinction between\u00a0<\/span>dar al-Islam<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(„the abode of Islam”),\u00a0<\/span>dar al-harb\u00a0<\/span><\/i>(„the abode of war”) and\u00a0<\/span>dar al-’ahd\u00a0<\/span><\/i>(„the abode of covenant”),<\/span>[6]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0 are not relevant to international relations in the modern world. In\u00a0 light of these changes, he calls to examine reality from a broad perspective and draw up a new jurisprudence for foreign relations while still conforming to the principles of Islam and preserving the essence of Islam.<\/span><\/p>\n

„Today, the state is an international legal entity that has an independent abstract identity and independent economic responsibility. This legal entity is the one that bears responsibilities, fulfills duties and obtains rights. The perception of statehood has developed considerably compared to what it was in the past. Previously, the state represented the rulers, and there was no legal association between the ruler and individual [subjects]. For example, the 'Umayyad state’ represented the Umayyad [rulers], the 'Abbasid state’ represented the 'Abbasid [rulers], and the 'Ottoman state’ represented the Ottomans. Those who lived within the boundaries of these states were subjects. Books of Islamic tradition never described any subject of these states as an Umayyad, Abbasid or Ottoman.<\/span><\/p>\n

„[In the past,] the state meant imposing a particular rule on certain territories and regions, without granting the any legal status to the individuals living in that territory or to each of the states belonging to the same Muslim region\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n

„The modern development of the concept of statehood compels us to reexamine many issues in the sphere of contemporary international relations from the perspective of jurisprudence. Among [these issues] are those of reconciliation with the enemy, neighborly relations with non-Muslims, protected peoples, individuals entitled to [temporary] protection as part of a covenant,\u00a0<\/span>jizya<\/span><\/i>, and [matters of] peace and war. These issues and others cannot be examined only through the prism of the accepted jurisprudential distinction in Islam between\u00a0<\/span>dar al-harb<\/span><\/i>,\u00a0<\/span>dar al-Islam<\/span><\/i>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>dar al-’ahd<\/span><\/i>. We must examine these issues and [formulate] a new jurisprudence that addresses reality without deviating from the objectives and principles of the Islamic laws and while preserving the essence of Islam and the five necessities of Islam\u2026<\/span>[7]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

„The modern state is now perceived as a legal entity comprising several branches [of government, namely] the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. It rules over a well-defined territory with definite boundaries and the people affiliated with it are called citizens. They are the people who legally hold its citizenship, and this is what distinguishes them from the citizens of other states. This is a significant development in the concept of the state, which was not previously known as it is today.<\/span><\/p>\n

„Whoever examines the books of jurisprudence and the books dealing with\u00a0<\/span>al-siyasa al-shar’iyya<\/span><\/i>\u00a0[i.e., shari’a-based policy] finds that these issues are addressed in the chapters dealing with interpersonal relations (<\/span>mu’amalat<\/span><\/i>), and that the guiding principle is that of permission. Therefore, all the rules regarding the governance mechanisms of the Islamic state \u2013 such as the mechanisms [regulating] the pledging of allegiance to the ruler,\u00a0<\/span>shura<\/span><\/i>\u00a0[consultation], the appointment and removal of rulers, etc. \u2013are not strict shari’a laws… This is in contrast to the chapters dealing with the relationship between man and God (’<\/span>ibadat<\/span><\/i>), with Islamic punishments, with retaliation for grave transgressions and with inheritance. The shari’a laws pertaining to these issues are strict, specific and detailed, and the guiding principle regarding them is that of prohibition.<\/span><\/p>\n

„In light of this, the clerics in general and the [religious] research centers [in particular] must reexamine the jurisprudence pertaining to the modern perception of the state and to this entire field. [They must rethink] the relevant [religious] laws from a broad and comprehensive jurisprudential perspective. For it is unreasonable to argue, for example, that relations between an Islamic country and a non-Islamic one today are completely forbidden according to the shari’a, without considering that, within an\u00a0 Islamic society, contract between a Muslim and a non-Muslim is allowed, and without considering the interest and the [potential] losses [of the Muslims] in the international arena.”\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Early Islamic Precedent: The Return of Abu Jandal To The Infidels’ Stronghold In Mecca<\/b><\/p>\n

