{"id":16339,"date":"2021-10-01T18:14:43","date_gmt":"2021-10-01T16:14:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/?p=16339"},"modified":"2021-10-01T18:15:17","modified_gmt":"2021-10-01T16:15:17","slug":"czlonek-partii-sily-libanskie-hezbollah-jest-czescia-islamskiej-rewolucji-iranu-chce-zmienic-character-libanu-wspolistnienie-z-nim-jest-niemozliwe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/czlonek-partii-sily-libanskie-hezbollah-jest-czescia-islamskiej-rewolucji-iranu-chce-zmienic-character-libanu-wspolistnienie-z-nim-jest-niemozliwe\/16339","title":{"rendered":"Cz\u0142onek partii Si\u0142y Liba\u0144skie: Hezbollah jest cz\u0119\u015bci\u0105 islamskiej rewolucji Iranu, chce zmieni\u0107 character Libanu; wsp\u00f3\u0142istnienie z nim jest niemo\u017cliwe"},"content":{"rendered":"

31 sierpnia 2021 r. ira\u0144ski prezydent Ebrahim Raisi wys\u0142a\u0142 list do sekretarza generalnego Hezbollahu, Hassana Nasrallaha, dzi\u0119kuj\u0105c mu za gratulacje z okazji wyboru Raisiego na prezydenta i chwal\u0105c Hezbollah i jego dzia\u0142alno\u015b\u0107, kt\u00f3ra, jak napisa\u0142, „nie ogranicza si\u0119 d\u0142u\u017cej do Libanu i Palestyny”. W li\u015bcie Raisi por\u00f3wna\u0142 Hezbollah do drzewa wydaj\u0105cego owoce \u2013 m\u0142odych wojownik\u00f3w d\u017cihadu i \u201ckrew m\u0119czennik\u00f3w oporu\u201d \u2013 i nazwa\u0142 Hezbollah \u201cnadziej\u0105 ca\u0142ego islamskiego narodu\u201d oraz regionaln\u0105 si\u0142\u0105, kt\u00f3rej wp\u0142yw jest taki, \u017ce \u201e\u017caden czynnik polityczny, wojskowy lub odpowiedzialny za bezpiecze\u0144stwo w regionie lub na \u015bwiecie nie mo\u017ce go ignorowa\u0107”. Doda\u0142, \u017ce Hezbollah „mo\u017ce stanowi\u0107 unikatowy model polityczny, dzia\u0142aj\u0105cy zgodnie z religijnymi zasadami i dyrektywami najwy\u017cszego przyw\u00f3dcy Iranu, Alego Chameneiego”<\/a>[1]<\/strong><\/a>.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

Ten list wywo\u0142a\u0142 reakcj\u0119 Charlesa D\u017cabboura, szefa departamentu medi\u00f3w i komunikacji partii Samira Geagei, Si\u0142y Liba\u0144skie, znanego z opozycji wobec Hezbollahu. W artykule opublikowanym w liba\u0144skiej gazecie\u00a0\u201c<\/em>Al-Jumhouriyya\u201d, kt\u00f3ra identyfikuje si\u0119 z t\u0105 parti\u0105, napisa\u0142, \u017ce list Raisiego dowodzi raz jeszcze, \u017ce Hezbollah otrzymuje rozkazy od najwy\u017cszego przyw\u00f3dcy Iranu, stanowi integraln\u0105 cz\u0119\u015b\u0107 islamskiej rewolucji Iranu i dzia\u0142a na rzecz cel\u00f3w Iranu, z kt\u00f3rych jednym jest zamiana Libanu z \u015bwieckiego pa\u0144stwa w pa\u0144stwo religijne. D\u017cabbour podkre\u015bli\u0142, \u017ce jest to sprzeczne z konstytucj\u0105 Libanu, kt\u00f3ra definiuje Liban jako pluralistyczne pa\u0144stwo \u015bwieckie. Dlatego, powiedzia\u0142, nie ma \u017cadnego sposobu na koegzystencj\u0119 z Hezbollahem i utrzymanie stabilno\u015b\u0107 w kraju w jego obecno\u015bci. Wed\u0142ug D\u017cabboura, list Raisiego opisuje Hezbollah jako narz\u0119dzie do ustanowienia islamskiego narodu i wyst\u0105pienia przeciwko Izraelowi. To, powiedzia\u0142, zadaje k\u0142am twierdzeniu, jakie Hezbollah szerzy\u0142 przez lata, a mianowicie, \u017ce walczy z Izraelem, by broni\u0107 suwerenno\u015bci Libanu. Pokazuje to, \u017ce w rzeczywisto\u015bci Hezbollah walczy z Izraelem jako cz\u0119\u015b\u0107 wielkiego ira\u0144skiego programu.<\/em><\/p>\n

Nale\u017cy zauwa\u017cy\u0107, \u017ce ten artyku\u0142 jest cz\u0119\u015bci\u0105 rosn\u0105cej krytyki g\u0142oszonej wobec Hezbollahu przez jego przeciwnik\u00f3w w Libanie, kt\u00f3rzy uwa\u017caj\u0105 go za narz\u0119dzie ira\u0144skiego re\u017cimu, naruszaj\u0105ce suwerenno\u015b\u0107 Libanu. <\/em><\/p>\n

\"Charles
Charles D\u017cabbour (\u0179r\u00f3d\u0142o: Al-Jumhouriyya, Liban)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[Dalszy tekst \u2013 fragmenty artyku\u0142u D\u017cabboura \u2013 nie jest spolszczony]\u00a0 <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The following are excerpts from Jabbour’s article:<\/em><\/a>[2]<\/em><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

„The letter Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah received from Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in response to [the former’s] words of congratulation upon [that latter’s] election to the presidency is significant in many ways. Its importance lies in the fact that it underscores what is already known and presents the Iranian perception of Hizbullah, this time in statements by the Iranian president himself\u2026<\/p>\n

„What does [this] letter include?\u2026 First of all, [by stating that Hizbullah is the hope of the Islamic nation, the letter] clearly indicates that that the Islamic nation relies upon the Islamic resistance, i.e., upon Hizbullah, to realize the program of the Islamic nation\u2026 But this role contradicts the Lebanese constitution, as well as the pluralist character of the state and its historical role.<\/p>\n

„Second, [Raisi’s statement] that 'in accordance with the political instructions of the Exalted Imam Khamenei, the Islamic resistance [Hizbullah] can constitute a unique political model operating according to the religious principles\u2026’ indicates two things. First, that the Islamic resistance, i.e., Hizbullah, receives orders from Imam Khamenei, namely from outside Lebanon, which contravenes the [Lebanese] constitution, the role of the state and [Lebanon’s] sovereignty. Second, that Iran is interfering in Lebanon’s affairs and openly calling to establish a religious regime in [the country], when Lebanon is a civil state and any attempt to change its identity is [in fact] an attempt to perpetrate a coup\u2026<\/p>\n

„Furthermore, Raisi stresses [in his letter] that the Islamic resistance is not confined to a limited area [region, i.e., „Lebanon and Palestine,” as Raisi wrote in his letter], which means that he does not recognize states and their sovereignty. The phrase he used [in the letter, namely], 'the geographical [scope] of the Islamic resistance,’ has many meanings, the most prominent of which is that this resistance has a geographical [scope] of its own that does not recognize the existing geographical [national boundaries]. This is part of its ambition of [establishing] the Islamic nation\u2026 In other words, the role of the resistance is determined by Tehran. This is known, of course, but the public declaration [of this fact] is important, and has further significance, as follows:<\/p>\n

„1. The decision that Hizbullah has a central role in the ambition of establishing the Islamic nation originated in Tehran.<\/p>\n

„2. Hizbullah’s main role contravenes the Lebanese constitution and the existence of Lebanon as a\u00a0fait accompli<\/em>.<\/p>\n

„3. Hizbullah is an integral part of the Iranian program and revolution. Its source of authority is in Tehran and that is where its decisions are made.<\/p>\n

„4. Hizbullah’s decisions on Lebanese affairs are made by [Hizbullah] itself, whereas the decisions regarding the Islamic nation and [Hizbullah’s] role in spreading the [Iranian] revolution are made exclusively by Tehran.<\/p>\n

„5. Hizbullah draws a distinction between its temporary role in the domestic Lebanese arena and its strategic role of Islamizing Lebanon.<\/p>\n

„6. Hizbullah’s inner beliefs and orientations are Islamic and contravene the civil character of the Lebanese state and the existence of Lebanon as a\u00a0fait accompli<\/em>.<\/p>\n