As a precedent for his position, Al-Yousuf mentions the case of Abu Jandal bin Suhail bin 'Omar. Abu Jandal was a companion of the Prophet who converted to Islam but who was returned by the Muslims to the infidels of Mecca as part of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, signed by the Prophet with the Meccan tribe of Quraysh in 628. As part of the treaty, Muhammad agreed, inter alia, to send back any member of the Quraysh tribe who came to Al-Madina seeking to join the Muslims. Conversely, the Quraysh were not required to send back Muslims who had left the fold of Islam and returned to Mecca. Abu Jandal was one of the first members of the Quraysh tribe to embrace Islam. But before he could leave Mecca and join the Muslims, his father, Suhail bin 'Omar, who was a Qurayshi leader, imprisoned and tortured him for his decision to convert. When Abu Jandal heard that Muhammad was in Hudaybiyya, close to the city, he escaped. He arrived at the Muslim camp, still wearing his shackles, just after the signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya. His father, who was himself in Hudaybiyya as the Qurayshi representative in charge of drafting and signing the agreement, demanded that Abu Jandal be the first Qurayshi to be returned to Mecca, and Muhammad agreed to this, to the Muslims’ disappointment. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Al-Yousuf states that this decision by the Prophet to send a Muslim back to an infidel city \u2013 which carried the risk of sparking internal strife among the believers \u2013 was a demonstration of leadership and a case of making a difficult choice in order to secure a more important interest. He writes:<\/span><\/p>\n

„There is religious evidence in the books of\u00a0<\/span>siyar<\/span><\/i>\u00a0[i.e., the literature dealing with the conduct of the Islamic state vis-a-vis other communities] and in the Hadith about the Treaty of Hudaybiyya that the Muslims of Al-Madina and their allies signed with the Meccan tribe of Quraysh and its allies. One of the terms of this treaty was that the Muslims of Al-Madina would not harbor people who migrated from Mecca to Al-Madina, but [the Qurayshis] were not [required to do the same]. Accordingly, the Messenger [i.e., Muhammad] sent his honorable companion Abu Jandal bin Suhail bin 'Omar, who had fled from the Meccan polytheists and come to Al-Medina, back [to Mecca] immediately after the signing of the treaty. [Abu Jandal] returned to Mecca with the representative of the Quraysh tribe [who had come to Hudaybiyya] to draft the treaty and sign it [i.e., his father Suhail bin 'Omar]. When Abu Jandal [expressed] fear that [the Meccan polytheists] would make him stray from his religion, Allah’s Messenger told him: 'Abu Jandal, be patient and you will be rewarded [by Allah], for He has devised a salvation and a refuge for you and for those who are oppressed with you. We have made an agreement with these people [the Qurayshis] and we have a covenant with them. We will not violate [our covenant].\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

„Focusing on just one part of [the story about] the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, we see that the Muslims’ action [of taking] a person who had become one of them and sending him back to the infidels, despite his fear that he would be made to stray from his religion \u2013 [when preserving the religion is] the greatest [of the five] objectives of Islam \u2013 is a grave action that can cause division, internal strife and discord among the Muslims. But since the [Islamic] nation had a leader \u2013 [namely Muhammad], Allah’s prayers and peace be upon him \u2013 and since there were interests and principles that were more important, a Prophetic instruction was given to fulfill the terms [of the treaty] and surrender the honorable companion to the infidels of Mecca.”<\/span><\/p>\n

The Ruler May Adapt His Policy To Public Interest In Order To Defend Islam<\/b><\/p>\n

Al-Yousuf argues that the conduct of the Prophet Muhammad \u2013 who acted not just as a prophet but also as a leader with legislative and executive powers \u2013 is decisive proof that, modern rulers can also employ [the principles of]\u00a0<\/span>al-siyasa al-shar’iyya<\/span><\/i>\u00a0so as to promote the collective interest and defend Islam and the Muslims. He stresses that this practice follows the example set by the Prophet in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, thus underscoring the religious legitimacy of the state authorities and their decisions: „There is no doubt that, in his handling of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, [Muhammad], Allah’s prayers and peace be upon him, exercised [not only his religious authority but] also his legislative and executive authority, for he was both\u00a0 the Messenger [of Allah] and the leader of the [Muslim] nation. This is decisive proof that the leader of the Muslims and the commander of the nation governs his state and his subjects according to\u00a0<\/span>al-siyasa al-shar’iyya<\/span><\/i>\u00a0and [the principles of] international relations, in the way he believes will serve [their] clear interests. In this manner he safeguards the religion and defends the Muslim collective. Peace reigns, commerce thrives and mosques are built. In this manner he follows the example of Allah’s Messenger, who signed the 10-year Treaty of Hudaybiyya with the infidel Qurayshis, until [the treaty] was violated by allies of the Quraysh. This treaty provided security, peace and stability for all sides. Each was allowed to enter the territory of the other, act there directly, and safeguard the collective interest, especially the interests of commerce, so as to secure the trade caravans in summer and winter in a general atmosphere of security, peace and stability. Furthermore, the Islamic state in Al-Madina could concentrate on uniting its ranks, arranging its internal affairs and strengthening its forces in general.” \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Today International Relations Are Conducted In The Framework Of The UN; 'Dar Al-Harb’ Is An Irrelevant Concept<\/b><\/p>\n

Al-Yousuf goes on to say that the rules of the game in international relations have changed in the modern era, so that Islamic concepts like\u00a0<\/span>dar al-harb<\/span><\/i>\u00a0[territories not under Islamic rule, which must be conquered by force of arms] are no longer relevant. Today the principles underpinning international relations are the ones set out by the UN, and all states must comply with them. He therefore reiterates his call to formulate a comprehensive religious perception of the state and of international relations that safeguards the interests of the Muslims while preserving the basic principles of Islam.<\/span><\/p>\n

„If we examine our current reality we will find that [the concept of]\u00a0<\/span>dar al-harb<\/span><\/i>\u00a0in its Islamic and jurisprudential sense is no longer implemented today. The fact that it is not implemented does not mean that the shari’a laws pertaining to it are abolished, but only that they are not applied to modern states because this term is not used in the modern international community. Modern states interact through contracts, charters, agreements and alliances. These can be collective, like the UN Charter, which is the founding document of the UN, [an organization] that encompasses all the world countries. According to this charter, states have rights and duties towards the UN, towards the international community and towards each other\u2026 Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to sign the UN Charter, and it is therefore a founding member [of this organization]. King Faisal signed the charter as a founding member already on June 26, 1945 in a ceremony that took place in San Francisco.<\/span><\/p>\n

„Relations between states can hold on the regional level, through membership in regional international organizations like the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council, or in international organizations dealing with specific [fields], like the World Trade Organization. A state can also maintain exclusive ties with one other state, for instance by recognizing it or holding diplomatic or consular relations with it\u2026 Such recognition [actually] requires establishing bilateral relations, a [mutual] opening of embassies, mutual visits and respect for the interests of both sides.\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

„An in-depth examination of the reality in the modern international community reveals that a state, in addition to being a legal entity, may not violate modern international law\u2026 For example, it may not hijack planes, trains or ships in another country, and if it does so, it incurs international condemnation. In addition, no country may interfere in the private affairs of another, for instance in [matters of] public institutions, legislation, road construction, etc. This can be done only with the consent of the relevant country.<\/span><\/p>\n

„In other words, in the current reality, states have become almost similar to human beings. They have a juridical personality that endows them with rights and duties. Thus, the state as a state, can make considerations. It considers [its] interests and actualizes them, identifies [possible] losses and prevents them, and, when necessary, expresses its approval as a state.<\/span><\/p>\n

„We therefore need a broader jurisprudential shari’a-based perception of the concept of the state and its collective regional or exclusive relations in the modern era\u2026 that actualizes the clear interests of the state and its citizens as part of the international community. [And] all this in a manner that is not at odds with the absolute principles of the shari’a, and its principal objectives of ensuring people’s wellbeing, preserving the [Islamic] religion and the observance of its rituals.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Israel Is One Of The States Of The International Community; It Is The Prerogative Of Leader To Decide On The Establishment Of Relations With It<\/b><\/p>\n

Al-Yousuf concludes his article by stating that Israel is part of the international community, and therefore the leader is entitled to employ judgement and determine whether or not to establish diplomatic relations with it: „Finally, let me say that Israel is a state within the international community, whether we like it or not, [for] UN Resolution 273 of May 11, 1949 granted its request for UN membership. This resolution was passed after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 69, of March 4, 1949 [which recommended to admit Israel as a member]. The international community thus regards Israel today as a full member. For an Islamic state, establishing ties with it is part of general political practice and of handling the affairs of the nation in a manner that benefits it. This is the prerogative of the ruler, based on what he believes serves the individual and collective interest.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