„Also conspicuous is the way the Iranian president addresses Hizbullah’s secretary-general, [namely, as] 'my dear brother, Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin<\/a>[3]<\/a>\u00a0Sayyid<\/a>[4]<\/a>\u00a0Hassan Nasrallah’\u2026 This indicates Nasrallah’s important place in the chain of command of the Iranian revolution\u2026<\/p>\n

„Raisi ascribes no importance at all to Lebanon. He sees it merely as Hizbullah’s sphere of influence, not as an independent entity, and focuses exclusively on Hizbullah’s role as one of the fruits of the Iranian revolution. [This is evident from the fact that] he wrote in his letter that 'the role of the Islamic resistance, namely Hizbullah, in ensuring security [and] confronting the state-terror (of Israel) and the\u00a0takfiri<\/em>\u00a0terror [i.e., of extremist Islamic organizations that accuse fellow Muslims of heresy] has turned this revolutionary jihad-fighting current into an influential element in the regional equations, so much so that no political, military or security element, including even global powers, can ignore it’\u2026<\/p>\n

„In light of all the above and in light of Raisi’s letter to Nasrallah, the question is this: How can a state\u00a0 be built and how can coexistence and stability be maintained in the presence of a political group [i.e., Hizbullah] that believes in a religious [Shi’ite Iranian] program that fundamentally contravenes the Lebanese program and forms an integral part of the Iranian revolution…<\/p>\n

„Raisi’s statements refute the narrative Hizbullah tried to market after the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon [in 2005, namely] that its role is limited to resisting Israel and establishing a balance of terror vis-\u00e0-vis [this country] so as to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty \u2013 when [the fact is that] its confrontation with Israel is part of the Iranian program. In order to ease the Lebanese pressure on it, Hizbullah had no choice but to make the excuse that its weapons are meant to deter Tel Aviv, which cannot be deterred with the ordinary weapons [of the Lebanese army, especially] since the U.S. refuses to arm Lebanon…<\/p>\n

„Now that the Iranian president has once again highlighted what was already known \u2013 Hizbullah’s\u00a0 Iranian identity and its religious program \u2013 we can once again ask the questions: Is it possible to reach understandings with a party that does not believe in Lebanon, which promotes a program that is larger than Lebanon and which seeks to change the character of the Lebanese regime from a civil rule into a religious one — especially considering that [Hizbullah’s] weapons are an organic part of [Iran’s] revolutionary and ideological program? The answer is unequivocal: there is no way to reach any understandings with Hizbullah. The upshot is that the conflict will go on and on, and each phase will look different [from the last], until Hizbullah manages to change Lebanon’s character and role and turn it into an Islamic state. Alternatively, perhaps the domestic or foreign opposition to [Hizbullah’s] program\u2026 will compel it to turn back and accept Lebanon’s historical role, its neutral identity, its sovereignty, its very existence as a\u00a0fait accompli<\/em>\u00a0and the fact that the state is an arena shared by all Lebanese.”<\/p>\n

\n

<\/a>[1]<\/a>\u00a0Alahednews.com.lb, September 1, 2021.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[2]<\/a>\u00a0Al-Jumhouriyya<\/em>\u00a0(Lebanon), September 3, 2021.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[3]<\/a>\u00a0Title of a senior Islamic jurisprudent.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[4]<\/a>\u00a0Title denoting people accepted as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

31 sierpnia 2021 r. ira\u0144ski prezydent Ebrahim Raisi wys\u0142a\u0142 list do sekretarza generalnego Hezbollahu, Hassana Nasrallaha, dzi\u0119kuj\u0105c mu za gratulacje z okazji wyboru Raisiego na prezydenta i chwal\u0105c Hezbollah i jego dzia\u0142alno\u015b\u0107, kt\u00f3ra, jak napisa\u0142, „nie ogranicza si\u0119 d\u0142u\u017cej do Libanu i Palestyny”. W li\u015bcie Raisi por\u00f3wna\u0142 Hezbollah do drzewa wydaj\u0105cego owoce \u2013 m\u0142odych wojownik\u00f3w […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":16341,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[824,827,835,837],"tags":[869,891,940],"class_list":["post-16339","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-specjalne-komunikaty","category-iran","category-archiwum","category-kraje","tag-iran","tag-palestynskie","tag-ebrahim-raisi"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16339","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16339"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16339\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16342,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16339\/revisions\/16342"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/16341"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16339"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16339"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www2.memri.org\/polish\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16339"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}