„So many Muslims wish to come and pray in Jerusalem and rebuild it. In the present circumstances, this cannot be done without holding contacts with the state of Israel, and here it is up to the Islamic\u00a0 ruler to assess the interests and losses [involved], far from the path of prohibitions and the brandishing of bombastic slogans.<\/span><\/p>\n

„Allah knows best my intentions.” \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Appendix: MEMRI Reports On Saudi Media Discourse Concerning Israel<\/b><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 10027\u00a0– Saudi Analyst In Article On Al-Arabiya Website: Solution To Palestine Problem Is Naturalizing Palestinians In Jordanian Kingdom That Includes Gaza, West Bank; It’s Time For The Palestinians To Accept Reality, Focus On Living Their Lives \u2013 June\u00a021, 2022<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 10002,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Political Scientist: Refusal To Compromise, Which Characterizes Arab Political Culture, Is Detrimental To Arab Interests, And Especially To Palestinian Cause<\/span><\/a>, June 7, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 9680,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Writer: War With Israel Not An Option; Palestinians Must Renew Negotiations Under Arab, Gulf Aegis<\/span><\/a>, December 13, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 9463 –\u00a0Saudi Journalists Encourage Local Judoka Al-Qahtani To Show Up For Match With Israeli Opponent \u2013 July 26, 2021<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 9269,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Journalist: Arabs And Jews Should Stop Fighting, Start Cooperating<\/span><\/a>, April 1, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 9100,\u00a0<\/span>Senior Lebanese Columnist In Saudi Daily: The Arab Countries Cannot Be Expected To Sacrifice Their National Interests For The Palestinian Cause<\/span><\/a>, December 21, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 9052 – Saudi Journalist In Message To Iran Following Normalization Agreements With Israel: Iran, Not Israel, Is The Enemy Of The Arabs, Destabilizes The Region \u2013 November 23, 2020<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8965,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Journalist: Peace With Israel Is A Necessity, Not A Choice; Turkey And Iran Are A Greater Threat Than Israel<\/span><\/a>, October 13, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8942,\u00a0<\/span>Editor Of Saudi Daily: Normalization With Israel Is The Arabs’ Only Option<\/span><\/a>, September 22, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8924,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Columnist: Palestinians Have No Right To Judge Arab Countries Wishing To Normalize Relations With Israel<\/span><\/a>, September 9, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8898,\u00a0<\/span>Senior Saudi Journalist Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashed: Every Arab Country Is Entitled To Establish Relations With Israel; Qatar, A Critic Of The UAE-Israel Agreement, Has Maintained Relations With Israel Since 1996 \u2013 Even Hosting Shimon Peres When It Served Its Political Purposes<\/span><\/a>, August 17, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8893,\u00a0<\/span>Reactions To Israel-UAE Normalization Agreement: Senior Saudi Journalist Praises It, Qatari Press Vehemently Attacks It<\/span><\/a>, August 14, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8742,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Writer Abdulhameed Al-Ghobain: Saudis Care About National Interests, Not About The Palestinian Cause; Our Relations With Israel Are Warm, Have Gone Beyond Normalization<\/span><\/a>, May 11, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1510,\u00a0<\/span>Saudis, Palestinians Clash On Twitter Over Status Of Palestinian Cause, Normalization With Israel<\/span><\/a>, May 5, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8705,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Columnist: A Real Bid For Peace With Israel Requires Acknowledging The Jewish Tragedy In The Holocaust<\/span><\/a>, April 20, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8540,\u00a0<\/span>Senior Saudi Journalist Following Meeting Between Leaders Of Sudan And Israel: Sudan’s Action Is Understandable; Many Arab Countries Hold Ties With Israel<\/span><\/a>, February 6, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8533,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Writers To Palestinians: Accept Trump’s Peace Plan, Or You’ll Regret It Later<\/span><\/a>, January 31, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8201,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Twitter Users Respond To Attack On Pro-Israel Saudi Blogger At Al-Aqsa Mosque: This Is Bullying And Ingratitude; We Are Entitled To Normalize Relations With Israel; Jordan’s Custodianship Of Al-Aqsa Should Be Terminated<\/span><\/a>, July 29, 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8151,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Intellectual: The Palestinians Forfeited An Important Opportunity By Boycotting Bahrain Economic Workshop<\/span><\/a>, July 2, 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8052,\u00a0<\/span>Chief Editor Of Saudi 'Al-Jazirah’ Daily: Do Not Reject The 'Deal Of The Century’ In Advance; There Is Need For Concessions By Both Sides<\/span><\/a>, May 13, 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8260 –\u00a0Saudi Writers Attack Hizbullah: It Initiated The Military Escalation Vis-\u00e0-vis Israel To Serve Iran, Is Devastating Lebanon<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 September 5, 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 8247 –\u00a0Senior Saudi Journalist 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashed: Israel’s Attacks On Iran’s Proxies In Syria, Iraq And Lebanon Play A Huge Role In The Struggle Against This Country; Relentless Pressure On Iran May Bring About Its Defeat<\/span><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 August 27, 2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

* Y. Yehoshua is Vice President for Research and Director of MEMRI Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[1]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Bin Salman made these statements in a March 3, 2022 interview with the\u00a0<\/span>Atlantic<\/span><\/i>\u00a0magazine. See MEMRI\u00a0Special Dispatch No. 9822,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Dailies Publish Full Transcript Of Saudi Crown Prince Bin Salman’s Interview With 'The Atlantic’: Wahhabi Islam Is Not Synonymous With Saudi Arabia; Social And Cultural Reforms Serve Our Interest; We Oppose A Weak Nuclear Deal With Iran; Israel Is Not An Enemy<\/span><\/a>, March 11, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI reports: Special Dispatch No. 9173,\u00a0<\/span>Fatwa Signed By Over 200 Mauritanian Muslim Clerics: Normalization With Israel Is 'A Betrayal Of Allah, His Messenger And The Muslims’; Jihad Against Israel Is A Religious Duty<\/span><\/a>, February 9, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

Special Dispatch No. 9073,\u00a0<\/span>Senior Member Of International Union Of Muslim Scholars In Antisemitic Article Against Normalization With Israel: Muhammad Expelled The Jews From His Territory By Force<\/span><\/a>, December 7, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Clip No. 7780,\u00a0<\/span>Sudanese Islamic Scholar Abd Al-Hayy Yousuf following the Netanyahu-Burhan Meeting: Normalization with Israel Is Treason against Allah and His Messenger<\/span><\/a>, February 3, 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Ibn Baz\u2019s fatwa in Arabic is available\u00a0<\/span>here<\/span><\/a>. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[4]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0See MEMRI\u00a0Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1575,\u00a0<\/span>Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s Far-Reaching Statements On Religion Herald Further Reforms In The Kingdom<\/span><\/a>, May 4, 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

[5]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0On the principle of\u00a0<\/span>al-siyasa al-shar\u2019iyya<\/span><\/i>, see: Muhammad Al-’Atawneh (2001), „”<\/span>Siyasa Shar’iyya as a Mechanism of<\/span><\/i>\u00a0Stabilizing Government and Society in Saudi Arabia,”\u00a0<\/span>Jama’a<\/span><\/i>\u00a08, pp. 54\u201483.<\/span><\/p>\n

[6]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Dar al-Islam<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(„the abode of Islam”) is territory under Islamic rule;\u00a0<\/span>dar al-harb<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(„the abode of war”) is territory not under Islamic rule, which must be conquered by force, i.e., though jihad, and\u00a0<\/span>dar al-’ahd<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(„the abode of covenant”) is territory inhabited by non-Muslims communities that have made a covenant with the Muslims guaranteeing them security.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0The five necessities of the shari’a are safeguarding the religion, life, intellect, property and progeny.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Przed wizyt\u0105 prezydenta USA Bidena na Bliskim Wschodzie, zaplanowan\u0105 na po\u0142ow\u0119 lipca 2022 r., w mediach ponownie pojawi\u0142y si\u0119 spekulacje na temat mo\u017cliwej normalizacji stosunk\u00f3w mi\u0119dzy Arabi\u0105 Saudyjsk\u0105 a Izraelem.\u00a0Tajne kontakty mi\u0119dzy krajami trwaj\u0105 od jakiego\u015b czasu, ale Arabia Saudyjska jak dot\u0105d powstrzymywa\u0142a si\u0119 od przy\u0142\u0105czenia si\u0119 do niekt\u00f3rych swoich sojusznik\u00f3w w podpisaniu porozumienia pokojowego […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":17613,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824,826,835,837],"tags":[885],"class_list":["post-17612","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-specjalne-komunikaty","category-arabia-saudyjska","category-archiwum","category-kraje","tag-arabia-saudyjska"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17612","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17612"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17612\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17614,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17612\/revisions\/17614"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/17613"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17612"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17612"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17612"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}